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ABSTRACT 
A radical argument is presented that it is plausible to look 
at the condition of mental handicap as entailing dynamic 
cognitive processes which may be available to some degree of 
therapeutic intervention at a fundamental level. 
An overview of some broad aspects of mental handicap is 
presented and it is argued that much of the subject of mental 
handicap is based on assumptions which may not be justified. 
On the assumption that in normal infancy play is a powerful 
medium for promoting developmental change, aspects of the 
mentally handicapped child's inability to play is examined and 
discussed. This is done by adopting the Piagetian notion of 
decentration and showing how the concept has explanatory value 
for looking at change in the severely, or profoundly mentally 
handicapped child. A model of aspects of the process is developed 
and implemented as a computer simulation. This model entails he 
processes of "Integration and Differentiation" of hierarchical 
chunks. 
The prospects and usefulness of a developmental curriculum 
as a framework within which to work with the profoundly and 
severely mentally retarded is discussed. The notions of 
Integration and Differentiation are applied to systems of 
sensori-motor competence and presented as a candidate for a 
curriculum. A presentation of the Uzgiris & Hunt scales serves to 
provide the user with the means to understand where the child is 
"at" in the curriculum. 
The computer simulation is further developed to show how it 
could be extended to provide explanations for the effects of 
success and failure upon developmental process. The model 
provides an insight into the nature of stereotypy and the 
implications of the model are explored in a therapy undertaked 
with a mentally handicapped and withdrawn child. The relationship 
between the understanding gained here and the processes of normal 
mothering is introduced. 
The theme of the mothering process is develcped apd explored 
as a means of providing the mentally Nandi Gaped child with the 
experience of success that section 3 suggests is the means for 
promoting change. This is demonstrated via several case accounts. 
The transactional interface between the intractable organic and 
the potentially more plastic cognitive/social process is 
tentatively explored by a discussion of "eye contact". Finally 
an evaluative framework for the possible implications of the 
work are discussed. 
PREFACE 
The work I present in this thesis began with a preoccupation 
with the nature of structural psychological change that I had 
acquired as an undergraduate. I had the opportunity to develop 
this preoccupation when I began work at the department of 
psychology at Leavesden Hospital, for there lived some 150 
mentally handicapped children, few of whome had any language. 
Language acquisition was an example par exallence of the type of 
structural change that I was interested in. 
Although my interest was in language acquisition per se, in 
trying to answer the question "Why can't these children talk? " it 
soon became apparent that a more usefull question to ask from my 
perspective was "Why can't these children play? " I felt that were 
it possible to answer this question then it might be possible to 
enable the same sort of acquisitional process that operates in 
normal children. This thesis represents my attempt to understand 
the problem of playlessness. 
During the course of this enterprise I have become 
increasingly aware that this work was not a solitary 
individualistic effort and that the resulting thesis is a 
culmination of the influences and joint efforts of many people. 
I would like to express my warm thanks to Patrick Humphreys 
for his considerable advice, help, and guidance over a number of 
years; Roger Ramsden for making the project possible and for his 
continual support over the years; and Hywet Francis and his staff 
at Springfield School for adopting me as their "tame" 
psychologist. Particularity I would like to thank Chris Woods, 
who provided the material for "Candy" and the structured play, 
Denise Wallace and Marian Davies for their work with Judy - 
Marian was also involved in the "mothering" project. 
Many other have helped; Brenda Nicholls provided patient 
secretarial support; Gerry Choo and Ayleen Wishuda provided 
computer help when otherwise I would have despaired; the 
Technicians at Brunel Psychology department have, with good 
humour, provided invaluable support; others, too numerous to 
mention, have listened patiently and supportively and provided 
invaluable feedback about my enterprise. 
Finally I should mention Rosemary and Growly for providing a 
'background of safety" and the children of Leavesden for teaching 
me so much. 
It is customary for authors to absolve all those who have 
helped them from responsibility for errors etc. However, since 
this enterprise is a really a group effort, responsibility for 
errors, misconceptions, etc., should be shared by all those 
involved. 
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OVERVIEW. 
In this work I shall be presenting a tentative and radical 
approach to understanding mental handicap. I shall be arguing 
that it is plausible to look at the condition as entailing 
dynamic cognitive processes which may be available to some degree 
of therapeutic intervention at a fundamental level. 
In Chapter 1 (Introduction) I shall present an overview of 
some broad aspects of mental handicap and argue that much of the 
subject of mental handicap is based on assumptions which may not 
be justified. 
In section 1 (Chapters 2,3, & 4), operating with the 
assumption that in normal infancy play is a powerful medium for 
promoting developmental change, I shall examine aspects of the 
mentally handicaped child's inability to play. I do this by 
adopting the Piagetian notion of decentration and showing how the 
concept has explanatory value for looking at change in the 
severely, or profoundly mentaly handicaped child. I develop a 
model of aspects of the process and present an implementation of 
the model as a computer simulation. This model entails he 
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processes of "Integration and Differentiation". 
In section 2 (Chapters, 5,6, &7) I examine the prospects and 
usefulness of a developmental curriculum as a framework within 
which to work with the profoundly and severely mentally retarded. 
I develop the notions of Integration and Differentiation (as 
developed in section 1) as applying to systems of sensori-motor 
competence, and present this as a candidate for the curriculum. I 
then describe a presentation of the Uzgiris & Hunt scales 
(Appendix 1) which are intended to provide the user with the 
means to understand where the child is "at" in the curriculum. 
In section 3 (Chapters, 7,8, &9. ) I take up again the model 
developed in section 1, and show how it can be extended to 
provide explanations for the effects of success and failure upon 
developmental process. The model provides an insight into the 
nature of stereotypy and the implications of the model are 
explored in a therapy undertaked with a mentally handicaped and 
withdrawn child. The relationship between the understanding 
gained here and the processes of normal mothering is introduced. 
Finally, in section 4 (Chapters 10,11, & 12) the theme of 
the mothering process is developed and explored as a means of 
providing the mentally handicaped child with the experience of 
success that section 3 suggests is the means for promoting 
change. This is demonstrated via several case accounts. The 
interface between the intractable organic and the potentially 
more plastic cognitive/social process is tentatively explored by 
a discussion of "eye contact". The final chapter evaluates and 
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explores the possible implications of the work. 
CHAPTER 1... LOOSENING UP 
The gate porter of a large institution for the mentally 
handi capped once said to me, "You can't put in what God left 
out". This remark seems to encapsulate a whole range of 
assumptions made about the nature of mental handicap and the 
plight of the mentally handicapped person. These assumptions are 
versions of the basic notion that the condition is permanent and 
not am menable to change. 
The aim of this work is to entertain the possibility that 
the pessimism is unjustified and to present a plausible and 
certainly optimistic attempt at understanding what is mental 
handicap. To say that an explanation is plausible is not to say 
that it is the only explanation, let alone a correct 
explanation. However, when such an explanation is given a serious 
hearing (assuming it is worth a hearing) its faults and deficits 
may prompt the reader to set about making his or her own 
explanations. 
I believe that attempts to promote understanding of mental 
handicap in terms of pathologies of functional processes will 
serve to generate therapeutic practices which will at least 
reduce the severity of the conditions which come under the 
umbrella of the term "mental handicap". 
I do not claim that mental handicap is 
curable but it is worth bearing in mind that the use of the word 
"curable" is a statement about the state of professional 
knowledge, rather than information about the condition. C See 
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Cantor, 1961) 
Pessimism and the chronic psychiatric patient. One of the 
implications of this is that understanding mental handicap 
entails not just understanding the plight of the individual 
person but extends to understanding the social nexus of which his 
plight is a focus. This nexus includes his family, of which more 
later, but also the knowledge and practice of the various 
professional groups who specialise in mental handicap and also 
the culture within which they operate. 
This statement may be further illuminated by considering how 
the inviduous influence of pessimism operates in the neighbouring 
field of general psychiatry. Clare Benedek(1980) makes a useful 
distinction between what she terms the "fast flow" Psychiatry of 
the outpatient clinic and admission ward and the "slow flow" 
psychiatry of the chronic back ward. In fast flow psychiatry the 
patient is seen as undergoing change and his pathology, at one 
level, has a beginning, a middle, and an end. He tends to get 
better. His illness may re-occur but he is seen as being 
changeable. In the slow flow psychiatry of the back ward the 
patient is seen as being stuck in a timeless chronicity (Jones 
1974 ) where there is no change expected. Yet if such patients 
are lucky enough to be placed in a different setting in which it 
is assumed that change will occur, all else being equal, the 
patient will change and often very dramatically get better. * The 
---------------------------------------------------------------- *For instance, the self care unit at Shenley hospital, Herts, 
serves to promote the successful discharge of institutionalised 
patients by voluntary placement in an unstaffed setting where 
they contract to have concrete plans for employment etc. within 
a six month period. 
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new setting may not neccessarily have a focused therapeutic 
procedure but the effect of optimism, the assumption that change 
is possible, is subtly therapeutic. 
Within the chronic regime any attempt to produce change may 
be anathema. Many tales are told of various programs introduced 
by doctors, nurses, or psychologists, which have been sabotaged 
either deliberately, or subtly and unconsciously. 
The same tales of sabotage are recounted in hospitals for the 
mentally handicapped. The Jay report (1979) makes optimistic 
proposals about the possibility that mentally handicapped people 
can lead full and relatively independent lives by being placed 
within setting which expect change. These proposals, whatever 
their merit, have been the subject of very strong attacks from 
some members of the nursing profession, and the content of the 
attacks tends to emphasise the dependence and chronicity of the 
mentally handicapped person. Ryan and Thomas (1980) provide a 
wealth of examples of such attitudes. 
Cultural assumptions. Historically the issue of pessimism and 
optimism goes back at least to medieval times. In the days of 
Edward the Confessor there was a legal neccessity to 
differentiate between lunacy and idiocy. Lunacy was seen as a 
temporary state and the lunatics' property was managed for him 
for the duration of his illness at the end of which time his 
property and status was ceremoniously handed back to him. The 
idiot on the other hand was seen as being in a state of permanent 
irresponsibility and his property was permanently taken over. The 
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effect of this was to deprive him of his status as a member of 
his society (Louek. 1980). 
At the turn of this century the issue in this country was 
clouded by strong moralistic attitudes. Whilst this is really a 
side issue it is worthy of comment. Consider the following quote. 
The social and economic burdens of uncomp- 
licated feeble mindedness are only too well known. The 
feeble minded are a parasitic predatory class, never 
capable of self support or of managing their own 
affairs. The great majority ultimately become public 
charges in some form. They cause unutterable sorrow at 
home and are a menace and danger to the community. 
Feeble minded women are almost invariably immoral and if 
at large usually become carriers of venereal diseases or 
give birth to children who are as defective as them- 
selves..... Every feeble minded person, especially the 
high grade imbecile, is a potential criminal needing 
only the proper environment and opportunity for the 
expression of his criminal tendencies. ( Fernald 1912 - 
quoted by Sarason and Doris, 1969 ) 
It is curious that a condition of "intellectual inferiority" 
produces such a strong moralistic outburst in a professional 
person, albeit 70 years ago. It is especially interesting that 
the most dangerous members of this group are those who are 
borderline cases and who could potentially cross the boundary 
and become one of us. (c. f. Douglas 1966 ). It is also 
interesting to note that many of the attitudes expressed by 
Fernald are not uniquely addressed to mental handicap. Negroes 
and other minority groups receive very similar descriptions. 
Fernald's statement may be extreme but it still exists today in 
various forms. A benign version of the attitude is that they are 
"just like children". Here again the same statement could have 
been uttered by a benign plantation owner. The word "children" 
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has connotations of lack of moral judgement and a need for 
externally imposed moral structures, without which "normal" 
society is in danger of being polluted. The belief that certain 
minority groups are "constitutionally inferior" and constitute a 
danger to normal society underlies, I believe, much of the 
pessimism associated with mental handicap. 
The Politics of Intelligence. The Eugenics movement, fearful 
of the genetic deterioration of "normal" society, believed that 
superior intelligence could be bred, and consequently had a 
vested interest in the existence of intelligence as a unitary and 
hereditable trait. This belief was manifest in the concept of 
"G", the factor of general intelligence. The dark side of the 
Eugenics movement was manifest in the need to prohibit marriage 
in people of low intelligence, especially since it was assumed 
that they were prolific breeders. Like the negro, the mentally 
handicapped were seen to possess considerable virility and fec- 
undity. Even today marriage amongst the mentally handicapped is a 
rare event, discouraged even to the extent of needing a 
psychiatrists consent in most big institutions. It may be 
argued that the discouragement is a necessary protection for the 
children of such marriages, since the partners may not be fit 
parents. In many cases such an argument may be valid but the 
issue carries with it the undercurrents of genetic danger to the 
population. In the 1900's when the eugenic movement held some 
sway both in this country and in the United States, the Parisian 
authorities were mindful of the need to identify the 
educationally backward. The problem was given to Binet, who in 
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due course produced the first intelligence scale. The existence 
of a means of measuring abilities on an interval scale, coupled 
with a vested belief in a hereditable general factor of 
intelligence was the basis upon which the I. Q. movement grew. 
The politics of intelligence, in the form of the nature/nurture 
debate produced some spectacular controversy since the debate 
inevitably focussed on racial issues. The debate has now subsided 
for the present and many people now believe the nature/nurture 
dichotomy to be inappropriate. (However see Kamin (1977)). As 
Hebb (1949) put it. "intelligence is 100% nurture and 100% 
nature". Notwithstanding the present state of the debate, I 
suspect that most people in our culture believe in the genetic 
argument and believe in the genetic transmission of specific 
skills. Such lore is often expressed in statements of the form, 
"I don't understand where he gets it from, no one else in the 
family is artistic! ". 
Mental handicap is part of our culture and the politics of 
intelligence operates in this field too. Yet there is no public 
controversy over the nature of the condition. The assumptions 
with which lay people and professionals operate have remained 
implicit and have not been subject to public scrutiny. This lack 
of debate may be suprising in view of the policies of recent 
years whereby the mentally handicapped person is seen as being 
entitled to a place in his community and is encouraged to be an 
independent citizen. ("Better Services for the Mentally 
Handicapped" (1971)). It may be the case that our cultural 
assumptions about mental handicap are changing but I suspect that 
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the truth is closer to the idea that our culture is developing a 
benign and compassionate tolerance of people who are still seen 
as being constitutionaly inferior although they may no longer be 
seen as quite so dangerous. That is attitudes are changing rather 
than assumptions. The media, especially television, has given 
increasing coverage to the topic of mental handicap invariably 
presenting the plight of the mentally handicapped person in a 
sympathetic manner. Within the subcultures of our institutions 
for the mentally handicapped the politics are much closer to the 
surface and there is some considerable resistance to the 
possibility of change. 
When we look at specialised wards or units we often find a 
perverse pride amongst staff in the intractibility of the people 
catered for. Where a dramatic change is effected with a 
particular mentally handicapped person it often happens that that 
person is not only recategorised but that his original placement 
in that category is questioned. "That child wasn't brain damaged, 
he was autistic" is a not uncommon response to change. In a 
different setting it may take the form "That child was not a true 
autist". 
The person who choses to work with the mentally handicapped, 
whatever his profession, tends to acquire considerable social 
respect. However, this respect conveys a sham status since he is 
likely to be poorly paid whilst arousing the suspicious 
admiration of his fellow citizens. "I couldn't do what you are 
doing " expresses admiration but at the same time denigrates 
those working in the field. (G. E. Jones (op. cit. ) cites similar 
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contradictory messages given to psychiatric workers who, despite 
the remit given to them to provide care to the psychiatrically 
ill by our society, are seen as being libertarian to the point of 
being eccentric and acquire the stigma of those in their care. ) 
By investing value in the intractability of his clients, the 
worker bolsters his own status and denies the contradictions 
presented by his fellow citizens. 
Classification by intelligence. In the United States, mental 
handicap is defined as a retardation in development and bodies 
such as the National Mental Handicap Development Group (1978) 
adopt similar definitions. In contrast British administrative 
practice continues to use intelligence as a basis for 
classification upon which services are based. For instance, since 
1971, mentally handicapped children are classified as being 
"severely retarded (I. Q. < 50)" and are placed in E. S. N. (S) 
schools {Educationally subnormal(severe))- or they are classified 
as being E. S. N. (M) {moderate) (I. Q. >50, <70) and placed in 
E. S. N. (M) schools. 
If we look at the parents of children in E. S. N. (M) schools 
we find that , as a sample, they are not representative of the 
population as a whole. They are predominately of low socio- 
economic status and are usually identified as problem families. 
In contrast the parents of E. S. N. (S) school children seem to be 
more representative of the total population. The ratio of numbers 
of middle class parents to number of working class parents being 
approximately the same as the population at large. ( Kushlik and 
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Blunden, 1974 ) 
One possible implication of this is that, assuming a 
unidimensional model of intelligence, the intelligence of the 
population does not follow the theoretical Gaussian curve but is 
based on two overlapping distributions. (see fig. 1.1). One 
population expresses the normal variation in intelligence, the 
second expresses the variation of intelligence in brain damaged 
or genetically aberrant individuals. 
I Brain Damaged 
Normal ......... 
PERCENTAGE OF 
POPULATION 
100 
INTELLIGENCE QUOTIENT 
Fig 1.1 Hypothesised bimodal nature of population I. 4 
distribution. 
The picture is not so simple however. In the case of Down's 
syndrome, for instance, we find that the distribution of 
intelligence is much greater and some Down's children are of 
normal intelligence. 
Kushlick (1968) points out that if we predict, using the 
Gaussian distribution, the percentage of the school age 
population whose I. Q. 's are between 50 and 74 . we discover that 
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less than half attend the schools provided for their needs. It 
seems that many thousands of E. S. N. (M) children are attending 
ordinary schools. They may be seen as slow learners, but they are 
not Labelled as mentally handicapped. It is only when a 
particular child presents management problems for his teacher 
that he may be referred for assessment. It would seem that the 
E. S. N. (M) child is labelled as such for social behavioural 
reasons, not for intellectual reasons. His I. Q. only becomes an 
issue when he fails to function socially. 
A similar argument could be applied to the population of a 
large institution for the mentally handicapped. People are 
usually admitted to subnormality hospitals, not for reasons of 
intellectual defecit but for reasons of social maladjustment. The 
persons' intelligence only becomes an issue when the specific 
nature of his placement is considered, and even then it is rarely 
that an I. Q. test is administered, and even then it is often a 
post hoc justification for the placement that has already taken 
place. Indeed there are a few young people in subnormality 
hospitals who are of normal intelligence but who function at a 
lower level because of emotional/social reasons. Such cases 
almost invariably have a history of a childhood spent in care, 
manifesting increasing antisocial behaviour untill they are 
placed in the interim security provisions of a subnormality 
hospital. The institution is often perceived as a "bad guy" in 
these instances, particlarily by some liberal members of the 
caring professions, but this is a naive perception and if the 
institution is to be criticised it because it is not strong 
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enough to say "no" to the very strong pressures put upon it by 
the various agencies to admit such people. 
Suggesting that those children placed in E. S. N. (M) schools 
are there because of social-familial factors does not in itself 
mean that intelligence is not an issue. The fact remains that 
they are slow learners and the assumption usually made is that 
this is for intellectual/genetic reasons. This imposes an 
intractability upon the problem. 
Nature, an overstated case. R. B. McCall(1976) and S. Scarr- 
Salatapek(1976) independenly present arguments which seriously 
question the evidence for intelligence being a function of 
genetic variability. Evidence for intelligence being genetic 
usually rests upon three predictions. 
a)If a genetic factor is operating then it will operate 
throughout a persons' life. It follows that infant 
abilities will be predictive of adult abilities. 
b) The more a group of people have genetically in common 
then the greater the tendency for them to have similar 
intelligence. In practice this proposition focuses on the 
differences in I. Q. correlations in siblings, non 
identical, and identical twins. 
c) The third issue is in effect a corollary of (b) and 
focusses on the proposition that the less two groups have 
genetically in common the more dissimilar will be their 
I. Q. 's. In practice this argument manifest itself as the 
proposition that different ethnic groups have 
intrinsically different I. Q. 's and it is this issue which 
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has dominated the I. Q. contoversy 
Contrary to the first prediction infant ability is a very 
poor predictor of adult I. Q. (McCall et al. 1972) and socio 
economic status provides a far better predictor (I. Q. / S. E. S. 
correlations range from . 25 to . 50 ) There are two exceptions to 
this. Cameron et al. (1967) found that the precocious onset of 
speech in female infants correlated at . 76 with verbal I. Q. at 
the age of 26. 
Honzik et al. (1965) point out that low developmental scores 
in infancy do predict low adult intelligence, but since low 
developmental scores are those obtained by brain damaged or 
genopathic children it is hardly suprising that the pathology is 
manifest throughout a persons' life. 
The second prediction is usually taken to be supported by 
data derived from twin studies, where I. Q correlations between 
siblings, non identical, and identical twins are compared. In 
various studies (see McCall et. al., op. cit. ) the correlations 
quoted are within the ranges given in table 1.1. 
Table 1.1 Monozygotic Dizygotic Siblings 
Twins Twins 
I. Q. Correlations . 81-. 85 . 55-. 74 . 15-. 37 
The first anomaly about these figures is that the sibling 
and dizygotic twin correlations are so different. Given two 
groups with the same proportion of genetic similarity (50%) it 
would be expected that the intercorrelations would be the same 
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for the two groups. 
The second anomaly is based on a more lengthy argument. In 
the collaborative Perinatal Project, Nicholson and Broman (1974) 
found that there was a tendency for serious retardation to be 6 
to 9 times higher in twins than in single births. (They assumed a 
very conservative definition of retardation such that 1 in 10,000 
children would be retarded if the distribution of scores was 
normal). They also found that the incidence of retardation was 
twice as likely in monozygotic twins than it was in dizygotic 
twins. 
This suggests that the monozygotic twins' high correlations 
are an expression of a sizable number of the sample being in some 
way organically damaged. If the correlations are recomputed 
having discarded those subjects who are of very low intelligence 
then the difference in correlation between monozygotic and 
dizygotic twins vanishes! 
McCall explains the difference between twin correlations and 
sibling correlations by arguing that the high twin corelations 
are a function of twins being tested on the same day and by the 
same psychologist, whereas siblings are likely to be tested at 
different times and possibly by different psychologists. 
An additional explanation suggested by Nicholson and 
Broman is that twins share the same prenatal environment and that 
it is this common experience which contributes to their 
relatively high intellectual intercorrelation. 
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I doubt that this is the end of the story. As children get 
older so their verbal I. Q. 's tend to approach those of their 
biological parents. (Honzik 1957). This suggests that language is 
involved in the issue of hereditability though it does not 
necessarily follow that language is innate in the sense it seems 
that Chomsky suggests. Whatever the nature of intelligence it is 
plausible and optimistic to maintain a position which emphasises 
the plasticity of intelligence. Such a position is supported by 
the epidemiology of mental handicap and allows for considerable 
optimism as far as the moderately handicapped are concerned, 
together with the rider that it is a position which places a 
great deal of responsibility on the agencies of our society. 
Where does this leave the severely and profoundly 
handicapped, the genetically aberrant and the brain damaged? Are 
there means of understanding their problems which would allow us 
some optimism, however cautious? 
Transactional Models of Infancy 
In a study of the effects of perinatal anoxia on later 
intellectual ability, Sameroff and Chandler (1975) propose a 
"transactional model". Their work supports assertions of the 
following nature. 
An anoxic baby born to a well adjusted mother enjoying 
reasonable material security would probably not suffer any long 
term effects, but, in contrast the same baby born to an anxious 
or depressed mother suffering from considerable material hard- 
ships would suffer some long term effects in the form of some 
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intellectual deficit. 
In order to account for such differences Sameroff and 
Chandler reject simple unitary or even additive models as being 
inadequate and propose that a transactional model, though complex 
and difficult to handle, is neccessary to explain such phenomena. 
The transactional model emphasises the dynamics of the 
relationship between mother and damaged infant and entails 
recognising that the damage will have an effect on the mother. 
The extent of the effect is dependent on her psychological state. 
The mother, as affected by her baby will in turn affect the baby 
through the way she relates to him. 
The thesis presented here operates within the transactional 
framework and the basic assertion which I shall explore could be 
expressed thus.. 
A baby born brain damaged or suffering from some genetic 
anomaly is not neccessari ly mentally handicapped per se. The 
handicap is a style of relating to the world which restricts 
adaptive growth, and this style developes from the interplay 
between the organic dysfunction and the child's environment. The 
organic dysfunction then is seen, not as a static absence or Lack 
of capacity but as a set of functional disorders dynamically 
related to other functioning parts which are localised in the 
child, in his parents, in the innanimate world, and in the 
culture of which he is part. This system of interrelationships is 
not seen as being intractably fixed but is seen as being 
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potentially plastic. 
If there is any basis for such an assertion then by 
beginning to understand such a system we can entertain the 
feasabi lity of engaging in therapy with the profoundly 
handi capped. 
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CHAPTER 2 ............... PLAYLESSNESS 
Bernie is a strong hansome 16 year old boy who lives on a 
ward of a large subnormality hospital. He is an extremely helpful 
member of his community. His homecraft skills would meet the 
approval of the most fastidious matron. After meal times he 
enjoys sweeping the dining room floor, wiping table tops and 
putting chairs in order. He is industrious and has a very high 
standard of personal neatness and cleanliness. 
However, Bernie has very little language. Except in the 
swimming pool he does not play. A teacher who has known him for 
the past 10 years remembers that he played for a short time with 
a toy bus on a sloping plank. 
On one occasion the school was reorganised. Following this 
Bernie spent a week trying to reinstall his old teacher into the 
classroom. Having finally accepted his new teachers' stubborness 
Bernie turned his attention to his classmates, half of which were 
new to the class. Bernie dealt with the interlopers by 
shepherding them into a corner of the classroom and erecting a 
barricade of chairs around them. He persisted in this exercise 
for several days before finally giving in. 
During a coach outing to a nearby town along a route which 
he had travelled only a few times previously, Bernie anticipated 
several junctions by leaning over the driver and operating the 
indicator switch appropriately. 
His I. 4 is around 40, but this tells us very little about 
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him. It would seem though, given his behaviour during the 
outing, that he can learn some very complex relationships very 
rapidly. His selfcare standards are high. Although he has 
considerable dignity and is rather aloof, he enjoys adult 
company, so he doesn't really appear to be autistic. Yet he has 
little language and does not play. 
Let's speculate about how Bernie makes sense of the world. 
His use of language is very limited, so that he could be compared 
to a normal toddler. But Bernie knows a great deal more than the 
toddler, having had a great deal more experience. 
The toddler, when he acquires language, not only acquires a 
means of communicating with others but also a different means of 
structuring what he knows about his world. Indeed during his 18 
months or so he has developed successive ways of understanding 
and relating to his world, each more comprehensive and flexible 
than the last. In Piagetian theory such means are typified as 
structures inasmuch as a child's behaviour in a given context is 
a function of the interaction between the child's memory and the 
situation within which he operates. His memory is not an 
amorphous collection of previous sensations but serves to 
organise what he looks at, select appropriate actions, etc. His 
memory then serves to organise the ways in which the child 
relates to a particular experience. As a result of this 
interaction the memory is revised such that his approach to a 
similar situation will be appropriately modified. 
It would seem that Bernie somehow got stuck with a 
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particular structure and during his development he learnt to use 
this particular structure to carry far more information than do 
most children before developing a new, more powerful and flexible 
structure. For Bernie to change his model entails that he must 
restructure all the information he has acquired within the 
structure he has been evidently been using for most of the past 
18 years, which is a mamoth task. If Bernie's world behaves in a 
way that does not fit in with his model then it is far easier for 
him to actively change his world to fit into his model than to 
change his model to accomodate the changeable world. 
This reluctance to restructure seems to underly his 
inability to acquire language. Intuitively it seems plausible to 
suggest that this "stuckness" has something to do with his 
inability to play. 
Every mentally handicapped child is different, and Bernie is 
certainly enigmatic, yet his "stuckness", his inability to play 
seems to typify the problems of the severely and profoundly 
mentally handicapped. 
Whilst there is no necessity for mental handicap to be 
defined in terms of an inability to play, playlessness is a 
common feature of such children. Even the "brighter subnormal" 
child's play seems to lack the sparkle and adventure of the 
normal child. 
Playlessness is such a prominent feature of the mentally 
handicapped that understanding playlessness may help us to under- 
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stand what is the nature of mental handicap. 
Cups and lettuce leaves 
Candy is 13 years old and is seriously retarded in her 
development. When presented with a cup she picks it up and 
brings it to her mouth. By so doing she discovers whether there 
is something to drink or not. 
We can describe how she responds to a "cup on the table" 
situation through a flowchart (Fig 2.1). 
Flowcharts are a means of writing down a set of rules. If we 
wish to, we can use a flowchart to attempt to describe something 
by means of a set of rules which, if obeyed, will reproduce 
either a) the object of our description, or b) a representation 
of the object. Flowcharts use the convention of a pathway to be 
followed and additionally employ the following devices to 
represent a set of rules.. 
1) A starting point, usually represented as... START 
2) A means of knowing the sequence to follow ... given by arrows 
3) Instructions as to which direction to take if the pathway 
bifurcates..... enclosed in a lozenge shape. 
4)Instructions for actions to be operated before continuing 
along the pathway... enclosed in a rectangle. 
5)Instructions to leave the pathway when the procedure is 
complete, usually represented as.. END or EXIT 
We are of course making an assumption that Candy is 
employing such a set of rules but by describing Candy's behaviour 
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thus we can begin to understand how her behaviour developed. 
Presumably, when Candy first began to drink from a cup presented 
to her she discovered that if she continued to drink from the cup 
a point was reached when the action of drinking produced no 
results. (i. e. The cup was empty) So it was useless to carry on 
drinking. So, from her point of view, whether a cup contained 
something or not was determined by whether drinking was 
successful or not. As her abilities developed she learnt how to 
reach for and pick up the cup. This sequence of actions then 
preceded the action of drinking as is shown in fig 2.1. 
Fig 2.1 Flowchart representation of Candy's behaviour. 
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This rule for dealing with cups works very well and Candy 
has no need to change her procedure, neither has she any idea 
that other procedures are possible. From our point of view, 
though, we might say, "wouldn't it be better if she looked in the 
cup first to see if there is anything to drink this would save 
her a lot of effort in picking up empty cups"? This entails that 
Candy redefines her concept of 'empty'. How might we do this? 
Candy's teacher presented her with several cups, some were 
empty, some full of drink, and some contained lettuce leaves, 
pebbles, etc. After two such sessions where she was confronted 
with such bizzare behavior, Candy began to look inside the cups 
before attempting to drink from them, and has done so ever since. 
In order to try and understand why this procedure produced a 
change in Candy's concepts, we might further speculate about what 
Candy does when she is trying to drink a cup full of lettuce 
leaves. 
As she tries to drink she sees the lettuce leaves, i. e. she 
sees that the cup is full, but despite this her drinking 
procedure defines her cup as empty. She is confronted with a 
contradiction which she must resolve. The resolution lies in 
being able to discriminate between "full of drink" and "full of 
non drink", and this discrimination must eventually be visual. If 
this is the case then we must suppose that previously , when 
Candy drank, she was aware of seeing the contents of the cup but 
operated and relied on her rule governed procedure. Now when 
visual and procedural sets of information do not correlate she 
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now attends to the visual information about the contents of the 
cup. [Attend to visual information] is a new procedure [Look], so 
Candy's new procedure would be as represented in fig. 2.2. 
Fig 2.2 Flowchart representation of Candy's new behaviour. 
Although the flowchart suggests that the procedure entails a 
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sequence of discrete events, in practice what Candy does is much 
more fluid. Looking to see if there's a cup on the table and 
looking to see if it's full are likely to be two acts which blend 
together, "reaching and grasping" is likely to coincide with 
"looking"etc. Despite such fluidity it must however be the case 
that the components of a competence are organised sequentially. 
It would have been possible to use the same technique to 
draw Candy's attention to the visual information by, say, gluing 
Lead weights to the base of the cup so that a (heavy = full) 
assumption would be invalidated. 
Although it is possible to draw such flowcharts to describe 
our ideas about what is entailed in Candy's behaviour, we have to 
make a distinction between what she attends to in order to act 
and what she is aware of but does not use. The shifting of 
attention to another aspect of a situation (hitherto unused) is 
what Piaget termed decentration. 
3 
2 £2 2 
ABCDEF 
ACT 
Fig 2.3 Decentration 
In fig. 2.3 we have aspect "C" of a situation attended to 
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but where and "F" are also available. Given that 
"C" is attended to, some action is asserted which results in "C2" 
being attended to. This same action may result in other aspects 
which co-ocurr with "C" changing, but these aspects are not used 
or acted upon. "C2"" may become the focus of another action which 
takes us onto "C3" etc. However if the process illustrated in fig 
2.3 decentres and, "D" for instance is attended to and acted 
upon, then this would lead to a hitherto unexplored part of the 
environment. 
It would appear that children such as Candy and Bernie are 
unable to decentre, and persist in attending to elements which 
previous experience has led them to expect will work. Only when 
their ambient world is artificially manipulated, such that a 
particular sequence no longer operates may such children 
decentre. 
Even so there are limitations here. Although such a 
technique may work with Candy for the particular situation, 
discussed earlier, another child may respond to the frustration 
with considerable agitation since alternative candidates for 
attention may not be readily available. How do we promote change 
in such cases? One method and it's implications are presented 
shortly. 
An interesting demonstration of some aspects of decentration 
is given by Karmiloff-Smith.. Bovet, and Inhelder (1974). They 
asked three groups of children aged 3,4, &5 years respectively, to 
balance a set of bricks across a rectangular bar (fig 2.4). 
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FIG 2.4 The balancing task. 
The bricks were of 3 types. 
a) Simple rectangular blocks. 
b) Rectangular blocks which had a biasing weight inset 
at one end. (Fig. 2.5 ) 
w: ,ý 
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FIG 2.5 Biased block. 
i\ 
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c) Complex blocks wade of simple blocks attached 
together. ( Fig. 2.6 ) 
FIG 2.6 Carptex Blocks. 
Their findings are summarised in table 2.1 
Table 2.1 
RESULT AT AGE 
3 4 5 years 
Type of block 
SIEPLE passed passed passed 
BIASED passed failed* passed 
CQIIPLEX failed failed passed 
*passed when blindfolded. 
The three year olds operated by finding the balance point by 
trial and error. This strategy allowed them to succeed in 
balancing both simple and biased bricks but not the complex 
bricks. 
The four year olds operated by assuming that the balance 
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point is the mid point of the block. This works for simple blocks 
but does not work for biased or c; ; Lox blocks. It would appear 
that tneir adoption of a midpoint theory is detrimental to their 
perfcrranct: ýn this task. If blindfolded they were forced to 
, uoVt t!, e" tr',, l anu error method of the three year olds and fared 
. - ,. 
r" 
t! ic coriplex blocks was solved by the S 
y(: ýr cA s and tr. eir solution involved using additional blocks as 
cýurterwe i ; r:. ts (fi: 1 2.7). 
Fig -. 1 ý, i, tI tu trc corr, $. lex clocks problem. 
This type of solution entails understanding the task of 
balance in terms of 'moments' (DIAS X DISTANCE FROM FULCRUM). The 
mid-point theory of the four year olcs is a necessary 
transitional stalle between operating a sensory motor method and 
acquiring understanding of balance and serves to draw the 
child's attention to the elements that are entailed in 
understanding the principles of balance. However his performance 
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suffers in the transitional phase and in order to shift from a 
succesful sensory motor method to a more powerful and general 
method of balancing bricks the child has somehow got to tolerate 
an apparent loss in competence for the sake of future gains. 
Although this example is a contrived experiment, examples of 
transitional loss of competence abound in infancy. In the domain 
of language acquisition Bever(1970) gives the following example. 
Children were asked to act out sentences such as 
a) The horse kisses the cow. 
b) It's the horse who kisses the cow. 
c) It's the cow the horse kisses. 
d) The cow is kissed by the horse. 
Two year olds performed the appropriate actions for the 
first three sentences but were only sometimes correct on the 
fourth. They appeared to have a hypothesis that the occurence of 
the sequence [noun. -verb] means Cactor.. action] and this 
hypothesis leads them to attend to any instance of noun verb co- 
occuring in any position in the sentence. The separation of the 
noun from the verb by. "is" in sentence (d) is something different 
to the two year old. The four year olds operate a hypothesis that 
the first noun is the actor and this leads them to attend to 
location. They tend to fail sentences such as (c) and (d) but are 
perfectly competent in (1) and (2). 
T. G. R. Bower (1974) has suggested that the infant has some 
supri sing abilities which he may lose before reacquiring at a 
later period. Underlying this apparent aberrance in development 
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seems to be a process of replacing competences based on innate 
mechanisms by those which are more fluid and adaptable and 
generated by an aquired and adaptive structure. 
The infant has, a walking reflex, which is normally non 
functional but as Zelazo (1976) has shown, the reflex can be 
developed to produce some extraordinary precocious walking 
behaviour. However Zelazo's baby's had the mechanical gait of a 
toy soldier compared with the much more fluid walk of the more 
mature infant. It would seem that the reflexive structures 
underpinning this baby's performance lacked the potential for 
fluid accomodation to the environment. Those more adaptive 
processes, functioning in the motor cortex and the cerebellum, 
afford the older child the potential for adaptive use of 
feedback. 
It does seem that throughout his development the infant 
repeatedly needs to be able to tolerate temporary loss of 
competence in order to make gains Later. It is worth bearing in 
mind that though an adult can cope with short term losses in the 
light of longer term aims, the infant is not privy to the future 
course of his development, so that from his point of view a loss 
of competence is not short term but absolute. It is possible 
though that the normal infant is too preoccupied with novel 
competences to mourn the loss of old abilities. 
In short, I would suggest that the mentally handicapped 
child desperately hangs onto what he can do, and cannot decenter. 
This theme will be expanded during the course of this work. 
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Guided Decentration. Earlier I suggested that decentration in 
the mentally handcapped might be facilitated by creating conflict 
between alternatives, but that only some mentally handicapped 
children could cope with such a confrontation. The following 
example gives us some ideas for an alternative approach. 
A group of retarded children had been working with their 
teacher placing various objects in a range of different cont- 
ainers and retrieving them. The teacher then placed a sweet in 
her hand and put her hand in an open tube (fig 2.8) 
i 
0, t " 
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FIG 2.8 Sweet placed in tube. 
All the children attempted to retrieve the sweet by trying 
to place their hands in the opening obstructed by the teachers 
arm and ignored the unobstructed other opening. They appeared to 
be operating a rule learnt from the other containers. 
[TO RETRIEVE AN OBJECT FROM A CONTAINER REVERSE THE 
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PROCEDURE THAT GOT IT THERE IN THE FIRST PLACE] 
Consequently they ignored the open end of the tube. Although this 
example has parallels with the 'lettuce leaves in cups' example 
presented earlier (inasmuch as the child is confronted with a 
situation where a normally successful procedure fails) it does 
not seem that the children have available alternative features to 
attend to here. 
The non-availability of the "open at both ende' feature of 
the tube may reflect that either this feature does not exist in 
the child's repertoire of possibilities, or alternatively that 
just too much effort is involved in bringing the feature into the 
centre of attention. 
Following their failure to solve the problem, the group was 
Led by the teacher into what might be termed a guided play 
session. 
In this session the children were helped to explore the 
properties of the tube by activities such as looking at each 
other through the tube, touching each other's hands through it 
etc. The original sweet retrieval problem was presented again and 
all the children succeeded in obtaining the sweet by reaching 
through the open end of the tube. 
In the guided play session the aim of the activity was to 
draw he children's attention to the "two opening" aspect of the 
tube. Other aspects of the tube could be entertained: roll- 
ability, acoustic properties when shouted through, etc. While 
these properties were incidental to the original problem they 
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might provide solutions to other problems. 
The teacher, in drawing the group's attention to the open 
end of the tube had the advantage of knowing the solution before 
hand. Had the group been able to play they would not have the 
advantage of this foresight, but in the process of playing would 
acquire knowledge of many of the properties of cardboard tubes, 
one of which would provide a solution to the problem. 
Fagan (1973) has defined play as "information gathering in 
a relaxed field". Bruner (1973) has similarity commented that in 
play the infant is buffered from the consequences of his own 
actions. Both these authors imply that the playing child is in a 
state where the need to succeed is suspended and it would seem 
that whatever "force" holds a child to a particlar hypothesis or 
feature is relaxed so that he is free to decentre and is then in 
a position to generate new hypothesis or procedures. 
In attempting to understand any person's condition it is 
often a useful exercise to realise that oneself may be operating 
under similar conditions, and the inspection of one's own 
processes may help one to understand the other. 
Consider the following hypothetical situation. Tomorrow I 
have a job interview. On paper I am a reasonably competent 
candidate but subjectively I may feel either confident or 
anxious. I am preoccupied with thoughts about the event. I 
entertain images about the interview. In my mind's eye.. I see 
myself in the interview room, I anticipate various questions and 
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see myself providing answers. Sometimes my anticipations are 
realistic and it could be said that I was planning. Other times 
my imagined behaviour is more divorced from reality and I would 
be said to be fantasising. The "reality" referred to is in the 
future and it is inferred rather than known since I am not omni- 
scient. In my imagining, my thoughts may lead me to realise that 
there are gaps in my competence which may be exposed in the 
interview. This may lead me to read, to ask questions of others, 
to gather information and enrich my understanding. 
When tomorrow comes, some questions might have been 
anticipated but most are novel. As long as I am not overanxious I 
am in a position where I can formulate appropriate resposes by 
virtue of my previous work in putting a great deal of information 
in a readily available form. 
If I am overanxious, despite my preparation , even though 
the information for the appropriate answers exists somewhere 
inside my head I am unable to access it and my performance comes 
over as stammered monosyllabic responses. 
If I have done no preparation for the interview I may, when 
faced with questions, become an anxious and incoherent person. 
However, if my attitude towards the interview is "it's not really 
important but I'll try". I may be relaxed enough to recall and 
utilise available information effectively and give quite a good 
account of myself. 
In these variations on the interview theme the sheer 
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comlexity of the information dealt with is of a different order 
from that dealt with by Candy in the problems that she encounters 
but our attention can be drawn to similar issues involving the 
aquisition and structuring of competence and the role of anxiety, 
risk taking, etc. in the preparational process. 
Were we able to understand these issues we might be in a 
position where we could help "retarded" children to play and so 
alter the style of their relationship with the world. 
For the greater part of this work I shall be attempting to 
develop an understanding of what makes play possible in normal 
infants and why mentally handicapped children do not play. I 
shall, in so doing, further explore the assumption that play is 
neccessary for development. 
In approaching a problem the investigator has a wide choice 
of approaches and his adopted approach reflects his own style, 
the nature of the problem, availability of technology, etc. The 
account and analysis of Candy's behaviour is a mini version of 
the overall approach adopted in this work. A specific situation 
was described and an attempt made to understand what was 
happening by building a flow diagram. If the diagram is inspected 
critically and carefully it will soon become apparent that in 
drawing it I have made some assumptions which I have no direct 
evidence to support. It is also true that I have presented no 
evidence which contradicts my assumptions. This may be a case of 
selective blindness, but for the moment I am fairly happy about 
my assumptions. My attempt at understanding the situation 
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involves my making some guesses and these are partially legit- 
imised by their contribution to the overall understanding of that 
which predicts and promotes therapeutic change. The overall 
explanation has a logical structure which the flow-diagram 
attempts to express explicitly. 
In the same way as the logic of my attempt at understanding 
Candy's behaviour can be thus represented, so can the logic of my 
attempts to answer the broader questions about play in the 
mentally handicapped be represented. However the nature of 
explanations about play, risk taking etc. are likely to be 
complex and the task of examining the logic of such an 
explanation becomes difficult. 
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CHAPTER 3 ... tore of cups and lettuce leaves 
Let's summarise our understanding of the material presented 
so far and from this raise some questions which may help to 
extend our understanding. 
We have posited that in being presented with a problem; 
1)The child attends to certain attributes of the 
situation 
2)Somehow connected with these attributes are 
procedures which he can operate to produce results. 
3)The child has other attributes potentially available. 
4)These attributes also potentially have procedures 
somehow connected with them. 
5)The child needs to acquire new attributes and by 
implication may need to build new procedures. 
6)Phenomena such as anxiety, perception of success 
etc. have a role to play in these processes. 
We can begin to tidy up these notions by thinking of the 
procedures as coherent units of organisation which are made 
available by attending to the relevant attribute. Furthermore, at 
a given moment in time the child has some constraints about how 
many units he can attend to. 
So far we have only mentioned situations where the child 
attends to one attribute which serves to make other associated 
attributes available for attention, but later we will need to look 
at situations where attention involves greater complexity. 
We can schematically represent these ideas as in fig 3.1. 
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Fig. 3.1 Initial status of model. 
At this point three questions are raised which, if we can 
answer them will give our model greater definition. 
a) What is the nature of these units of organisation? 
b) Is there any relationship between these units of 
organisation? 
c) On what basis does the child chose to attend to a 
specific unit of organisation? 
Although any answers must in the end be interelated we will 
begin by positing some partial solutions, taking each question 
independently. 
Nature of the units of organisation. 
Let's speculate about how a toddler operates procedures 
serving to define his conception of a dog. Somewhere in his 
mind's eye there may be a set of images of dogs that he has known 
in specific situations. When confronted with a particular 
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instance of dog he will attend to specific "doggy"* attributes, 
some of which items are behaviours "generated" by the dog which 
may imply specific behaviours on the part of the child. So the 
dog is represented both as an object and as a source of actions. 
Furthermore there may be actions which the child initiates which 
the dog responds to in a specific manner. Such behaviours on the 
child's part might be termed "tests" and would be part of his 
representation of the dog. We could represent the child's 
relationship with the dog as a "dog" check list. 
wags it's tail....... pat it 
has fur 
grow Ls ............... keep clear 
offer it food........ eats it 
has four legs 
Licks ................ urgh has ears ............. pull them 
gives you piggyback rides 
call it DOGGY 
throw stick .......... fetches it 
In practice such a check list might operate by calling up 
the individual items in sequence, attending to each item in turn. 
However the sequential order may vary and also items on the list 
may reoccur. Constraints may operate which make a particular 
succesion of events unlikely. e. g. It is not likely that the dog 
will lick immediately after it has growled. If we are to take 
temporal sequences into account it may be more convenient to 
represent the childs relationship with the dog as a network of 
events, as shown in fig. 3.2. Recording the sequence of items 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
*( This conception of a category as a set of attributes 
originates with Rosch (1973) and aspects of the child's develop- 
ment of semantics are modelled in a similar manner by E. V. Clark 
(1974). Smith, Shoban, and Rips (1974) employ a similar featural 
model. They make a distinction between 'defining' and 'character- 
istic' features and their model is similar to the the present 
model as it is extended in chapter 4. ) 
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which are encountered in the course of moving within the network 
would generate a list which would represent both attributes and 
their temporal relationships. 
HAVE A PIGG 
BACK RIDE 
KEEP CLEAR 
GROWLS 
WAGS TAIL 
PAT IT 
PULL IT'S EARS 
LICKS 
FEED IT 
CALL IT "DOGGY" 
Fig 3.2 Representation of Dog as a network of acts and events. 
In Candy's case we had a similar but far simpler situation, 
the sequence of drinking action was initiated or accessed by the 
mere presence of a cup. Once "called up" her particular drinking 
procedure would operate in an automaton-like manner. 
Our doggy network is less simple to operate. The 
conglomeration of dog procedures might be called up by the mere 
presence of a dog, but this presupposes that the child 
discriminates between, say, dogs, rabbits, and cows. Having 
called up the doggy procedures, our theoretical toddler still has 
the problem of deciding where in his tangle of procedures he 
starts off, and furthermore which particular sequence he 
operates. Apropos the latter decision, it would seem that some 
pathways in the network are, as it were, better trodden than 
others, but the child would still need to be flexible in his 
choice of pathway otherwise his behaviour would have the rigid 
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and rather obsessional quality that children such as Bernie 
manifest. 
As previosly suggested, the pathway taken through the 
network during a particular confrontation with a dog can be 
represented by a list if the ordering of the items in the list 
corresponds to the sequence traversed in the network. The 
reoccurence of an event simply entails that that item is entered 
more than once in the list. 
Some support to this "list model" is given by the following 
demonstration. A hiding game is played with a child who has 
recently acquired the concept of an object's existence 
independent of his actions. The attainment of the concept is 
tested by the following procedure. 
Three small screens are set up side by side on a table. An 
object in which the child is interested, such as a sweet or 
small toy, is covered by a cup. The cup is slowly passed behind 
the three screens in turn, care being taken that the child 
follows the passage of the cup. In passing the first screen the 
object is left behind. The child is now required to find the 
object. ( The procedure so far is actually a replication of the 
last item of the Uzgi ri s and Hunt object permanence scale which 
is described in appendix 1) 
A child who has fully attained object permanence will 
typically look behind the last screen that the cup passed behind. 
On failing to find it there, he will then work systematically 
backwards untill he finds the object behind the first screen. 
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The problem is now repeated but this time the experimenter 
employs sleight of hand, concealing the object in his hand. The 
child will search systematically as before and will be somewhat 
perplexed when he fails to find the object behind any of the 
screens. The experimenter then retrieves the object from behind 
the child's ear! 
The problem is again set up and the experimenter again 
conceals the object in his hand. On this occasion the child will 
typically begin his search by looking first behind his ear before 
proceding to look behind the three screens. When the child fails 
to find the object this time, the experimenter retrieves the 
object from under the child's sweater. On a subsequent 
presentation of the problem, the child first looks under his 
sweater, then behind his ear, and then behind each screen in 
turn... and so on. 
It would seem that the child here is operating a list of 
hypotheses, the list being extended by adding to the top of the 
list the most recently acquired hypothesis* and that the list is 
entered by the most recently occuring event. Yet in real life the 
most recently occuring event is not neccesarily the most salient. 
We could visualise a child engaged in this hiding game wanting 
the object to be found behind her ear rather than under her 
sweater because the experimenter tickles when he retrieves it. 
--------------- 
* Note that we 
----------- 
cannot use 
------ 
this 
----------- 
technique 
--------------------- 
to support our notion 
that items may occur more than once in the list. 
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Thus the point of access into the network varies as 
different items turn up at the top of the list. So, according to 
the "list model" every time a dog enters the child's life he will 
attend to whatever attribute his last encounter left on top of 
the list. We can envisage that given some experience of dogs some 
specific attribute will dominate the list. 
If we look at the original "dog list" given on page 38 we 
will find that one attribute of dog is the name "doggy", which 
the child can utter in it's presence. This is not to say that the 
child uses the word to symbolise a dog's image, the utterance is 
merely one of many means that the child has of relating to the 
animal and has no different status from, say, pulling the dog's 
ears. However any attribute which serves to address the dog 
network will by virtue of it's addressing role have a different 
status from the others. Piaget (1951) termed such addressing 
attributes, "indicators". It would seem that in a social context 
the child soon finds that employing attributes which happen to be 
utterances as indicators is particularity useful. So he begins to 
use utterances to address things. This has the very important 
implication that another person can easily provide the addressing 
feature. By merely writing the word cow, I can conjure up an 
appropriate image in my readers mind. I can extend the image by 
writing "the cow jumped over the moon". This may conjure the 
image of a cow with N. A. S. A. stencilled on its flanks, or it may 
bring back memories of a favorite book not seen for many years. 
----------------------------------------------------------------- *Detailed explanations about how this might be done will be 
provided later. 
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At this sort of level the use of language becomes very complex 
but it allows hitherto private cognitions to become social and 
shared. 
The indicator seems to be a phenomenon manifest in the 
transition from prelinguistic to linguistic means of handling 
images but in adult language use a similar phenomenon appears in 
the form of metonymy whereby a thing is referred to by the name 
of a particular part. e. g. Crown standing for King. 
Consider the following example. A sailor in the crows nest 
will "spy a sail". What he perceives is a ship but in this 
context "sail" is a particlarly relevant part or feature. The 
same sailor would never refer to the same ship in port as a sail. 
In that context he would term it a vessel, and thus highlight the 
ships capacity to contain goods. {The example is derived from 
Lacan. (1977) (Humphreys (personal communication)) 
Although it does not neccessarily follow that language is 
purely metonymic the structural similarity between Candy's use of 
a cup and the linguistic device is intriguing, and suggests that 
similar partial structures underlie sensory motor and symbolic 
structures. 
Levels of structure. 
So far we have considered bundles of organised information 
and have examined how these bundles might be accessed in a 
particular context. Let's now examine further how these bundles 
might be organised. 
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START 
0 
1 
Cn 
Lyes 
RAISE ARM 
LOWER 
ARM 
EXTEND 
FINGER 
IS 
FINGER 
STRAIGHT 
yes 
TRAIGHTEN 
ARM 
IS ARM 
TRAIGH 
\? 
/ IS FINGER' 
OINTING AT SAM 
EVEL AS DENOTE 
OBJECT ? 
Yes 
URN RIGH 
EXIT 
yes -IS FINGE 
POINTING AT 
OBJECT? no 
Fig 3.3 Subroutine: Point at object 
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no 
TOO 
LOW? 
es 
1 TURN LEFT 
yes 
IS FINGER 
LEFT OF THE 
OBJECT? "no 
If we consider our dog list again and take any item on the 
list it becomes apparent that each item has a similar structure 
to the overall bundle of which it is a part. Take the following 
incident. Our hypothetical toddler is confronted by a dog. The 
dog wags its tail and the child gives it a biscuit. While the dog 
is eating the child points at it at the same time uttering 
"doggy", he then pats it , pulls its ears, etc. 
We can represent this as a specific procedure made up of 
subprocedures. Sometimes two or more subprocedures may occur 
together. e. g point and say "doggy". The act of pointing could be 
described as a procedure as shown in fig 3.3. 
If we followed this procedure to point, our movements would 
be stiff and mechanical. Even an uncoordinated toddler would have 
more grace of movement than our procedure, since he has far more 
sophisticated feedback systems and also because components in his 
procedures would appear to overlap. 
We could change our perspective further and consider a 
subunit of our pointing procedure, [is arm straight? ] for 
instance, and attempt to write further subprocedures for this 
item involving the behaviour of individual muscles. This would 
entail monitoring kinaesthetic information and possibly visual 
information. Following this we might be able to write procedures 
for even lower levels. 
By now the reader might have forgotten that I'm describing a 
child playing with a dog. In dealing with so much information it 
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is very easy to Lose sight of the whole. Our toddler might have 
the same problem were he consciously working out the relationship 
between his biceps and triceps and he might sympathise with the 
mythical centipede who one day discovered he had a hundred legs 
and never walked again. 
In practice our lower units of organisation may be adaptable 
and involve many decisions, but they are unconscious in that they 
are operated without being attended to. We shall use the term 
schema for those units which could be defined as "enduring 
organised representations of prior experiences" { Nei sser(1967), 
Bartlett(1932), Piaget(1950)}. 
We can now update the state of affairs depicted in fig 3.1 
using the representation given in fig 3.4 
av 
I 
yxwv e d-c ba 
/z-7 
-- --e -- -- -"d _ .- -- 
c 
-- -- -- b -- -- -" --y - -- -- --x . .... --w -- -- -- v 
Fig 3.4 Metonymic coding of embedded lists. 
Here we have lists of lists, where the items on the list 
represents either things to attend to or things to do, and 
furthermore the relationship between each level of list is 
metonymic. 
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Flow of control. 
When discussing Candy we implied that whilst she operated 
her [test by drinking] procedure, visual information was avail- 
able to her but not utilised. We could rather crudely label parts 
of fig 3.4 to represent this as in fig 3.5. 
Although as yet this type of representation does not cope 
with the type of process that flowcharts such as figs. 2.1 & 2.2 
represent, we can partially represent the transformation from 
fig. 2.1 to fig. 2.2 by a reordering of the list in fig 3.5., such 
that [Look at contents] precedes the [pick up and drink] 
procedure. 
cup present 
etco*... smell look at pick up and 
contents contents drink procedure 
etc-ag rip cup extend arm 
etc. etc. 
Fig 3.5 "Pick up cup" procedure as nested lists. 
We could further envisage Candy deciding on the basis of 
smell rather than taste whether to drink the contents of the cup 
or not. The situation could now be represented as in fig 3.6 
cup present 
pick up sme l lt..... - look at . -a*- "-- cup present 
J contents contents 
. 41 -. 141 . 41 
Fig 3.6 "Pick up cup" : Modification of procedure. 
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In a flow diagram we can represent decisions by a question 
set in a lozenge "<>" whereby a specific condition is tested. 
e. g. <is cup full? >. It would seem that we can utilise a similar 
notion in our embedded lists. We would enter the list structure 
shown in fig 3.6 by noting if a cup was present or not. If not 
present we would move onto another list structure. If the cup was 
present we would then call up the Rook in the cup] List. Having 
established it was full we could, if we wished, continue to 
visually inspect the cup for the drinkability of its contents. 
This might entail searching down a list of possible 
alternatives.. 
Looks like beef ... move to next list 
looks like tomato ... move to next list 
looks like fish... exit to another list. 
etc. 
In this case we move down the list and consider each item in 
turn until we find an item in our list where conditions are 
satisfied. We then follow the instructions attached to those 
conditions. ( We are making the convenient assumption that each 
list contains all possible contingencies). As long as a "non 
drinkable" condition is not encountered, in which case the " pick 
up cup" procedure is abandoned, the list will provide instruct- 
ions for moving onto the next list, i. e. the 'olfactory' list, 
to further establish drinkability. Within this list we might 
have the following items...... 
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START 
no 
NEXT RIGHT LIST? 
LIST 
yes n w, 
SEARCH 
DOWN LIST 
yes 
ACTIONS? 
no no 
no 
OPERATE DONE FED UP? 
-- 
J 
yes 
yes 
MORE ON SEARCH 
LIST? UP LIST 
yes 
yes 
no SEARCH 
FED UP? ACROSS 
LIST 
COMMENTS: 
<RIGHT LIST> .... Does this addressing item have any 
correspondence to what is sensed? e. g. "Is a cup 
present? " 
<FED UP> .... In order to avoid the system having to 
continue acting in the face of no success some means 
of escape is neccessary. 
Fig 3.7(a) General rules for list searching. 
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smells of beef... move to pick up list 
smells of tomato... move to pick up list 
smells of fish... exit to another list. 
etc. 
The same procedure would be fol lowed until the cup's 
contents are deemed " drinkable" or not. 
Where we had cups filled with lettuce leaves we seem to have 
a slightly different list searching sequence induced by suprise. 
We might therefore suggest that contradictory conditions will 
cause a shifting of attention up and along a list level so that 
the next list is attended to. 
Our model now consists of lists embedded in other lists and 
some rules for moving through the lists. We can attempt a 
comprehensive representation of our rules as shown in figs. 3.7a 
& 3.7b 
exit to next list 
backlist 
acrosslist 
Fig 3.7b Directions of list searches. 
enter . ----- 
-- same as 
acrosslis 
0 
uplist 
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EXIT START 
no CUP 
PRESENT 
yes 
yes 
EMPTY? 
ATTEND TO option no 
VISUAL 
INFORMATION 
no 
RINKABLE? 
yes 
ATTEND TO 
OLFACTORY 
INFORMATION 
n 
*o DRINKABLE 
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OPTION 
yes 
ARE OPTION 
AVAILABLE? 
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yes 
no 
DRINK PROBLEMS 
yes rl o 
FINISHED? 
no 
CREATE NEW 
OPTIONS 
Fig 3.8 Updated "DRItdK" procedure 
lie can update part of cur flowchart in figs. 2.1 and 
2.2 
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to give us the flowchart shown in fig 3.8 
This works reasonably well but it leaves many questions 
unanswered, especially questions like "where do new options come 
from? "; "How might options be attended to in the absence of a 
problem? "; "What is meant by <problem? > in the flowchart? ". 
In our deliberations on lettuce leaves in cups and images of 
dogs we formLated the notion that the child seems to hold 
information as embedded lists. We also partially described the 
lettuce leaf problem as set of rules for moving through these 
list structures. We made these rules more formal by describing 
them as a flow diagram (Fig 3.7a). 
So far we have a general purpose structure and a set of 
general purpose rules for moving through our list. Yet these 
rules take us not much further than the situation described in 
fig3.7. Let's see how well the model works with Candy by looking 
at how fig 3.7 applies to fig 3.6. 
The child is confronted with a cup, by moving around the 
loop... [ right list? yes; down list; action? no; more on list? yes; 
across list; right list? yes; down list ..... etc. ].. the system 
runs through a checklist of cup attributes until it's satisfied 
that a cup is present. Having decided that he has enough 
attributes to define a cup < enough? >, he moves up and across the 
list to the list system labelled [look in cup] The search now 
procedes. »Cdownlist{to access the components of [look in cup]} ; 
action? yes {i. e.. looks}; operates; done? yes; more on list? yes; 
i 
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fedup? no; across list {i. e. brown fluid); right list? yes; down 
list; action? no;..... etc ].... and thus attends to the range of 
attributes that describe the contents of the cup. Assuming all is 
well the lists will be followed in this manner until the cup is 
drunk out of. 
cup present 
put cup down.. *. _ look at contents, cup present 
drink, *.. smell contents. .. look at contents 
Fig. 3.9 Updated list form of [DRINK] procedure 
If any 'non drinkable' attributes are discovered, somehow 
the child must get out of the list. It is tempting to insert an 
item into our flowcharts along the lines of <if attributes have 
negative qualities exit from the list>. Behaviourally this would 
result in the child simply dropping the cup. Although in reality 
that is possible, it is far more likely that the child will 
instead replace the cup onto the table. This draws our attention 
to something that was overlooked in fig 3.6. i. e. the act of 
putting down the cup must be listed. This allows us to use our 
list searching rules in their present form to exit by responding 
to <fed up? >. This would take us up the list and along, rejecting 
the olfactory List until it comes to the drinking procedure list, 
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somehow it must avoid this list and move along to [put down cup] 
list. Later we shall see that the avoidance of the drinking 
procedure list is possible because the list structure can be of 
the form shown in fig 3.9 
Summary 
For the past two chapters we have made much of the lettuce 
leaves in a cup incident. We have represented the incident as 
a set of flow diagrams (figs 2.1 & 2.2 ) representing the change 
of behaviour. We then abstracted a general structure of embedded 
lists which we hope will allow us to describe a wide range of 
conditions. We have implied that the embedded Lists can be re- 
structured but as yet have not shown how thus restructuring might 
operate. We have also drawn out a set of rules for moving through 
our embedded lists. These rules are fairly precise except for 
conditions like <fed up? > . The later type of condition is 
intuitively meaningfull but as yet we cannot describe it with any 
degree of precision. Furthermore, despite a great deal of 
theorising and formalising we are still unable to provide a full 
and unambiguous general notion of how cognitive transformations 
might take place, let alone apply that to the question of why the 
mentally handicapped child cannot play. The next chapter will 
bring us closer to a possible means of attempting to answer this 
question and the problem is taken much further in chapters 8&9. 
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CHAPTER 4 Integration and differentiation 
Before elaborating further on the notions developed in the 
last two chapters it is perhaps advisable to be clear about the 
nature of what these notions are about. 
In constructing the sort of model presented so far it is 
quite easy to fall into the trap of thinking that the subject is 
the model, and it is salutory to be cautious and remind oneself 
that the flow diagrams etc. presented here represent, not the 
child per se, but our ideas and theories about aspects of the 
child's functioning. In constucting psychological theories it 
would be nice to think that our theories are 'correct' in that 
they describe the psychological reality of our subject. However 
it is more realistic to recognise that our theorising, though 
aimed at describing psychological reality, probably falls short 
of that goal. Its evaluation then should be in terms of its 
usefulness in reaching towards that aim. In the clinical context 
another, possibly more important criterion operates in evaluating 
a theory: its contribution to developing effective therapy. 
When we set about constructing models we are attempting to 
understand by the use of analogy. The example of a map provides 
us with some insights about such enterprises. At one level the 
map bears no relationship to the real world. It is not a minature 
plaster of paris replication of the terrain. It has only two 
dimensions; parts of it do not change from green to gold in the 
autumn. If we put our ears to it we do not hear the gurgle of 
tiny streams. 
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In constructing a map we select a few features of the real 
world which seem useful for our purposes. These features we shall 
represent by symbols. Next, we set about measuring the 
relationship between these features and then, on a two 
dimensional piece of paper, we set out our symbolised features in 
the patterns that reproduce the measures relationships in the 
real world. A map then is only a representation of the real world 
inasmuch as it reproduces abstracted relationships. However, it 
is a useful device for armed with a map, compass etc., we can 
employ it to find our way about the real world. 
Which relationships we choose to represent on our map 
depends on the purposes for which we intend our map to be used. A 
motorist's map is of little use to a geologist. 
Maps can represent static states or dynamic states. A 
geologist's map represents the relationship between different 
types of rocks, soils, etc., and will serve to tell him where he 
is likely to find, say, limestone. However, if the geologist 
wishes to read from his map how the limestone got there in the 
first place then his map would need to take on a very different 
form and would somehow need to represent the process of 
geological change. 
Constructing a map of the processes that are involved in 
developmental change in infancy is a hazardous operation, as the 
terrain that we are attempting to represent is innaccessible 
since the processes which we are interested in occur inside the 
infant's head. The investigator is then forced to make guesses.. 
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and to induce the existence of features, or even systems, that 
may not in reality exist. 
In the last chapter the basis of a model was developed which 
posited that infants operate by searching through lists of 
possibilities. In the use of conjuring tricks in hiding objects I 
demonstrated behaviours that infants operate as if they are 
following a list. This may partially be a function of how the 
problem was set up. So if a child's cognitive function is viewed 
from one perspective, it will appear to be List-like, and a map 
reflecting the list structure wilt serve that perspective. From 
another perspective, the list-like features will not emerge and 
that perspective is best served by another form of map. That is 
not to say that one form of map is neccessarily superior to the 
other. It is a case of "horses for courses", and each 
perspectives' map will remain in currency until it ceases to be 
useful. Although in retrospect a particular map may appear to be 
misconceived it is certain that a contemporary map, through which 
perspective the old one appears misconceived, will itself be 
later judged to be incorrect. Each generation of map though will 
contribute to the development of later maps. 
In this enterprise the feature that has been induced and 
abstracted from the hidden terrain is that of embedded lists and 
to put more detail into our map we need to try to answer the 
following questions. 
(a) How might the structure of the lists change? 
(b) How do new elements get incoorporated into the lists? 
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Let's consider a child who can, 
(i) Crawl. 
(ii) Reach out and grasp objects. 
Until a given point in his development these two areas of 
competence are isolated from each other and if an object is 
placed out of the child's reach it will not occur to him that he 
may crawl in order to retrieve the object. Later he will discover 
that his crawling will enable him to get close enough to the 
object in order to reach for it and play with it. Initially he 
may respond to this discovery with some delight and may crawl to 
objects for the sake of it. So, whereas once crawling for its own 
sake was fun, now crawling to a preconceived destination can be 
fun. Later the craw ling may be taken for granted and become 
purely a means for getting at a desired object. 
How could we use our embedded lists to explain this facet of 
development? 
First we must make explicit an assumption that has operated 
in our account so far. Our notion of an embedded list implies 
that the child's entire memory, his repository of knowledge about 
his world, may be represented as a list. So a list model of our 
crawling child will consist of a long list of sublists, extending 
way back in time. These sublists will deal with specific 
competences, craw ling, crying when hungry, going "goo-goo", 
reaching for objects, putting objects in the mouth, etc. The 
particular order of lists will vary, but let's follow what might 
happen to the initial configuration shown in fig. 4.1 
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ATTENDED LIST 
"goo goo" crawl cry if reach for bang drum 
- _, 
hungry-- object _.. .. -ý-.. __, -_. -.. __. . 
Fig 4.1 Sublist of competences. 
A biscuit is placed out of the child's reach. He begins by 
working down his list considering each item in turn. The first 
item, [BANG DRUM depends on the presence of a drum. So in its 
absence that particular list group is ignored. The next item is 
now considered, [REACH FOR OBJECT]. This item is appropriate 
except that the item is out of reach so the next item is 
considered, [CRY IF HUNGRY]. The child is hungry, so he cries. If 
he is lucky, mum will come running and hold the biscuit for him. 
If we applied the searching rules given in fig 3.8, our child 
would respond by going up list and along and would now commence 
crawling. 
We'll give ourself some licence and suggest that in this 
specific instance it would be useful if he had a rule... 
IF SUCCESSFUL GO BACKLIST> 
useful, if a similar situation occured in the future, for the two 
sublists to be lumped together into a procedure.. 
[REACH FOR BISCUIT, IF OUT OF REACH, 
CRY, THEN MUMMY WILL GIVE IT TO ME] 
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Furthermore, making the assumption that the memory needs 
updating we can update fig 4.1 to the configuration shown in fig. 
4.2 
"goo goo" crawl cry if reach for bang_ reach for 
hungry object drum' obie, ct 
,,. _cry 
: reach for 
object 
Fig 4.2 Updated sublists (1) 
Let's now look at how the lists in fig 4.1 would operate if 
the object were a particular toy. 
[BANG DRUt"93 would be scanned and ignored. 
[REACH FOR OBJECT] would be attended to but rejected. 
[CRY IF HUNGRY] is not operated. 
(i. e. the child is not hungry) 
[CRAWL] is attended to and operated. 
Search direction now changes and.. 
[CRY IF HUNGRY] is not operated. 
[REACH FOR OBJECT] is operated, as in Fig. 4.2. The list 
would be updated to record this particular episode to obtain the 
configuration shown in fig 4.3. 
It should be kept in mind that this particular model does 
not attempt to account for the child choosing to crawl in any 
particular direction. Neither does it deal with the apparent 
abilty of young children to anticipate, in this instance, that 
crawling will make the object reachable. 
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The procedures described so far would operate a rather 
clumsy automaton who would "tumble" into its solutions. 
"goo goo" crawl cry if reach for bang reach for 
hungry object drum object 
. crawl reach for 
object 
Fig 4.3 Updated sublist (2) 
Related to this is the problem of how the lists in the 
concatenation should be ordered. If we decide that the item to be 
attended to first (even though it failed to operate in the first 
instance) is put first in the concatenated List then we have the 
happy situation where the list is addressed by the goal (i. e. the 
condition which allows a successful exit from the list currently 
being searched) and the solution (in this case [CRAWL]) would be 
attached to the intended act [REACH FOR OBJECT]. On the other 
hand, if the concatenated list were addressed by the first 
successfully operated List then attending to the act of crawling 
would have the implication that objects are reachable. (see fig. 
4.4). 
(a) reach for object (b) crawl 
°. - crawl- reach 
for object reach for object-t-crawl 
Fig. 4.4 Coding order of concatenated lists. 
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Let's give more substance to this idea of integrating 
separate ares by looking at a clinical anecdote where the idea of 
integration is used therapeutically. 
Integration in Echolalia 
Sadie is echolalic. She has a great deal of competence in 
handling speech sounds. If one addressed her with the utterance, 
"What on earth are you doing now? " 
Sadie would respond by repeating the utterance as likely as not 
word perfect, complete with the original intonation. Yet she has 
no language since she apparently cannot countenance the idea that 
words can have some relationship with the world. Even though her 
speech, viewed in isolation, seems at the level of a much abler 
child, her comprehension as measured on tests such as the Reynell 
Developmental Language Scales (1%9) is minimal and she barely 
scores. 
I had worked with Sadie for several sessions trying to teach 
her the names of objects, but to no avail. I was trapped in her 
echolalia. Prompts such as, "say ball", would be faithfully 
reproduced. Any verbal praise I gave would be Liltingly echoed 
back to me... " good girl Sadie "! 
Sadie's classroom was in a different building from my own 
room, so our sessions were preceded by a short walk to it. On 
route to the room she would dance, skip, and produce a variety of 
walks. She seemed to be playing, exploring different actions, 
different movements. A game developed on one journey. I held 
Sadie's hand above her head, said "turn round Sadie" and then 
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twirled her around whilst she was repeating " Turn round Sadie". 
Very quickly the game developed such that she would utter "Turn 
round Sadie", to which I responded appropriately. Within two 
sessions we were running, jumping, stopping, and turning round in 
response to her verbal commands. 
Her progress since then has been slow but steady. She is 
still echolalic inasmuch as her vocal competence still outstrips 
her communicative needs, but the gap between speech and 
understanding is slowly diminishing. 
What went on in this episode? 
Strictly speaking, Sadie's use of speech in the episode was 
not symbolic. The act of uttering "Turn round Sadie" did not 
stand for or represent an action but was an action performed in 
order to produce a given desired effect. It is an item in a chain 
of events and the relationship between the utterance and the 
resulting action is the same as that in the "crawling for an 
object" example. 
heard "TURN AROUND" 
utter "TURN AROUND"4 heard "TURN AROUND" 
A 
Fig 4.5 List structure of "turn around" 
Let's suppose that following this incident I had said, "turn 
round Sadie", and she had responded appropriately, then the 
utterance would be symbolic. In terms of our embedded lists we 
could represent the event as in fig 4.5. 
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In response to my utterance Sadie would search her lists 
until she found the utterance, ["TURN ROUND"]. Normally she would 
respond in a typically echolalic manner by repeating the 
utterance. 
The representation shown in fig 4.5 is a convenient fiction 
since it is not likely that Sadie carries a separate model for 
every conceivable utterance. A more realistic model would need to 
entail the breaking down of the utterance into their accoustic 
components and these would call up the appropriate mouth/voice 
forms. These would be assembled and operated as an utterance. 
Both versions have in common the idea of vocal action being 
operated. 
For the symbolic response to operate Sadie would have to 
suppress her actions and move into the next list item, which is 
the physical act of turning round. ( see fig 4.6) 
heard "TURN AROUND" 
action CTURN AROUND] 
heard "TURN AROUND" 
4 
utter "TURN AROUND"'-- heard "TURN AROUND" 
I 
Fig 4.6 Extended list structure of "turn around" 
We already have a potential candidate for this device in the 
form of the <FED UP? > condition represented in fig 3.8. But at a 
more intuitive level we might say that Sadie is much more 
interested in the action [TURN ROUND] and its contingency upon 
the utterance than in her reproducing the utterance yet again. 
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Car Driving 
Driving a car is a situation which again demonstrates the 
notion of integration but which is more central to my own 
experience. In driving a car, I rarely think about what is 
involved in changing gear, I just do it. Now consider the 
acquisition of this skill. Not every car driver is a good 
instructor. The good driving instructor has, amongst other 
things, the ability to break down a particular package of 
abilities, such as changing gear, down to the same level of 
organisation as his pupil is competent to handle. He then 
demonstrates at this level. As the pupil gains in confidence he 
builds up his chunks of component subskilis into bigger chunks. 
{the term "chunk" is a term for an organised bundle of 
information : Miller, Gallanter, and Pribram (1960)1. Eventually 
the pupil no longer needs to think about building up the elements 
which constitute a chunk such as changing gear, but starts to 
direct his attention to "learning to read the road. " This entails 
anticipating and responding to the actions of other road users. 
This is another area of chunk building. Eventually the whole 
process of driving a car becomes "automatic" and the driver can 
engage in conversations with his passenger, unless road 
conditions become hectic in which case he will break off from his 
conversation and direct all his attention to his driving. 
In addition to providing another instance of separate chunks 
of organised information being bundled together to form "super- 
chunks", the car driving example reintroduces the idea of 
metonymy, whereby the part stands for the whole. 
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When we drive a car we attend to limited features such as 
"road curves", and we respond to these features by the 
appropriate actions of steering. The experienced driver is not 
conscious of checking, "Am I oversteering... Am I under steering"? 
The act of steering is both fluid and unconscious, but the road 
curve engages the driver's attention and serves to call up the 
appropriate steering behaviour. 
Paradigm and Syntagme 
There are some differences between examples of metonymy, 
such as refering to a ship as a "sail" and examples such as a 
curve in the road ahead referring to "steer appropriately". The 
first example stands still as it were in time. The sail refers to 
the whole ship's existence. Jakobson (1968) termed the total 
system at a given moment the paradigm, as opposed to the syntagme 
which refers to the time based aspects of the system. Whereas in 
the "curve in the road" example the reference is to a sequence of 
actions which occur after the perception of the curve. In the 
crawling example the temporal distinction is even more clear cut. 
Computer Simulation 
To explore this notion it may be useful to look at the 
process of integration applied to our embedded list structures in 
a fairly abstract way. In order to do this I shall be introducing 
the idea of a computer simulation and this will allow us to 
explore other properties of our list structures. In effect this 
will entail designing a computer program that behaves in the same 
manner as the list rules and structures suggested in fig 6.7. 
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Usually psychology attempts to be rigorous by relating its data 
to a statistical model, which in effect serves to quantify our 
certainty about our psychological opinions. Computer simulation 
provides an alternative means of providing rigour by having 
recourse to a logical model. In effect it forces the 
psychological investigator to be utterly explict about his 
assumptions and helps to show him the logical implication of 
these assumptions. It is a method that is well suited to the 
development of psychological explanations. 
Colby (1978) built a model of a paranoid person. His main 
aim in this venture was to provide inexperienced medical students 
with initial experience of interviewing patients. At this level 
he was concerned with what Oetinger (1969) termed 'a functional 
model'. That is a model which focuses on the output of behaviours 
which are identical to the object of study without neccessarily 
mimicking the internal behaviour of the object. This Fodor (1968) 
terms weak equivalence. However in developing the model Colby 
makes explicit some assumptions about the nature of paranoia. 
(The model starts from the premiss that the paranoid person has a 
story, or theory, which he wishes to relate to another person, 
but on the bases of an ongoing evaluation of the other person he 
decides whether it is safe, or not, to relate his tale. ) In this 
sense Colby's model takes into account internal processes and is 
therefore a 'structural model' in Oetinger's terms. In its 
attempt to mimic a real patient, the model has conversational 
language capabilties and the student interviews the machine via a 
teletype, without knowing that it is a machine. However, although 
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the language of the machine is suprisingly convincing it does not 
neccessarily follow that the processes that generate the language 
are those employed by people. Fodor requires that for a model to 
be strongly equivalent it must be in effect both a structural and 
a functional model. So Colby's model of paranoid process would 
have strong equivalence but as a model of human language it is 
likely to be weakly equivalent. 
Most psychological enterprises involving computer simulation 
have been investigations of cognitive processes, especially 
semantic memory (e. g J. R. Anderson and G. H. Bower (1973), 
A. M. Collins and P1. R. Quillian (1972)} and as such are structural 
models. Since the flesh and blood processes towards which these 
enterprises are directed are not available for inspection it is 
very pertinent to ask, " How do we know that these models bear 
any relationship to the psychological reality of real organisms? " 
A. Turing (1950) deviced a rigorous test which required in 
effect that the structural model behaved as a functional model 
and that if interrogated it would be indistinguishable from a 
real organism. These are very stringent requirements but they can 
be relaxed by requiring that the test be addressed to what Fodor 
terms the appropriate level of description. A psychological 
explanation is neccessarily an abstraction and in order to be 
fair to the model the Turing test must be addressed to the 
appropriate level of abstraction. 
In the present context the computer simulation will involve 
building list like structures in the form of computer programs in 
order to examine how they behave and to draw comparisons between 
the behaviour of the model and that of children, parti culari ly 
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mentally handicapped children. In choosing this form of 
investigation we are restricting our options. My own experience 
of myself operating in the world is in terms of images and it 
takes some effort and contortion to discern that my own use of 
images could be described as a linearly operated list structure. 
It would take a very different form of technology from the 
digital computer to deal with the visual non linear aspects of my 
experience. 
To avoid confusion between the computer model and a real 
person I shall give the model a separate identity by referring to 
it as BABEL. So whilst we shall be keen to demonstrate 
similarities between BABEL and a real child, we will be aware 
that they are not the same thing. 
Abstraction 
a 
a 
da 
EI19fedcb 
ia 
/h\99 
\d 
bib 
hfe 
Fig 4.7 Translation of embedded list representation into binary 
tree representation 
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So far we have talked in terms of embedded lists, but we can 
represent exactly the same relationship as binary trees (see fig 
4.7) 
Integration in BABEL 
a 
a 
baded 
1%\/%/ p\ /\ ýhý 
9i\i 
-past- present 
Fig 4.8 BABEL'S basic memory structure. 
BABEL's main aim as a system is to attempt to follow what is 
happening in the environment. So given a memory configuration as 
in (Fig 4.8) and the presence of the following attributes in the 
environment... A, G, Q, R, B, S, V.... (Items in memory will be 
represented by lower case letters, items in the environment by 
upper case letters). BABEL begins its memory search by first 
considering (d), the most recent event in it's memory, fails to 
find it in the environment, so then considers (g), rejects it and 
moves onto (c). (C) is detected as being present. If we examine 
the contents of the chunk addressed by (c) we note that 
additional elements (in this case (d)) are coded. BABEL however 
is content to assume that whatever is addressed by (c) is present 
and engages in further search. Element (p) is now considered and 
rejected since it does not presently exist in the environment. 
Search continues and (a) is considered and accepted since 
attribute (A) is presently found to exist. Again BABEL is content 
to assume that the information addressed by (a) is present 
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without checking it out. 
The reader will note that the process described here is 
exactly the same as that found in fig 4.1, but letters are used 
instead of real behaviours and events. 
BABEL finds it useful to record that.. 
C FIRST (c) WAS FOUND AND THEN (a)] 
and the coincidence of these two chunks is added to BABEL's 
memory, as shown in fig. 4.9. 
C 
aPc9dac /\ 
b%\d 
Fig 4.9 Integration of coincidence 
There are several implications to this coding of coincidence. 
1) On a subsequent occasion, given the presence of (C) 
BABEL can assume that (a) has also occured and 
expend its efforts in integrating additional 
information to (c). 
2) The addressing of the integrated chunks is taken 
over by the element which addresses the first chunk 
found. 
3) The assumption that the contents of a chunk are 
present in the environment without checking up on 
them is risky and BABEL might be said to be 
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optimistic when taking such risks. Later we shall 
make much of this when we shall allow BABEL to be 
OPTIMISTIC or PESSIMISTIC. 
4) It has already been pointed out that both events 
which occupy a particular instance in time and 
sequences of events can be coded as chunks, and 
there need not be any structural difference between 
these two types of chunks. The notion of chunk 
integration makes this clearer. 
Since the world is ever changing, when BABEL sets out to map 
what it finds in its memory onto what is in the world it is 
confronted by this fact. Memory search takes time but the time 
taken to locate a particular item depends on that item's 
accessibility. 
Furthermore, dealing with information embedded within a 
chunk (unconscious) takes time and the more information dealt 
with the greater the time taken. 
At a simple level we could say that if memory search, and/or 
chunk processing is brief, then the world for the duration of the 
search is coded as if it were static. If however the search and 
the process time were increased then a portion of the world would 
be coded as a chunk whilst it is in the process of changing. A 
chunk formed under these conditions would contain information 
about the world before, during, and after a change had taken 
place. If a chunk is called up which operates an action, then 
that action, if appropriate, will change a large proportion of 
the world and again the world will be coded as changing. 
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The point raises the question of how BABEL realises that an 
action is appropriate. It would seem possible that an action 
would not produce any change in the world, yet BABEL might assume 
that the world as it exists after an action is in that state as a 
result of that action being applied. 
That this happens in real children is evidenced by instances 
where the infant has a "magi cal" notion of causation, and he 
tries to reproduce an event that coincided with a particular 
action by repeating that action, even though there is no causal 
relationship. It would seem that infants, like many psycho- 
logists, CTversky & Kahneman (1979)} are prone to infer causation 
from correlation. 
To deal with this situation we need to examine the possibi- 
Lity raised earlier, that BABEL operates memory searches both 
forwards and backwards in time. 
Search Directions 
I ask myself to think of something that happened many years 
ago. I think of the coronation. What I experience in remembering 
is an image of the crown being placed on the Queen's head, an 
event. As I ponder over the image, I can construct more, I can 
see whole episodes. So though I went backwards in time in order 
to remember the coronation, once I locate the appropriate image 
then I follow the sequence of events forward in time. To remember 
what happened before or after a specific episode though is harder 
work, and it would seem that I am working within the boundaries 
of an episodic chunk. Furthermore, even though we can remember 
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the individual episodes that make up a particular scenario it is 
often quite difficult to put these episodes into the right order, 
and this might be, to a certain extent, accounted for if our 
memory search at the level of the scenario was moving backwards 
and forwards. 
So for instance, as I work on my memory of the coronation I 
get an image of carriages being drawn through London but I am 
uncertain whether my image is of the journey to or the journey 
from Westminster Abbey. 
We might posit that in trying to remember something we 
search backwards in memory untill we locate what we are looking 
for. Then our search changes directions and moves forward. If the 
forward search fails, then we again alter search direction and 
now search backwards. 
Whenever we attempt to formulate an explanation of a complex 
area with any precision we find that more questions are raised. 
In this instance we have posited the rule. 
< SUCCEEDING>?........ yes - search forwards. 
no - search backwards. 
Two questions are raised here. First, "What is meant by 
succeeding? ". It might be said that BABEL's primary task is to 
recognise an identity between what is happening in the outside 
world and a particular section of its memory. In other words 
BABEL tries to experience the world as being familiar. In so 
doing it operates memory searches which take time. If BABEL is 
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too slow it will never keep abreast of events, so there is a need 
to make searching as economical as possible. Our notion of 
"success" then needs to take these issues into consideration. 
The second question raised here is, "How strict is the 
<SUCCEEDING? > condition. i. e. If in searching backwards a target 
item is found and the search changes into a forward direction, 
does the very next item found have to relate to the search task 
or would it be appropriate to build into our system some loose- 
ness and give it some tolerance of failure? In order to allow 
BABEL to sort out contingency from coincidence it is neccessary 
for it to have some slackness in its search direction criterion. 
Contingency and Coincidence 
To follow how BABEL sorts out contingency from coincidence 
we'll recreate, step by step, a BABEL run. 
Assume that a section of BABEL's memory is as in Fig 4.10. 
/\ 
/\ /\ /\ i\/\ 
Fig 4.10 
For simplicity we shall adopt the convention of ignoring the 
internal structure of our chunks as shown in Fig 4.11 
Events D, A, L, &M occur in the environment and BABEL 
commences to search backwards, considering in turn, k, j, i, e, b, j, 
until (a) is found. The match between BABEL's (a) and the 
existence of (A) in the world is noted. By now, though, the world 
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has changed and (D, A, B, &M ) exist. BABEL changes search 
direction and now considers (f) before finding the next item (b) 
occuring. The coincidence during the search is noted and added to 
the memory to give us the state represented in fig 4.12. 
. 5. . 
r\ ýq\ /f\ 
Fig 4.11 
hcdgafbei 
ýf ý 
jka 
nn 
b 
Aa 
Fig 4.12 
The existence of both (d) , which was locally available, and 
(m) in the world is ignored. If the world now changes to include, 
say (I), BABEL would begin a back search, locate (i), then begin 
to search forwards. Let's assume that the world now changes to 
include W. So (i) and (k) would be integrated and fig 4.12 
updated to fig. 4.13. 
gafbeijkai 
baki 
,%/%0%. % 
Fig 4.13 
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If the same situation arose subsequently BABEL would refer 
to Ci), not find it, then referr to (a) and find that. The 
updated (a) carries assumed information about (b) and this need 
not be attended to. The sequence C (a) THEN Ci) ] would be added 
to give us fig. 4.14 
hcdgafbe, j, kaia 
bakeis 
Fig 4.14 
In following this procedure BABEL has succeeded in 
abstracting a sequence of events from a background of other 
events which do not occur in this particular instance. However 
this does not preclude the possibility that some of the events 
coded in the sequence are variable. Let's go back to the config- 
uration shown in fig 4.13. We'll go through the same sequence, 
but this time (I) does not occur. So as before.. BABEL refers to 
(i), does not find it, searches back to (a) and finds that (A) 
does occur. Search direction now changes and (I) is referred to, 
but this time (I) does not occur. The search now moves backwards, 
(a) is passed over and (k) referred to. (K) is found and concat- 
enated to (a) to give us the state represented in fig 4.15. 
So the hypothesis that (a) is followed by (i) is dropped. If 
it were the case that (i) but not (k) followed (a) then BABEL 
would have problems. So far BABEL has been typified as operating 
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optimistically making assumptions and operating on them. 
hedgafbeIjkaia 
bakika 
IS /too -, #%/ % b 
Of % 
Fig 4.15 
In the example of car driving presented earlier, the 
instructor was typified as having the ability to "unpack his 
chunks" and to present and communicate the subunits of his 
driving competence at the level at which his student operates. 
From this level he set about enabling his student to integrate 
these subunits into larger and larger chunks. 
An experienced driver can carry on a conversation with his 
passengers whilst driving. In this state he is barely aware of 
his driving activity although he seems to be doing some spot 
checks on what is going on. So he is operating his 'chunks' as 
a means to an end, and it is unlikely that he is doing anything 
Like the integration process we have just discussed unless he is 
learning something from the conversation. 
However, if traffic conditions become hectic, or something 
happens, he breaks off his conversation and attends to his 
driving. His relationship with his driving activity is changed 
and he is not making assumptions to the same degree as he was 
previously. He unpacks his chunks and checks the veracity of data 
he was formerly content to take for granted. The process of 
unpacking is shown in fig. 4.16 
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The degree to which he unpacks would depend on the 
"pressure" on his driving, and on the degree to which he needs to 
restructure his plans. There would however be limits to this 
degree of unpacking. It is not likely that he would, for 
instance, check how his fingers are coordinated to grasp the 
gearstick. 
./ 
ANA 
taIbA cK 
kibakiba k' iba 
Fig 4.16 The process of unpacking. 
Pessimissm 
We can build the notion of unpacking into BABEL by giving 
BABEL a choice between being optimistic or pessimistic depending 
on its experience of its own success. 
In Fig 4.10 ,9 chunks were considered in the search 
process; in Fig 4.13,3 chunks were considered, in Fig 4.14 only 
two possible chunks were considered. The process of integration 
greatly reduces search time. We could set the system to be 
pessimistic in its early encounters with a particular sequence of 
events. This would greatly increase search time but it would 
contribute to greater certainty later when making assumptions 
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about the world. 
So although BABEL's early perception of a sequence would be 
"magical" it would, over a period of time sift out the invariable 
items. 
Differentiation 
Consider the following situation. I walk into a clubroom 
full of elderly looking gentlemen and say, 
"I saw a hairy today! " 
Were the gentlemen members of an elite conservative 
association, they might respond, 
" Humph, deserve to be flogged, social parasites.. etc. " 
However, were they members of the local entymological 
society, I might be asked information about its colour, markings 
etc. If I am reasonably certain that my companions share my 
assumptions and attitudes, then all is well, but if I am in 
anyway out of touch with my social context then I may get into 
some misunderstandings and I may need to inform my entymological 
friends that this particular hairy had a guitar. 
In this example, metonymic coding was employed but the 
coding was ambiguous and it became neccessary to disambiguate the 
metonymy by making explicit another part of the image referred 
to. We can build the same process into BABEL by the process 
represented in fig. 4.17 
BABEL's ability to differentiate is very useful where the 
items in the chunk are co-occurring. In Candy's case presented in 
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chapter 2&3, we could say that "the presence of a cup" as a 
coding for the whole procedure was ambiguous and she learnt to 
differentiate between cups full of drink and cups full of lettuce 
leaves, and we could represent the development of her ability to 
discriminate as a process of bringing more and more information 
to the top node of her drinking procedure. 
(a) is found to 
match environment 
a 
i/ 
\a 
1%f%1% 
/i\ 
i ký 
mode = PESSIMISTIC 
so unpack 
(1) is searched for 
but is not found. 
So the chunk is now 
repacked and the 
coding disambiguated 
Fig 4.17 Disambiguation 
a 
/` 
ba 
.... 
\ia 
`a 
ký\i b" 
a 
There are some serious problems though in this typification 
of the process of differentiation and it may be that we are 
getting into an area where the analogy is stretched. With some 
further effort the analogy might be extended to fit our domain of 
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interest, but it may be the case that to consider these areas we 
might have to adopt an analogy with a very different structure, 
but that is a topic for another book. Let's consider some of 
these problems. 
Overloading 
ca db wx zY ,%.. I%, ," /\ 
0 
differentiation differe ntiation i i integration $ $ integration 
ca db d\ wx zy-ºzy A\ ` a wx i Y z 
c d b c db WX y ,. ,% ,\,. ýa d, .b c zx zy 
differentiat ion differentiation 
a y c db wxz 
ad xz 
c b y w cad''b w`xz 
integration 
diff erentiaticn 
wxzy cad b zy \ 
cadb wxzy cadb wxzy 
/f /f /\ / 
Fig 4.18 Successive operations leading to overloading. 
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It is very easy to set up a situation where, through 
successive differentiation and integration, the number of 
attributes coding a particular chunk becomes unmanageable. (see 
fig. 4.18) 
Where the number of addressing attributes is small, there is 
no need for any structuring. A Large field of addressing 
attributes would need to be structured by some means so that the 
task of searching the field is adequately organised. 
One method which we might contemplate would be to simply 
repeat the hierarchical process that BABEL already employs, but 
to employ the disambiguating features as the addressing features. 
The distinction betwen "simple" differentiation and 
"hierarchical" differentiation is further shown in fig. 4.19 
n sý 
önniss ön1s 
Fig 4.19a Simple integration 
S 
nS 
tý n t' s 
Fig 4.19b Hierarchical differentiation. 
%' /\ 0 n' 
ont5 
1%1%1 1\ 
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Although it serves well in allowing the reorganisation 
of attribute importance, the use of hierarchical differentiation 
may seem cumbersome and redundant when our chunks deal with 
co-occuring attributes. When the chunks are of such a size that 
they cover sequential information, there are some interesting 
consequences. 
Consider the following configuration (fig 4.20) 
abcdef 
Fig. 4.20 
Let's suppose that BABEL is operating in an environment 
where at a given moment the sequence A>C>D>F occurs. 
At this moment (A) is occuring so a backward search is 
initiated and (a) found. Search now changes direction, but at the 
same time the environment is moving through the A>C>D 
sequence, so (C) now is occurring. The sequential occurence of A 
>C is coded as in fig. 4.21 
abcdefa 
i\ 
%\ 
/\ /A 
ýýcgýa 
Fig 4.21 
The search continues and the D>F sequence is coded. (Fig 4.22) 
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Fig 4.22 
In a repeated scanning of the same sequence we have (A) 
is again found and (F) is anticipated, but (F) has not yet 
occured. Unpacking at this point would make (c), the next item in 
the sequence, accessible. However, if the coding is altered as a 
hierarchical differentiation we get the state described in fig 
4.23. 
d 
`d 
.f 1% 
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ý 
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/c\ ac 
.I\j\ 
'ý\ c sg% a 
Fig 4.23 
Whilst this form of coding raises difficulties in 
handling search directions the consequences of addressing a 
sequence by an anticipated state is important since it allows for 
the possibility of searching for a goal and using that goal to 
call up the sequence that leads up to it. 
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This points to another aspect of human cognitive 
functioning that BABEL in its present form does not handle. 
BABEL, as it has been described thus far, operates by trying to 
build a data structure and mapping it onto the ongoing events in 
the environment such that it anticipates events. As a theory 
BABEL focuses on the nature of the data structure and also on the 
processes which organise the mapping between the data structure 
and the environment. 
However, much of human activity involving planning and 
problem solving involves organising mapping relationships between 
personal data structures as well as relating these to the 
enviroment. 
This presents us with some fascinating questions. 
However, it does seem, from the author's point of view, that we 
can gain more understanding of what distinguishes a mentally 
handicapped child from, a normal child by focussing on the issues 
involved in understanding the management of success and failure 
in processes of the type hypothesised in this chapter. 
This theme is taken up in chapters 8&9 where an 
attempt is made to extend the model in that direction. 
The notions of integration and diffentiation have 
considerable utility in providing us with a means of developing 
an overview of sensori-motor development and some differential 
diagnosis of specific problems that mentally handicapped children 
encounter in covering 'the sensori-motor syllabus'. The nature of 
this syllabus is reviewed in the next chapter. 
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The Suppression of Action 
In the same way that BABEL needs to choose whether it needs 
to be optimistic or pessimistic, to integrate or to 
differentiate.. BABEL has another dimension of choice and that is, 
whether to ACT or not. In the early discussion of list 
structures, actions were structured in the same way as 
sensations. In other words a list item could refer to a set of 
sensations or to a set of instructions, and depending on the 
nature of the event being coded, sensations and actions could 
interrelate in a variety of ways. In BABEL's representation this 
means that coded items could have either status. The nodes in the 
hierarchies may refer to inputs or to outputs. We will not make 
much of this feature in this presentation but this dimension of 
choice has important implications for cognitive change. 
Consider the following problem set to a toddler. A desired 
object is placed in a low cupboard. In front of the cupboard 
drawer is placed an obstacle light enough for the toddler to 
move. One toddler approaches the cupboard, pulls it open, 
discovers the obstacle, and then moves it out of the way before 
returning to opening the cupboard door. Another toddler will 
approach the door, move the obstacle out of the way before 
attempting to open the door. This second child has demonstrated 
the ability to imagine himself operating the action of opening 
the cupboard door. In this act of imagining he has anticipated 
the problem. The first infant encountered the problem in the 
execution of the act. The second infant 'planned'. 
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If we attempted to model this with BABEL the process would 
procede something like this. The first infant would call up the 
chunk [OPEN CUPBOARD] and attempt to operate it. The obstactle 
would induce failure and so the chunk would be unpacked, compared 
to the ambient situation, a solution would be searched for and 
[MOVE OBJECT] implemented. The second infant would call up the 
[OPEN CUPBOARD] chunk and operate it, but in operating this chunk 
he would decide not to implement any actions called up during his 
operation of the chunk. This would allow him to call up the image 
of him self implementing the actions and the previous consequences 
of his action. A mismatch between this scenario and the 
confronting situation would invoke the same back search that made 
CtIOVE OBJECT] the first infant engaged in. This could be 
incorporated into the [OPEN CUPBOARD] chunk, possibly checked out 
under the same condition of choosing not to act, and then finally 
and successfully implemented. 
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PART 2. 
THE SENSORY MOTOR CURRICULUM 
Towards a functional cognitive assesment of the mentally 
handicapped child. 
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CHAPTER 5a sensory motor curriculum. 
INTRODUCTION 
Attempting to understand the nature of playlessness implies 
that given this understanding we may be in a position to talk 
about therapy. In an educational setting this could be 
interpreted as knowing how to educate a severely or profoundly 
handicapped child. Let's assume that we have the benefit of such 
understanding and we know how to teach. We still need to know 
what to teach. In other words we need a curriculum. 
A curriculum means many things to many people and the topic 
of curriculum design has enjoyed a recent fashionability in 
normal school education. Inevitably, this fashionability has 
spilt over into special education. 
In educational philosophy, two opposing extremes can be 
discerned which seem to arise from assumptions about human 
nature. 
1) Education should provide the child with the 
knowledge and skills neccessary for his future life 
such that he will be a useful member of society. 
2) Education should be about the provision of 
opportunities within which the child can develop his own 
potential 
The curricula that arise from the first position are 
pragmatic. From a psychological point of view they imply a 
behaviourist position inasmuch as the onus of responsibility for 
curriculum design is vested in his cultural environment. The 
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child here is seen as a passive recipient of the wisdom of his 
elders. 
There is another, opposing version of pragmatism, wherin the 
child is seen, not as a tabula rasa, but as a savage needing to 
be trained and civilised. This is the moralistic victorian pole 
of pragmatism. 
The nature of a curriculum for the idealist is problematic, 
inasmuch as it implies that the child is privy to his own 
curriculum. From a psychological point of view an innate position 
is implied. This simple interpretation of the idealist position 
would lead to the absurd statement that, say, know ledge of the 
periodic tables is innate. 
This is a gross distortion of the idealist position which 
would propose that a child's natural curiosity, his innate 
ability to acquire and organise his own experience, leads him to 
the most useful understanding of the world of which he is a part. 
The notion of a curriculum would meet with some suspicion from an 
extreme idealist. 
In practice, the consensus within our culture seems to 
assume an idealist position for infancy, but has a tendency to 
operate a pragmatic position which increases with the age of the 
child. 
The assumption of an idealist attitude towards infancy is 
not staightforward. In areas of competence, such as walking, 
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talking, etc. where there is no controversy about the nature and 
content of the competence, parents seem happy to adopt an 
idealist position, and few parents would claim to have taught 
their children these abilities. Areas such as toilet training, 
demand verses schedule feeding, which have connotations of 
morality, personality, and about which there is controversy, seem 
to elicit a pragmatic stance from parents and they are happy to 
see themselves in a training role. 
Bruner (1972) has an interesting and rather controversial 
suggestion. Given that child rearing practices are "designed" to 
prepare infants for a specific culture, parents in modern 
industrial societies have a problem inasmuch as they are not in a 
position to know what sort of culture their offspring will grow 
up to be part of. He suggests , rather controversially, that the 
adolescents have their fingers closer to the cultural pulse and 
are therefore in a better position to provide appropriate child 
rearing practices. 
In the non controversial areas of infant competence, the 
normal infant appears to educate himself with remarkable ease and 
proficiency {R. A. Brown (1973) though in reality parents play a 
powerful but subtle role in this process. 
The mentally handicapped child encounters considerable 
developmental problems and may give up the struggle and become 
stuck at a particular point in his development. 
The existence of an intrinsic ability to learn is a 
presupposition of the idealist educator so that when he is faced 
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with a mentally handicapped child his basic tenets become 
untenable and , if he is to operate in the field, he is forced to 
shift his ground and become more pragmatic. This may induce him 
to invoke the notion that there are two kinds of human nature, 
which may produce an uncomfortable conflict in his ideology. 
In his practice he will be forced to countenance the idea of 
a curriculum and he may attempt to resolve his ideological 
conflict by looking to normal child development for a curriculum. 
The pragmatist's curriculum may be structured by considering 
what skills and competences are required to live a normal life 
and set up these skills as training goals. A normal adult though 
employs a very rich repertoire of abilities, in working, in 
relating to others, communicating etc., and the prospect of 
training such a complexity is daunting. 
The pragmatist has some very real problems in deciding what 
subsets of the normal adult competence should be in his 
curriculum. A realistic and useful response to this is to 
recognise the limitations of one's own training method and to 
limit the contents of the curriculum to those items which can be 
taught, given the skills of the educator. 
In practice the recognition of one's own limitations is 
threatening and there is a tendency to ignore those areas of 
competence which are untrainable. The result is a very abridged 
version of a normal adult's competence. The "successful" 
mentally handicapped person, when viewed in this framework, 
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polishes his shoes and teeth regularity, folds his trousers 
neatly on the chair at night, reports punctually to work which 
may consist of putting cotton wool balls in paper bags. 
Some of these issues are highlighted in the study of 
language acquisition and the application of this understanding to 
the problem of retarded language acquisition in the mentally 
handi capped. 
An early formal approach to the understanding of language 
acquisition was that proposed by behaviourist psychologies such 
as that of Skinner (1957). 
The acquisition of language was seen as a process whereby 
correct responses by the child were shaped and reinforced by the 
parents. The approach said little about the structure of language 
(however see Staats, 1969) and places the responsibility for the 
program on the environment. 
This point of view was optimistically adopted by people 
working with the mentally handicapped since it gave considerable 
hope that something might be done to help the many hundreds of 
mentally handicapped children who had no speech. 
Skinners' position came under some very strong attack from 
Chomsky and Miller (1963) who argued that using the process 
Skinner proposed, it would take many thousands of years to 
acquire the linguistic competence of the average adult. Chomsky 
also emphasised the generative quality of language. i. e. the idea 
that an utterance could be utterly novel. He argued that any 
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account of language should take this creative aspect into 
account. Chomsky's earlier work focussed on the syntactic aspects 
of language, and his aim was, in principle, to write a grammar, 
the minimal set of rules which would generate a given language. 
In contemplating the ease and rapidity with which normal 
children acquired this complex body of rules, Chomsky and Miller 
commented that what the child did was either miraculous or 
impossible! 
They opted for the "miraculous" explanation, the miracle 
being that the child had a ready made structure which he employed 
to master his mother tongue. They further appeared to postulate 
that this language acquisition device was in some form innate. 
The implication of Chomsky's work are pessimistic for those 
working with the non speaking mentally handicapped in that the 
problem becomes insoluble, and writers such as Lennenberg 
(1967) reinforced this pessimism. 
Naturally, those working on helping the mentally handicapped 
despai red of learning anything from psycholingui sti cs and for 
many years were ignorant of subsequent developments in the field. 
Academics such as Slobin (1973) did not accept the innatism 
of Chomsky and in effect opted for the explanation that the 
toddler managed to do what Chomsky and Miller termed "the 
impossible". 
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The cognitive position in effect accepts that the child has 
a ready made structure but maintains that this structure is 
acquired during infancy and is a "cognitive, perceptual 
structure". Developments from the cognitive position have 
increasingly emphasised the social nature of the infant's 
learning. (e. g. Bruner (1975)} 
The implications of this for the mentally handicapped is 
much more optimistic and many behaviour modifiers have begun to 
deal with areas of prelinguistic competence, such as object 
permanence. 
Assuming that we accept the cognitive position then the 
understanding gained from this framework should be hot news for a 
curriculum for the mentally handicapped child. In the next 
chapter I shall outline a prelinguistic, or sensory motor 
curriculum. 
Yule and Berger(1975), working from the pragmatic point of 
view of the behaviour modifier very bravely and honestly try to 
grapple with ideas generated by the cognitive position, but 
encounter problems which arise from assumptions generated by an 
innapropriate underlying S-R model of the learning process. 
I am suggesting that the process of teaching is inextricably 
tied to and functionally related to the material taught, and this 
implies that the learning process, even when considered 
abstractly, cannot be divorced from the content of what is being 
taught and the overall structure provided by the curriculum. 
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The ancient Greek philosopher, Heraclitus saw everything as 
change and process, and maintained that stability and permanence 
was an illusion imposed upon reality by the human intellect. This 
view of reality has considerable currency in modern physics, 
whereby objects seen by the layman as simple and solid are 
understood by the physisist to be an expression of the dynamic 
interplay of complex fields of energy. 
Adopting a Heraclitian view, a general principle seems to 
operate that everything at one level has content and structure, 
but viewed at a different level the static description can be 
understood as a dynamic process. The attempt to define the 
process of transposition of process to structure arises in most 
sciences, including psychology. 
These points may seem very abstract and divorced from the 
problems of the mentally handicapped, but there is a strong 
implication that if one sets about to teach the mentally 
handicapped child in areas of infant competence such as language, 
then it is neccessary to understand the nature of the curriculum 
and also to understand that what the child learns is inextricably 
tied with how he learns. 
The nature of the interaction between mother and normal 
infant seems to be designed to "educate" the infant in a manner 
ideally suited to his needs. The notion of a curriculum is alien 
to most mothers. If one asked a mother, 
"What aspect of language are you teaching your child today? " 
She would be unable to answer and probably regard the question as 
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strange. Indeed, as we shall see shortly, when a mother does see 
herself in a didactic role, then the infant's language 
acquisition is likely to be impaired. Despite the unconsious and 
intuitive manner that mothers go about the business of mothering, 
babies tend to follow a similar course of development. Even so, 
there is some variation, and it would seem from K. Nelson's 
(1973) study of early language acquisition that there are several 
ways in which the child can acquire language. The path taken by a 
particular child seems to reflect both his and his mother's style 
of relating to the world. 
Structure and Strategy in Learning to TaLk 
Some of the issues I have raised are well illustrated by 
Nelson's study. In it she looked closely at a group of 20 
children during the period that they acquired their first 50 
words. Her subjects all came from an American university campus 
and all had superior developmental quotients (mean D. Q. =120). In 
her study she focussed on what went on between mother and child 
and characterised the language acquisition process as a 
negotiation between the two. 
She found, for instance, that the active participation of 
the child in family activities was important to the acquisition 
process. Children who went on frequent outings fared far better 
than those in T. V. orientated families, despite television 
providing a wealth of illustrated language. 
The words that children in her sample tended to acquire, 
refered either to interesting objects, especially animals, or to 
99 
objects that the child himself acted upon. For instance, articles 
of clothing that children of that age could manage themselves, 
such as shoes, socks, featured prominently in the child's 
vocabulary, whereas the word "diaper" was conspicuously absent, 
despite the likelihood, that of all the articles of clothing 
named, "diaper" is likely to have a very high frequency of usage. 
Nelson classified her mother/child pairs in these 3 ways. 
a) Whether mother and child agreed or not about how to 
categorise the world. For instance, Mother might see the 
grand piano and the kitchen table as being utterly different 
classes of object, whereas her child might see them both as 
flat surfaces with which to go 'brrrm brrrm" with a toy car. 
b) Whether Mother was didactic and tended to correct what 
her child was saying, or whether mother operated by trying 
to understand the message that her child was trying to 
communi cate. 
c) Whether language development was in terms of vocabulary 
growth, or in terms of increased syntactic complexity. 
This latter dimension related to the childs interests and 
seemed to be sex linked. Object orientation, typical of boys, 
resulted in the development of vocabulary. Social orientation, 
doll play, role playing etc. tended to result in development in 
syntactic complexity. A third group of children tended to 
orientate themselves more to activities. The relationship between 
these and the form of their language development was not clear. 
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Nelson found that where mother and child agreed about 
partitioning the world and where mother attended to what the 
child was trying to communicate, then language was likely to be 
precocious, but where there was disagreement about the world, and 
mother played a didactic role, then the child's language would be 
retarded despite his intelligence. (See fig 5.1) 
CONSENSUS MEANING 
DIFFERENT MEANING Language 
Retarded 
Language 
Precocious 
DIDACTIC ENABLING 
Fig 5.1 Nelson's categorisation of mother toddler speech. 
She gives an account of a boy in the latter category. An 
early word that he began to use was CAR, this being used for 
cars, trucks, lorries, etc. Mother seemed happy with this usage, 
but when he also acquired the word TRUCK which he applied to 
trucks, lorries, tractors, buses, etc. she would correct him. 
From the boy's point of view it seems that he was attending to 
the size of wheeled vehicles and had formulated the hypothesis 
that big vehicles were called trucks, as opposed to small 
vehicles which were called, cars. However, he received so many 
disconfirmations to his hypothesis that he eventually discarded 
the word and regressed to his first use of the word CAR. 
We can speculate from Nelson's example on what might have 
happened had the mother been more accepting. Plausibly, mother 
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would have accepted the "car-truck" dichotomy as labeling the 
sizes of wheeled vehices. Having worked through this theory, the 
child might then have begun to attend to those exemplars of large 
vehicles that carried people, and needing a label for these, 
would have acqui red the word "bus". Later he might attend to 
vehicles that worked on land, and so acquired the word "tractor". 
It should be noted in passing that part of this process 
involves the notion of decentration introduced in chapters 2 and 
3. 
Let me briefly say here, that although the mothers' role in 
the acquisition process is that of enabling by confirming 
hypothesis, we shall see later that she also has the role 
of di sconfi rming and extending hypothesis. It seems that the 
skill of mothering entails managing these apparently 
contradictory roles in a manner that meets the developmental 
needs of her child. 
With the insights provided by Nelson's study in mind, the 
following incident underlines some of the problems of an over 
rigid task orientated regime for the mentally handicapped child. 
A teacher in a community school for the mentally handicapped 
was conducting a language class with a group of children using 
the Peamundy Language Development Kit. On the table was a box of 
plastic fruit. One child became very excited and began to 
repeatedly utter the word "apple" whilst reaching for a plastic 
orange. Her teacher immediately corrected her, saying, 
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"It's not an apple it's an orange" 
Wherupon the child was reduced to a crestfallen silence. 
It would seem, in the Nelson study, that a "curriculum" 
exists in the emergence of additional dimensions being attended 
to, but the "curriculum" is not invariant. A rural child would 
possibly have acquired the word "tractor" before the urban child. 
The developmental curricum is not the child's private internal 
program but has some relationship with his experience. 
The adoption of an idealist position on the mentally handi- 
capped child emphasises the need to be clear about the 
relationship between structure and process. Furthermore, in order 
to realise an idealist position we must recognise our ignorance 
about the nature of the developmental process in the mentally 
handicapped child. We need some framework that will guide our 
endeavours so that we do not get lost. This will be the task of 
the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Integration and Differentiation fron a Systen Perspective 
In the account of Sadie, the echolalic child we typified her 
problem as an inability to either perceive or construct a 
relationship between her vocal competence and her understanding 
of the world. For Sadie, "words" and "things" did not fit 
together, but by using her play, we succeeded in some small 
measure in drawing her attention to the relationship. 
In a less pedantic manner than that employed in the previous 
chapter we can typify our therapeutic endeavour as making 
possible the integration of two hitherto isolated systems which 
we might label the vocal and the semantic. 
We also described a crawling child in similar terms. He has 
available a Locomotor system and a system for exploring objects, 
but, as with Sadie, he cannot at a given time in his development 
perceive or construct a relationship between the two systems. 
When, eventually, he does integrate the two systems then he has a 
new superordinate system for dealing with objects located in 
large spaces. 
In contrast, a babies' mouth/throat has a multiplicity of 
functions; eating, crying, mouthing, etc.; and initially the whole 
complex of mouth functions operates as one system, but with the 
development of vocalisation a differentiation of the mouth/throat 
into two separate sub-systems can be perceived. 
Similarity, a differentiation of systems can be perceived 
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in the area of hearing. At one point in his development the 
infant does not seem to be aware that his own sounds are 
different from those uttered by the adult, especially since 
adults are in the habit of imitating infant noises (Pawlby, 
1977). At a later point in his development though he will 
distinguish between two systems of sounds. The first involves his 
own sounds and those addressed to him by adults, whilst the 
second involves adult to adult speech which is beyond his 
understanding. Understanding here entails not the semantic 
meaning of the adult utterance but having models that make the 
phonemic sequences that adults produce predictable and 
repeatable. 
He may initially not attend to adult speech but as his 
understanding of speech sounds developes he will begin to attend 
to overheard conversations and attend, not to the individual 
syllables of the speech, but to the parasodic overlays of adult 
speech. i. e. the intonations used by adults. He may play with the 
pattern of intonations, quite often accompanied by the 
appropriate gestures etc. Here the differentiation of systems 
employs different processes from those employed in the mouth 
example. 
In the differentiation of the mouth we have a separation of 
a system of competence into two sybsystems appropriate to a 
particular context. The differentiation between adult speech and 
infant speech entails the recognition of the possibility of 
competence in a sub system of what was previously beyond the 
infant's competence. This then is a differentiation by selection, 
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recognising that a system is knowable against a background of 
uncomprehended relationships. 
We can now utilise the notion of integration, differ- 
entiation and selection to give us an overview of sensory motor 
development. The overview is summarised in fig 5.8 and the 
following section is intended to explain the diagram. It should 
be stressed that the overview is a framework for making sense of 
the interrelationships between various aspects of sensori-motor 
development leading up to the acquisition of language, rather 
than anything more definitive. 
The Sensori Motor Field 
We will begin by making the assumtion that the infant 
experiences himself not as an integrated whole, but as different 
systems of sensory experience and actions. We can represent this 
state of affairs as fig 6.1. 
GD 
HANDS EYES MOUTH 0 
EARS CED 
Fig. 6.1 The infant represented as a set of separate 
action/experience systems. 
Early on in his development the infant becomes aware that 
there is a relationship between the actions of his hand, which he 
experiences as kinaesthetic sensation, and the spectacle of his 
hands moving in his field of view. Here we have an integration. 
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Likewise the infant becomes aware that there is a correlation 
between activities focused in his mouth/throat system and events 
experienced in his hearing system. 
The infant also learns to use the muscles of his face to 
smile and to elicit repeatable spectacles in the form of his 
mothers' response. 
We can update this state of affairs from that shown in fig 
6.1 to that given in fig. 6.2 
LEGS 
Mother 
MOUTH EARS FACE 
Smiling 
Feeding 
Early Babbling 
Fig 6.2 The emergence of handwatching and babbling 
If we consider the elicitation of parental responses we can 
see that the picture is far more complex than is represented 
here, since the process of eliciting repeatable actions from 
mother involves both seeing her face, so the visual system is 
involved, and also eliciting cooing behaviour from her which of 
course involves hearing. 
It also seems that there may be underlying maturational 
107 
Handwatching 
processes. Lennenberg (1967) suggests that the emergence of 
smiling is maturational since it appears that smiling emerges at 
a fixed period of time after conception. Premature babies will 
smile at a later chronological age than full term babies but at. 
the same conceptual age. (See Fig 6.3) 
Full term infant In utero Birth 
Premature infant In utero---O-Birth 
Smile 
Fig 6.3 The first smile as a function of conceptual age. 
There is some debate over this issue but for our purposes we 
can entertain the possibility that such maturational processes 
occur in many areas of infant competence. 
Accepting the possibility that such processes occur does not 
imply acceptance of a naturist position. In the case of smiling 
it may be that the infant has the opportunity to learn to smile, 
but if he fails then maturational smiling helps to ensure the 'v 
inception of the baby into the social play of his family. 
Issues of greater subtlety are encountered in the 
development of babbling. During early babbling particular 
sequences tend to occur. 
In the case of consonant development, the infant begins by 
being restricted to back consonants such as 'K' and 'G'. But as 
his babbling developes his repertoire increases to include new 
consonant sounds by increasingly using the frontal areas of the 
108 
. jUt:,. hi S giVE'S LiS a sequences 
In the c6: se of vo! els the converse appears to happen, 
ülthouch there is Some d; oate her: _. Sone authors { sec Gluck- 
soocr-Danks (1050 maintain that lnltlaL voller sounds are 
prcc: uced in the frort o the [mouth but the repertoi rc J velopcs 
an, eil. ` (Co. 
- 
'_. 
-., 
) 
front sounds 
CONSONANTS 
back scunds 
frcnt sounds 
VOWELS 
back sounds 
"eel' "uuh" "ah" 10 eeh" 
rL jrc. 
i! r- re a roin the oosssibiLity rises that trnere 
is a 
maturational process underlying the sequence since it is reported 
that deaf children invariably pass through a normal babbling 
period (Oleron, 1953). However, whatever the nature of the process 
underlying the scc, uence, the exi stence of such a "one bit at a 
tinn, io" ecquisition of ! ohonctic responses does see: to h nve 
ic. -., _ortant con scGuenc° 
Initially the child: uill äe attending to iris oilti sounds 
109 
before begining to attend to those sounds created by his parents. 
If we adopt a motor theory of speech perception (Liberman et at., 
1967) whereby it is assumed that the child attends to and 
organises those sounds in his environment which have a relation- 
ship to his own productions, then were the child to have a large 
initial repertoire he would be faced with unravelling a complex 
range of sound patterns. The existence of some process which 
would introduce the infant slowly to his repertoire makes life 
much simpler for him in that initially the process decides for 
him what to attend to and organise. 
Returning to our much simplified framework, we can represent 
such a process as a simple integration of subsets of adult speech 
into the infants' sound reception/production system. 
The infants' exploration of objects is initially oral but 
with the development of hand-eye coordination, the hands become a 
means of bringing objects to the mouth until a point is reached 
where the hand-eye system itself becomes a means for exploring 
objects. 
These developments, and the development through crawling of 
the childs' conception of himself operating in large space is 
represented in fig 6.5. 
With the realisation, mentioned earlier, that crawling is a 
means of attaining desired objects, the infant has a large system 
dealing with what might be termed object/spatial competence. 
Within this system there is continual restructuring and 
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development. 
LEGS 
Crawling 
HANDS) I EYES 
Handwatching 
MOUTH 
Feeding 
L 
Mother 
EARS FACE 
Smiling 
Early Babbling 
s 
Adult Speech 
Fig 6.5 Further development of the infants' systems 
An important development is that of tool use, whereby an 
object is employed as a means of acquiring a given end, rather 
than as an end in itself. The classical demonstration of this is 
phenomenon is that of Kohler's ape who used a stick to gain a 
banana just out of his reach. (Kohler, 1925). 
In the Piagetian account of sensory motor development, this 
development heralds the fifth stage of development. The use of an 
object as a means rather than as an end has very important 
consequences. 
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Consider a thirsty toddler wanting a drink. His drink is in 
a high cupboard and out of his reach. He goes to Mum tugging at 
her and directing her attention to the desired object by pointing 
or looking at it. Mother obliges by interpreting her childs' 
message and performing the appropriate action. 
In this scenario.. Mother is structurally equivant to the 
stick used to gain the banana, and is simply a means used by the 
child to gain his particular end, but in using mother as a means 
the toddler has had to communicate his intentions. Throughout his 
life the child has, in a sense, communicated, but the action 
described here is different since he needs to plan his 
communicative act before he deliberately operates his scheme. 
In our systemic framework we have an integration of the 
social/interactive system with that of object/spatial 
competence. Within this system the operation of greater sophis- 
tication in the use of gesture promotes the further development 
of the social and object/spatial fields. 
Throughout the development of these systems the child 
becomes increasingly sophisticated in the means in which he uses 
his mind's eye and he becomes a sophisticated manipulator of 
images. For example, he can visualise himself operating a plan, 
and foresee problems before he puts the plan into concrete 
operation. ( The example of a blocked cupboard door is already 
given on page 88 ). 
In chapter 3, the idea was presented that images could 
be addressed by actions. The use of such addressing devices gives 
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the child greater freedom and flexibility in dealing with the 
here and now. Indeed it may be said that the child is released 
from the constraints of reality. The use of symbols represents a 
further step in the development of distance from reality, but in 
order to successfully use these, the child needs the flexibility 
afforded by a sophistication in his use of mental imagery. A 
closer look at the development of object permanence is presented 
in the interpretation of the Uzgiris and Hunt scales presented in 
appendix 1. For our present purposes we may consider that we have 
here a system dealing with social/object/spatial competence 
developing to the point that it becomes possible for the child to 
support a symbolic system. The symbolic system is available in 
the language of the parents and the child has already developed a 
competence in some aspects of this system during the development 
of babbling. The final integration then is the integration of the 
phonemic system with the social/object/spatial system. The 
development of the total system is represented in fig 6.6. * 
The following account of how this might happen is appealing 
but probably simplistic. 
In our account of the course of babbling we have the child's 
repertoire of sounds increasing until he finally acquires front 
consonants (b, d, n, m. ) and back vowels (a). Babbled combinations 
of these sounds result in utterances such as (mama, dada, nana, 
baba, papa ) which are usually recognised as the infant's first 
----------------------------------------------------------------- * The schein ati sati on is my simplification and integration of 
Piaget's account of sensori-motor development, with a few 
elaborations. The scematisation was promoted by the insight that 
the echololic child maintained a boundary between speech and his 
sensori-motor semantic system. 
113 
T 
a 
n 
m i 
m 
i 
3 
c 
-4 
= 
m 
m 
-< z mV 
Ny 
r 
m 
cl 
CA 
SOCIAL INTERACTIONS 
N 
3 
H 
r 
H 
C, 
m 
o. 
4 
V) 
N CD 
NN 
rO 
rp ý 
ý r. 
to 1 
"3 
0 
r+ 
O 
CD 
CD 
r- 
O 
B 
CD 
r+ 
d 
N 
W 
T 
. d. 
CL 
0 
r+ 
CD 
to 
J. 
M 
to 
an 
ai r 
r-< 
H 
Z '/ 
G7 G1 
ADULT SPEECH 
as 
ýz 
H 
OBJECTS 
- 
ZV 
O 
z3 
aa 
-I -a NN 
z cn z 
--4 m 
m 
3O 
T 
s 
0 
z 
A 
\tm 
m 
x 
1. 
Ar 
ö 
-4 
z/ 
Goe XN,, ýRN 
0 
on 
00 
3 
('ý mJ 
m 
z 
N 
H 
O 
Z 
OBJECTS 
0 
a) 
C 
m 
r 
M c, NO 
-1 O. 0 W 
CA 33, C- 
ß -4 m 
m. +n 
-4 a -+ 
Cnv mr 
r+ -+" z 
Nd A 
to to m 
rý(D 
r+ 
ýn - N 
n 
a 
r 
z 
ANOCn 
O0WO 
aý-n 
U--4mº-4 
CA "X) mr. na 
rt e. -a a -a r 11,91, mr 
(12 Q z 
tDm 
,,. r m 
o, - (n 
SYMBOLIC SYSTEM 
SPATIAL 
114 
words. As far as I know these forms are to be found universally 
regardless of the infant's mother tongue. (see also Ferguson, 
1964) 
Baby's first words are part of his parent's culture so his 
production of 'mama' or 'dada' is anticipated with keen relish. 
When baby does produce the magic words ( usually, to mothers 
chagrin, it seems to be 'dada' ) parents respond with the same 
enthusiasm as they did to his smile many months previously. 
It is very tempting to suggest that this happens at the same 
time as the toddler is ready to support a symbolic system. Such a 
coincidence would have a nice design logic, but it does seem to 
happen earlier. 
It seems that the infant, throughout the development of his 
systemic integration goes through two levels of process. 
a) The awareness that two systems are somehow related 
without neccessarily knowing how. 
b) The development of understanding how they are related. 
It may be the case that the emergence of utterances such as 
"mama", serve to draw the toddler's attention to the possibility 
that the two systems are interelated. Indeed it is invariably the 
case that in language acquisition the child's comprehension 
develops ahead of his productive competence. As McNamarra (1972) 
pointed out, the child needs to know what he is going to say 
before he attempts to say it. 
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We have already suggested the idea that echolalia is a 
failure to integrate two systems. This is rather a trite 
statement since it misses out the complexity of what integrating 
the two systems entails. In our account of Sadie we attempted a 
much richer explanation, but even here we only succeeded in 
presenting a plausible explanation about how the two systems 
might be integrated such that Sadie would be able to decenter and 
attend to elements from the two systems, thus allowing her to 
integrate the elements into novel aspects ( words standing for 
things) which form the basis of a new system. 
Some further insights into the subtleties of the process of 
system integration/differentiation may be gained from the 
following hypothesis about an experience which the reader may 
share. 
In hearing an exotic foreign Language, ones' experience is 
of hearing, not strange words, but a confused flowing gobbel- 
dygook. It seems that the gaps perceived between words do not 
exist in the physical sounds that come from the speakers mouth, 
but are put in by the listener. 
Thisworkswithwrittenaswellasspokenlanguage. 
My own experience of acquiring some very limited modern 
Greek seems to follow the following course. 
Following an initial period of hearing Greek as a continuous 
flow of strange sounds, I began to discern the occasional word, 
Presumably these words either occured frequently or had some 
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phonemic similarity to english words. Endax.. O. K. has frequent 
usage, and 'Aftos' sounds like 'after'. Having gained a few such 
words I was able to somehow discover a structure and suddenly I 
heard Greek as strings of words, without neccessarily knowing 
what the words meant. 
It may be that in acquiring just a few words I had enough 
information with which to decode the rules operating the 
intonation contours of Greek. By recognising the portion of the 
intonation pattern that corresponded to the words I knew, I may 
then have looked for similar intonational sequences within other 
segments of speech. Having found these the corresponding sections 
of gobbeldygook emerged as words. 
Despite the gross simplificatins and omissions neccessary to 
produce a diagramatic summary of sensori-motor development it 
provides us with a useful framework for looking at some of the 
problems of the developmentally retarded child. 
I have already, in the account of the synthesis of speech 
and meaning, partially introduced the notion of systemic 
synchrony whereby two systems are developing concurrently but 
independently and where the possibility of integrating the two 
systems entails that they are mutually ready for integration. 
When we view the retarded child through this framework we 
often find that asynchrony of two systems contibutes to and 
compounds their problems. 
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For example, the normal adolescent can cope to a reasonable 
extent with the problems presented by puberty. The pubescent 
mentally handicapped child lacks the language, the selfawareness, 
the social maturity, etc., which would help him to cope. 
Our systemic framework allows us to specify component 
subsystems which need to be at an appropriate developmental level 
before a given child can be expected to talk. 
He needs... 
a)Cognitively, to be able to symbolise. (Piagetian stage 6) 
b)To have something to talk about. 
c)Be interested in people and want to communicate 
d)Have some understanding of how to communicate ( stage 5) 
e)Have a sufficient mastery of speech sounds to be able to use 
this competence in language. 
The low functioning autistic child often has (a), (b), and 
(e) but his asocial orientation precludes the possibility of 
communication. Until work is done with him in the area of social 
interaction attempts to promote language are likely to be 
premature unless the portion of language taught is explicitly 
directed at developing social competence. 
Some mentally handicapped children appeared to have babbled 
at an earlier period in their life, but at a time when their 
corresponding interactive and cognitive systems were 
insufficiently developed to support the babbling. These children, 
instead of becoming echolalic, seem to lose interest in sounds 
and become mute, and functionally deaf. If eventually they do 
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acquire (a), (b), (c), and (d) they still lack the productive 
competence to talk. In the case of such children and also 
children who are not neccessarily mute but whose phonemic 
competence is retarded, it is useful to focus on a non verbal 
communicative system such as a sign language in order to allow 
the development of communicative competence to procede. At the 
same time work can potentially be done on the sound system. 
The notion of developmental asynchrony highlights the 
vacuity of giving a mentally handicapped child an all embracing 
mental age. Even where there is no asynchrony there are 
considerable differences between a mentally handicapped child 
and a normal child of the same mental age. If they are compared 
in terms of cognitive structure then the mentaly handicapped 
child will have operated that structure for many years, whereas 
his normal counterpart will operate that structure only briefly 
before moving on to other means of structuring his knowledge. 
Viewed thus the handicapped child knows more about his world than 
his normal counterpart. 
Conversely, if a comparisom is made on the basis of the 
content of the child's knowledge then we may find a mentally 
handicapped child to have a mental age of three, yet he cannot 
talk. 
The notion of systemic integration and differentiation is 
particularity useful in working with the profoundly handicapped 
child. 
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For example Arnold is 14 years old. On developmental tests 
he scores at the level of only a few weeks. He is microcephalic 
and severely spastic. Without regular physiotherapy, his arms 
tend to bend tightly at the elbows and to be tucked in against 
his chest. His hands bend tighly at the wrist and there is little 
freedom of movement. He is apparently deaf. 
I attempted to work with him in order to develope the 
possibility of some voluntary motion but found no clear cut 
behaviour to respond to. I also undertook to exercise his arms in 
order to relax his muscles, but any gross behaviour engaged in 
only served to increase the spasm. 
Eventually I employed a stethoscope to monitor his heart 
beat as an indicator of whether he was responding and attending 
to my activities or not. Tickling etc., produced no obvious 
effect on heart beat. I had observed that on occasions he would 
scratch the back of his neck. When I replicated his actions there 
was a dramatic increase in heart rate. 
This effect could be repeated several times. By 
alternatively scratching the back of his neck and then tickling 
under his arms it was eventually possible to gain a heart rate 
response by tickling alone. Further activities involved a counted 
finger walk prior to tickling (i. e. one, two, three, tickle! ) 
Eventually Arnold would produce an anticipatory tensing of his 
body when counting was used without finger walking. The 
rhythmical sound of counting was sufficient data for anticipation 
of the tickle. 
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This procedure, quite explicitly, used the notions of 
integration and a variety of differentiation to extend the range 
of events that Arnold attended to (see fig 6.7). Differentiation 
here seems to differ from that described in chapter 4 inasmuch as 
the original addressing feature disappears, leaving the secondary 
disambigating feature alone. We shall examine this notion further 
in chapters 8&9. 
(1) [Neck scratch] 
(2) [Neck scratch] + [Tickle] 
(3) [Neck Scratch] OR [Tickle] 
(4) [Neck Scratch] OR [Counting] + [Finger Walk] + [Tickle] 
(5) [Neck Scratch] OR [Counting] OR [Finger Walk] + [Tickle] 
Fig 6.7 Sequence of phenomena available to Arnold's attention. 
Formal Assessment 
The systems framework so far provided might potentially be 
used to provide a careful assesment of an individual child. 
Fortunately a ready made scale is available in the Uzgiris and 
Hunt (1975) scale which can be related to our system overview. In 
the next chapter a modified presentation of the scale is 
introduced. 
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CHAPTER 7 The Uzgiris and Hunt ScaLes 
Appendix 1 comprises a self contained manual for the 
educational and clinical administration of the Uzgiris and Hunt 
Scales. The items in the scale replicate those of Uzgiris and 
Hunt (1975) and in this form only four of the six scales are 
employed. The manual presented here differs from that of Uzgiris 
and Hunt only in its form of presentation and for a fuller 
understanding of the scale the reader is referred to the original. 
Although the scales are designed as an assessment instrument my 
motivation for presenting them in this form is that they provide 
a useful "Piagetian Primer", although it departs from Piagetian 
theory in some points of detail. 
The practical implication of my motives is that the Uzgiris 
and Hunt scales could be used as a curriculum for some, but not 
all areas of the child's competence. As a curriculum, though, it 
should not be in the form of a rigid programme of operations to 
be applied to specific materials, but as a set of guiding 
principles enabling the teacher to understand how the child 
understands his world and so enable her to respond accordingly. 
To suggest that an assessment scale could be used as a 
curriculum may strike some as being an ill-conceived notion since 
it smells of "teaching to pass exams", or even training to take 
I. Q. tests. To teach someone to pass items on standardised 
developmental tests such as the Griffiths (1954) or Bayley (1965) 
would indeed be silly. 
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So what makes such practice based on the Uzgi ri s and Hunt 
scales legitimate? Let's look at the principles underlying the 
construction of standardised developmental tests. 
We have a group of, 100 children, and we observe and count 
every three months how many have acquired the skill of, say, 
blowing bubble gum. We then plot a graph showing how many 
children have acquired the skill for each three month interval 
and obtain fig 7.1. From this, we can say that the average child 
in our sample learns how to blow bubble gum at six years of age. 
Using the same procedure, we discover that 4 years and three 
months is the average age at which children in our sample can hop 
on one leg in wellington boots. 
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Fig 7.1 Hypothetical plot of bubble gum blowing acquisition age 
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Age at which subjects aquire skill 
Intuitively, we can obtain and test out a series of skills 
which the average child in our sample acquires, say, every month. 
If we can assume that our hundred children are representative of 
the child population of the country, then we have a tool for 
measuring any child's developmental level. We have, in effect, a 
ruler where each mark on the ruler is a test item. (see fig 7.2) 
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Fig 7.2 Hypothetical superimposition of skill acquisition ages. 
In practice there is much more to it than this. Test items 
would be selected that have low variance. (i. e. the graph would 
have a small spread. It would also be neccessary to make sure 
that the items are administered in exactly the same way for each 
child. Our original sample of children would have to be 
124 
.d .VY" %j 1 tV 0. l0 .Vv 0- v. v . -- --- 
representative of the population as a whole so that they could be 
drawn from a variety of backgrounds in the same proportions as 
the population as a whole. Additionally most developmental scales 
are subdivided into subscales and the pattern of scores across 
those scales give valuable clinical information. 
Now although a child's developmental age may be useful for 
monitoring his progress in other areas, each individual item, 
excepting statistical criteria, is arbitary. "Blowing bubble gum" 
could be substituted by 'being able to tie shoelaces" as long as 
the average child in the sample acquires the skill at the right 
age. There is no theory underlying the test to justify the 
selection of any specific item. 
If we had a theory of development, then our selection of 
items for a developmental scale would be determined by the logic 
of the theory rather than by statistical criteria. How "good" the 
scale would be would depend on how "good" the theory is. 
The "goodness" of a theory is problematic and I shall avoid 
an exhaustive discussion of the topic here but restrict myself to 
expressing three criteria of "goodness". 
(i) Does the theory fit observable facts? 
(ii) Is the explanation provided by the theory usefull for 
what you want to do with it? 
(iii) Is the theory coherent? Are ther any contradictions 
and omissions in the logic of the theory? 
Given our current state of knowledge, Piaget promises to 
reasonably fulfill these criteria. Up to a point, Uzgiris and 
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Hunt have taken Piaget's theory applied to the sensori-motor 
period, the first 18 months, as a basis for constructing their 
scale. So, each item on the scale demonstrates the underlying 
means of knowing employed by the child, according to Piagetian 
theory. Furthermore, the means of knowing demonstrated by one 
item is a neccessary pre-requisite of the means of knowing 
demonstrated by the next item. This statement may be more clearly 
represented in fig 7.3 
Behavioural demonstration 
of ways of knowing 
Developmental 
Scale 
w« rrrwwrrwrrrrwwrrrwrwrrr«wwrrrwr w«« rrrrrwrrwr 
r« wrrr r« 
Developmental 
Theory 
Theoretical sequence 
of ways of knowing 
Fig 7.3 Developmental process underlying test items 
In practice, Uzigris and Hunt have departed slightly from 
the Piagetian stages and have inserted extra "stages" which seem 
intuitive rather than theoretical, though of course their 
intuitions have been refined and supported by empirical evidence 
obtained by testing out the stages. It seems, by and large, that 
what each of these extra scales demonstrates is the child's 
growth in competence in operating within a particular Piagetian 
stage. So, the Uzgiris and Hunt scales zig-zag across the 
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Piagetian stages. (see fig 7.4) 
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Fig 7.4 The relationship between Piaget's and Uzgiris & Hunt's 
stages 
Uzgi ri s and Hunt seem to assume that each item in their 
scale represents a discrete stage. I think it is more plausible 
that the horizontal components of the zig-zag lie along a 
continuum, though this is not always so clear. 
Thus, the movement from item 1 to item 2 in the object 
permanence scale (see text of scale : Appendix 1) represents an 
increase in the child's confidence in maintaining an object in 
the field of view by looking at it during it's path of movement. 
Eventually this confidence will arive to such a level that he 
will persist in trying to make the object reappear by looking at 
it. So, his understanding of objects in this context changes from 
"objects disappear because it is in the nature of objects to 
disappear", to "objects disappear because I can't make them re- 
appear". (i. e. because the operation of looking fails to make 
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them reappear). So, at one Level, we have a continuous process 
involving the increase of confidence but which is manifest at a 
different level as a discrete change. 
These considerations appart, the Uzgiris and Hunt scales 
seem a useful way of getting people to try on Piagetian 
spectacles to look at retarded children. Thus, the relationship 
in fig 7.3 between the developmental theory and the developmental 
scale changes direction. When a child reaches his ceiling on the 
scales, we should then ask, "What does this tell us about how the 
child makes sense of the world? " 
For this reason I have attempted to provide an explanation 
of what each item demonstrates. The explanations I provide are 
provisional and the user is advised that there currently is 
considerable controversy (see Butterworth 1979) about what it is 
that the child attends to and understands during his acquisition 
of object permanence. - With regard to the other areas of the 
child's understanding, there is little controversy because, as 
yet, little work has been done outside the area of object 
permanence. This partially reflects the importance of object 
permanence but, more Likely, it is because the stuy of object 
permanence seems more amenable to controlled experimental work 
than, say, gestural imitation. 
The diagnostic use of the Uzgiris and Hunt scaLes 
Considerable clinical information may be obtained from any 
psychometric tool consisting of subscales measuring different 
abilities by judgement based on the profiles C the patterns of 
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differences in abilities ). For instance many clinicians maintain 
that a depressed score on the Similarities subtest of the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence scale is indicative of Schizophrenia. 
The theoretical underpinning to the Uzgiris and Hunt scales 
potentially lends itself well to clinical formulations based on 
the logic of the theory. 
The following comments are based on my relatively limited 
experience in employing the object permanence, the means end, 
the gestural imitation, and the vocal imitation scales in 
attempts to answer the question, "Why does this child not talk? " 
Support for some of the propositions made here is provided by 
Bates (1976) 
(1) Language involves, amongst other things, the use of 
symbolic representation. Before he can begin to use 
symbols, the child must have a representational sophis- 
tication at least at the level demonstrated by item 11 
on the object permanence scale. (Piaget's stage 6). 
(2) If a child is not talking or comprehending much and 
has passed beyond item 11 on the object permanence scale 
then we can learn something from the means end and the 
imitation scales. 
(3) If the child fails to pass item 10 on the means/end 
scale (Piaget's stage 5) then he will be unable to use 
adults as a planned means to obtain an end. This level 
is neccessary if the child'is to communicate in a 
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deliberate manner. A score on this scale which is 
depressed in comparisom with the object permanence scale 
often seems to indicate a child who is unduly passive in 
his relationship with the world. 
(4) The child who obtains a depressed score on the 
imitation scales will probably exhibit one of the 
following characteristics.... 
(a) Not interested in people. (since imitational 
competence derives from social interaction)> 
(b) Has a poor body image (Hypothetically a disorder 
of kinaesthesia). 
(c) Has problems of motor coordination. 
Where a child falls into this pattern but is obviously 
sociable then disorders of kinaesthesia and/or motor 
coordination are suggested. 
(5) Where a child has a depressed score in vocal 
imitation alone then some disorder of auditory input may 
be indicated. This may be straight forward deafness or a 
specific high frequency toss, or conceivably and 
hypothetically a coding-decoding problem. Dysarthri c 
disorders may be reflected. These may again be a 
function of disorders of motor coordination but even a 
relatively minor disorder, which would not reflect in 
performance on the grosser behaviors employed in the 
gestural imitation scale, would give rise to 
articulation problems. 
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The suggestions made here have the status of working 
clinical hypothesis based Largely on clinical impressions. 
Accordingly a great deal of systematic work could be done in this 
area. Dunst (1980) provides a useful systematic development of 
the differential uses of the Uzgiris and Hunt scales to which the 
interested reader is referred. 
The Uzgiris and Hunt scales as a curricuLua 
In viewing these scales as a curriculum, certain 
misconceptions about the nature of the child's knowledge may 
reduce their usefulness. These possible misconceptions might best 
be dissipated by examination of Piaget's concept of horizontal 
deecalage. 
Intuitively the concept is demonstrated in the observation 
that potters' children acquire conservation of volume in clay 
long before other children. The rule structures that the child 
operates at each stage are not empty processes that he can apply 
to any class of object. They are derived directly from the 
child's experience with that material. A child who passes item 10 
on the object permanence scale when an object is concealed in the 
hand before being hidden behind a screen, will not neccessarily 
pass the same item if it is concealed under a cup and then passed 
behind the screen. The child has had more experience of objects 
concealed in adult hands than he has beneath cups. Objects 
concealed under towels represent an easier task for children than 
objects concealed behind- screens. 
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Fig 7.5 Hypothetical relationship between experience and 
cognitive level 
Horizontal decalage would be manifest as the attainment of 
the same cognitive structures in different material situations, 
not neccessa ri ly at the same time. Fig 7.5 illustrates the notion 
that if items are ranked ordered in terms of the child's 
experience, then the ordering will correlate with the different 
cognitive stages obtained for each item. 
We could presumably test the hypothesis by somehow measuring 
the experience a particular child has with each object and then, 
having tested each item on the scale, work out the correlation 
which should approach 1.0. For the teacher, it would be 
appropriate to accept the hypothesis and use it as an indicator 
of the child's experience, although, as an important rider, it is 
probably true that the child's own interest is also indicated. 
The main point is that, if the scale is to be used for part 
132 
Items rank ordered in 
terms of child's experience 
of the curriculum, then it needs to be applied in a flexible 
manner to a wide range of materials. 
The teacher is also encouraged to invent variations and 
elaborations of the structures demonstrated by the scales. This 
is especially appropriate in the means/end scale. An example of 
this might be, fishing objects from off the table top with a rod, 
line, and large hook; placing a toy out of sight on the end of a 
long piece of string so that pulling the string brings the object 
back into sight; etc. It would also be good practice, when 
inventing such variations, to attempt to provide explanations of 
what the situation demands of the child. This would also help 
avoid presenting problems beyond the child's competence. 
Although it may be necessary with some children, the use of 
sweets, biscuits, etc as goals should perhaps be best avoided. If 
the child is too intent on the goal then the possibility of 
decentering is reduced and so he will fail to attend to a range 
of attributes available in the situation. 
Frequently ,a change in the child's style of operating will 
be seen in these situations. Initially he is goal orientated. He 
works in order to get the object. After a while, as the task 
approaches his level of competence, he will regard the situation 
as a game and may even take his own initiative. The means becomes 
intrinsically interesting. The spirit of such a change is well 
illustrated in the following anecdote. 
I was assessing James on the object permanence scale using 
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an orange as a desired object. Each time James found the orange, 
he took a bite. On approaching his level, James began to hide the 
orange himself. When finally he had taken the last piece of 
orange, in order to carry on with the game, he spat it out! 
During this sticky melee, we found that James failed item 
10: finding an object followed by one invisible displacement. By 
one demonstration in terms of his own action, (i. e. Placing his 
hand over the covering cup, prompting him to cover the orange, 
then pushing it behind the screen and leaving the orange there), 
James was subsequently able to do item 10. Several weeks later he 
was reassessed and found to have retained the new level. 
Here ends part two. In part three we shall be returning to 
some of the ideas introduced in part one and developing them 
further to explore the role of success and failure in the 
developmental processes of the mentally handicapped child. 
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PART 3 
MODELLING SUCCESS AND FAILURE 
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CHAPTER 8 ... Imitating a child 
Re cap 
In section 1, ideas were presented about the possible nature 
of processes involved in organising the infant's knowledge about 
his world. 
It was proposed that this know Ledge was organised 
hierarchically, and that the two processes of integration and 
differentiation updated the hierarchical structures in the light 
of experience in interacting with the environment. 
This system was described as operating either 
optimistically, whereby it tended to opt for an integrating 
process, or pessimistically, whereby it tended to unpack and if 
neccessary differentiate. In this section we shall return to 
these notions and further explore the concepts of optimism and 
pessimism and their relationship to success and failure. 
So far, the ideas presented have made little distinction 
between normal and mentally handicapped children. In this section 
the differences will be explored and an attempt made to develop a 
differential theory based on difference in cognitive risk taking 
styles. 
We shall begin with an account of a therapeutic enterprise 
with a socially withdrawn mentally handicapped child and from 
this example we shall examine some ideas about the content of 
social relationships before pursuing the questions of optimism 
and pessimism. 
136 
Therapy with a severely withdrawn child. 
Preface 
I had, with the active help of his teacher, been assessing a 
child on the Uzgiris and Hunt object permanence scale described 
in chapter 7. Lenny, the child, is severely mentally handicapped 
and socially withdrawn. Following the session, Lenny's teacher 
and I were discussing his performance. On the table were two 
empty yogurt cartons. Lenny picked up one of the cartons between 
his two fingers and proceeded to wave the carton rapidly from 
side to side. This is one of his stereotypies and normally he 
would maintain this specific activity for a period of half an 
hour or more. Without any real rationale I picked up the other 
carton and copied his activity. He then began to tap his carton 
on the table, and again I copied this. Lenny reponded to this 
with a great gasp and ran through his whole repertoire of actions 
with myself in hot imitative pursuit. 
Most discussions of stereotypies assume that the child 
maintains the stereotypy as a defence against his world and the 
child engaged in such activity has succeeded in blanking off the 
world. Though the idea of such a defence is plausible, it is 
based on the notion that attention is a passive process operated 
by means of "filters" or similar processes. More recently, a new 
conception has emerged of attention as a process of selecting 
from the environment those aspects which are relevant to the 
current and ongoing interest of the subject. (tJeisser, 1978) The 
subject, according to this conceptualisation is in an active 
relationship with his world. When we apply the notion of active 
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selection towards an explanation of stereotypy, we are allowing 
the possibility that the child thus engaged, may be aware of the 
world beyond the field of his ongoing activity but finds it 
irrelevant to his stereotypic activity. When I imitated Lenny, I 
provided something in the world that was relevant. 
The Therapy 
Shortly after this incident I was asked by a teacher if I 
could give her some ideas about what she might do with Judy, a 
child who was very similar to Lenny. 
Judy could be briefly described as an attractive but 
socially passive 12 year old girl who would typically be seen 
walking barefoot, on tiptoes, gazing just above the horizon. Her 
usual activity involved systematically tearing long thin strips 
of paper from a sheet and then flicking the strip with her 
fingers. She persistently disrobed and had to be dressed in a cat 
suit. Especially characteristic was her apparent indifference to 
people, marked by her complete avoidance of eye contact. 
With the episode with Lenny in mind, we approached the 
problem by trying to see the world as Judy might see it, and also 
on speculations about underlying processes of memory 
organisation. 
A plausible hypothesis seemed that for Judy the world was 
full of potentially recognisable and familiar things but that she 
was unable to anticipate what was going to happen next. 
Underlying this, the implication seemed that in order to 
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recognise, she must search through her memory for the image of 
what might be familiar. Given a minimal degree of anticipatory 
organisation, the memory search represent no more than an 
inefficient rummage and Judy would be lucky if she found what she 
was looking for, let alone do something with it. (i. e. integrate 
it with a co-ocurring or contingent familiar event) Since I 
assume that such integrations are the basis of anticipatory 
organisation, it seems that Judy is caught in a circular 
situation. However, there is an area where she does have the 
ability to anticipate, and that is her own idiosyncratic 
activities, viz, her stereotypies. Here she can act and produce a 
predictable result. The problem is that her stereotypy is a 
closed system and beyond the object employed in the activity, 
there is nothing in the world that is relevant and causally 
related to her stereotypy. So she cannot use her chosen actions 
to generate interactions with other potentially familiar items in 
the world. Here again she is caught in a circular situation. To 
break out of this circularity it is neccessary to alter the 
nature of her world such that there is a simple causal link 
between her behaviours and those of her environment. This is what 
we do when we imitate a child's actions. 
Let's describe the process from Judy's point of view. She is 
engaging in a stereotypy when she suddenly notices a direct 
relationship between the visual input of her stereotypy and part 
of the surrounding chaos. There are enough point of identity 
between her stereotypy and the adult's actions to make the relat- 
ionship "obvious". She changes her actions and produces a 
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predictable change in the adult's actions. She discovers that she 
can use her own repertoire of idiosyncratic actions to develop a 
map of the adults' imitating actions. Now, were the adult's 
imitations a perfect match, then presumably Judy would use her 
whole repertoire of actions, reproduce the effects in the adult 
until a perfect mapping had been attained. This would be a new 
but closed system and change in structure would cease to develop. 
In practice though, the identity is not perfect since it is very 
difficult to produce a perfect imitation of an idiosyncratic and 
systematic stereotypy, and further, there are obvious contextual 
differences between the child's actions and those of the adult. 
It seems that this line of argument would predict that in 
attempting to map the imitated actions, she would also map the 
differences. Thus novel elements would be introduced into her 
system and she would move into a more open relationship with her 
world. 
To put these ideas into practice, we decided to set up short 
sessions where an adult would imitate Judy. It was decided to 
limit these sessions to a duration of ten minutes. It seemed 
practical that a teacher with a class of eight very difficult 
children could reasonably devote this amount of time with an 
individual child. We also decided to give her a mark to indicate 
the termination of the session. This detail was based on a point 
raised by Bruner(1975). Bruner's argument, tailored to the 
present context, is as follows. Whilst the onset of these 
sessions would be obvious to Judy, the termination of the 
sessions would not be so obvious. Consequently, there seemed to 
140 
be a risk that if she attempted to map in an unresponsive 
context, the failure of these mapping attempts might be manifest 
within the sessions. Accordingly, marking the boundaries for the 
sessions defined for her a context where it was safe to attempt 
mapping. 
Since, in the long run, we were interested in allowing Judy 
to maintain an open relationship with her world regardless of 
context, it seemed undesirable that the sessions be limited to 
the same adult. Three adults undertook to see Judy daily. 
The initial sessions were set up with the adult and Judy 
being seated facing each other. Alongside the adult and facing 
Judy was a large mirror. The adults initially imitated Judy by 
mirroring her activity. So Judy's right hand activities would be 
imitated by the adult's left hand, etc. The mirror served to 
emphasise the nature of the activity. 
The initial results were dramatic. Within a few sessions 
there was prolonged eye contact. The adults involved described 
the experience as a "clicking together", .. "of suddenly 
being of 
relevance to Judy". She also began to initiate cuddles. For one 
session we introduced a stranger as therapist, within minutes, by 
imitating Judy she too experienced the rapport. 
At this point let me make two comments. 
a) At the time, although we were gratified by the eye contact, it 
did not suprise us. On reflection, however, the rationale 
underlying these sessions did not consider the role of eye 
contact and it seemed difficult to incoorporate it into our 
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therapy. It seemed that eye contact had an innate, preprogrammed 
quality about it but needed a relevant context in which it could 
become manifest. 
b) Whilst until fai rly recently psychologi sts assumed naively 
that babies learnt by imitating their mothers it seems from 
studies of infant/mother interaction (eg. Pawlby 1977) that the 
reverse is that case. flothers imitate their infants, which is the 
activity that we had undertaken here. 
Following the initial imitation sessions, the interactions 
with Judy began to deal with sequences and cause and effect 
relationships. The earliest form of sequence involved delayed as 
opposed to concurrent imitation. Judy would produce a complete 
behaviour then attend to the adult producing the same complete 
behaviour. Examples of cause and effect play are.. 
1)Judy taps my head.. I tap hers back with the same 
force-she produces a stronger tap.. I reciprocate.. she produces 
a soft tap.. two rapid taps.. etc. 
2) Judy searches for a piece of paper to tear.. I move the 
paper out of reach. This becomes a repeated game where Judy's 
motivation is directed at playing this reciprocal game rather 
than in obtaining the piece of paper. 
An interesting observation emerges from this last example. 
Though the explicit role of the adult in these sessions is to 
respond to the child, in practice the adult is active and can 
initiate activities. The question is, "When is it appropriate for 
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the adult to take the intiative? " Within the same day, the three 
therapists involved decided, spontaneously and independently 
within their session, to discourage paper tearing and to remove 
it from Judy's reach. The results in each case were the same 
reciprocal paper-snatching game. We can only surmise that the 
incident was in some way initiated by Judy. 
Our basic therapeutic rationale allows us an explanation of 
this game. The initial structure we developed was that of 
identity between two systems. This identity, once established, 
allowed Judy to map co-occurences and contingencies. Let's 
examine what is implied in the mapping of contingencies in the 
light of the paper snatching game. 
Judy attempts to get a piece of paper from me. This 
situation involves two roles, those of holder and snatcher. Now, 
if Judy succedes in obtaining the paper, and I attempt to regain 
possession, the roles are reversed. I become the snatcher, she 
the holder. As the game proceeds, it seems that Judy becomes 
aware of the game in its own right. More formally we might say 
that she becomes cognizant of the snatcher ; holder relationship. 
The relationship is independent of the particular context. It 
does not matter who is the holder and who is the snatcher. This 
aside, in actual operation, Judy needs to know if she is snatcher 
or holder in order to act appropriately. Some information will be 
given by sequence.. your turn, .. my turn. Alternatively, 
appropriate information is given by.. who is holding the paper. 
Thus Judy is enabled to attend to herself as an entity appart 
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from the actions that she produces. This hypothetical process may 
be the basis for the early development of body image and 
identity. Similar situations are involved in games such as 'peek- 
a-boo', 'pat-a-cake', etc. 
Three months after the initiation of the therapy change was 
steady and progressive and an indication of the general nature of 
the change can be given by the following indices. 
a)Vocalisation increased and occasionally she babbled 
systematically. eg. "Buh buh buh Puh puh puh ". Comprehension 
seeped to be increasing. 
b)She became interested in activities not directed at herself and 
began to observe her teacher working with another child. 
c)She began to initiate events in the classroom. e. g. 
(1)On one occasion she went to the toilet of her own 
volition. 
(2)Following a swimming session, her teacher had 
dressed Judy but had omitted to put on her shoes. 
Later Judy approached the teacher and thrust her 
shoes on her lap. 
d) She was able to play social games at a distance. e. g. chase 
e) She began to approach strangers from outside the classroom, 
other school staff noticed how much more outgoing she had become. 
Two years later Judy is a very outgoing person and her 
outgoingness occasionally produces management problems. Her 
comprehension vocabulary is in the region of 40 words. Her 
babbling is continuous and she can now produce most sounds. As 
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yet her productive use of language is restricted to saying 
"please" in sign language to indicate a desire, and saying "no" 
vebally to terminate something. 
Origins of Interactive Games 
Let's firstly look at how BABEL might simulate the process 
of being imitated. We'll represent Judy's memory as a series of 
chunks, some of which we might term "stereotypies" 
R RR 99 RRR 
Stereotypy Other Events 
Fig 8.1 Schematisation of Judy's memory. 
lJ 
Unpacked stereotypy 
The "attended to" chunk operates a set of actions which 
effect a specific change in the world. So we can represent the 
stereotypy as having three components 
a) Information that the action is appropriate. 
b) The action itself 
c) Feedback from the action 
where the action and its results are synchronous. (Since when an 
action is operated the feedback, both visual and kinaesthetic, is 
experienced as the same continual process. ) 
When Judy is imitated, the effect is to produce a part of 
the environment which corresponds to the visual information 
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embedded in the hierarchy. 
For this to be available the chunk must be in an unpacked 
state. So we have Judy using the visual part of her chunk to 
recognise the adult's actions. However it would seem that at this 
juncture she might not realise that the adult's actions are not 
her own. Differentiation between her own actions and those of the 
adult would presumably arise when Judy tries to attend to the 
kinaesthetic components of the adult's actions. These are of 
course part of the adult's private experience and not available 
to Judy. 
Environment 
Feedback II Action 
/q - /q 
p 
Fig 8.2 Relationship between chunk and environment. 
The practice of imitating withdrawn and profoundly 
handicapped children often produces a remarkable suprise reaction 
when it is first done, and it is tempting to interpret this 
response as.. "what happened? where's my kinaesthesia gone? " 
Whether an infant codes an absence is a difficult question. 
He may code not the absence but his response to it. The problem 
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relates to the Lacanian concept of Lack. (J. Lacan, 1977) For our 
purposes though it may be as well to avoid this question and to 
focus on what is similar. The absence of kinaesthesia would 
result in the chunk remaining unpacked and leaving the visual 
components accessible. Since BABEL works by replicating chunks, 
the original synthesis of visual feedback and kinaesthesia would 
still be avai lable. (see fig 8.3) 
3 Conditions 
Results Action 
Visual Kinaesthesia 
Fig 8.3 Availability of subcomponents in a chunk 
This would provide an independent visual chunk which could be 
employed to build a partial representation of the adult. 
It is difficult to produce a perfect imitation of another 
person so there are performance differences between Judy's 
behaviour and that of the adult. There are also contextual 
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differences. (E. g. differences in the clothes worn, etc. ) 
Initially it seems that these differences are unattended but once 
a mapping of similarities is underway then it is possible to 
attend to the differences and to integrate them into the 
schema of similarities. 
The use of delayed imitation would enable diachronic chunks 
to be built up whereby interactive sequences are coded.. e. g. 
child's action...... others action. 
Differentiation of such chunks would occur whenever someone 
behaved out of turn. Such differentations would lead the child to 
attend to attributes which are specifically her own as opposed to 
the other's. The "other" will potentially be differentiated into 
the individual people that may engage in interactive activities. 
It is possible that delayed imitation may contribute to the 
child's ability to supress his own actions. Let's assume that the 
child is in the process of being imitated but he does not know 
whether the action is his own or the adult's. Let's further 
assume that he is attending to a chunk which refers to himself 
rather than to the other. In attempting to decide who is acting, 
were he to attempt to operate behaviours coded in his chunk then 
he would fail. If, on the basis of his uncertainty he chose not 
to act, then he would give himself the space within which to 
decide who the actor is. 
In the sessions described here contact was made with Judy by 
using her stereotypies. Usually work is done with autistic 
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children based on the idea of suppressing the stereotypy. (E. g., 
Bucher & Lovaas, 1968 ) 
A stereotypy has a compulsive quality inasmuch as once a 
particular stereotypy is "called up", the child seems captured by 
it. This seems especially apparent in distressing behaviours such 
as head banging. The behaviour may initially be a response to 
some upset, but eventually it seems in many children to acquire 
an autonomous quality. One successful way of dealing with, say, 
face slapping is to put constraints on the child and to engage 
him in other activities. The naive explanation given for this 
method's success being that the child forgets the behaviour, or 
loses the habit. There may be some substance to this. 
BABEL might explain the technique as removing the conditions 
which allow access of the behaviour and then building a 
repertoire of behaviours such that a long memory search is 
required before the stereotypy is recalled. During the search, as 
long as the intervening repertoire is appropriate and accessible, 
other relevant behaviour will be selected and operated before the 
stereotypic behaviour is brought back into the action.. 
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CHAPTER 9 
The type of explanation offered in the previous chapter, 
though giving some insights into the nature of imitation as 
therapy, gives only a meagre explanation of the ongoing success 
of the sessions. 
To attempt a fuller explanation we need to modify BABEL to 
include some new aspects. These will be employed to examine the 
question of optimism and pessimism and to elaborate a model of 
play as process. Firstly we'll recap how the search rules operate 
in BABEL. 
Memory Environment 
YZ 
DA 
AAAX x W 
Fig 9.1 BABEL's basic memory structure 
Let's consider the situation in fig 9.1 where chunk (d) is 
searched for and found. The search direction is now altered and 
moves forward: (g) is considered but not found. Under the present 
search rules BABEL would change search directions and scan 
backwards. However, as was suggested in chapter 4, if we allowed 
BABEL to tolerate this one instance of failure, it would then 
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move forward to consider chunk (a), which it would accept. Given 
this tolerance of failure BABEL would operate a stimulus sampling 
procedure, sifting out those chunks which were invariant in the 
sequence. But when the failure rate became exessive on the basis 
of some criterion then it would be appropriate for BABEL to 
respond by changing into the optimistic mode. 
Let's then propose that BABEL responds, not directly to 
success and failure, but to the rate of success/failure, within 
the boundaries set by some constraints. What then might be the 
nature of these constraints? Some interesting insights are given 
by Schultz' (1969) model of sensoristasis. In this model (fig 
9.2) Information load and arousal are linearly related and the 
organism has a preferred level of arousal, which is maintained by 
a homeostatic process. 
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Fig 9.2 Schultz' model of Sensoristasis ( After Ellis, 1973) 
Events which take the system out of its preferred range of 
arousal are experienced as having negative affect, and events 
which serve to bring it back into its optimal arousal range are 
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experienced as having positive affect. We can tentatively go 
further and label each affect as anxiety, boredom, effectance, 
and excitement. 
As Ellis(1973) points out, such a model has the abiLty to 
provide us with an explanation for intrinsic motivation. When a 
child is confronted with a problem, information load increases, 
and so accordingly does arousal. The child experiences anxiety 
and works on solving the problem. As the problem is being solved 
the information load decreases and he experiences effectance. 
When the problem is thoroughly mastered then information load 
decreases to the extent that the child experiences boredom. 
Accordingly he will begin to look for variations to the problem 
or even take on a new problem in order to increase information 
toad. 
We might borrow the notion of optimal arousal from Schultz 
and build it into BABEL. There are some other possibilities to 
chose from. Pribram (1971) has suggested that the concept of 
arousal is misconceived and that it merely represents the brain 
at work. So we might chose to talk about optimal information 
load. This might introduce the notion of limited capacity. 
Alternatively, we might interpret optimal information load as a 
function of process speed. Even within the framework of a concept 
of optimal arousal there are some considerable complications. At 
an intuitive experiential level, the concept of a fixed arousal 
level does not feel plausible. The actual range would vary with 
mood, tiredeness etc. Furthermore the degree to which an event is 
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arousing is a function of how interesting or important that event 
is. If we are to build something along these lines into BASEL we 
have a wide and complex choice of alternatives. 
Consider the following situation. BABEL is working away on a 
repeated sequence of events, building more and more economical 
codings of the episode and becoming increasingly optimistic. 
Unknown to BABEL it has been working on a subsystem of the 
environment which has, for a variety of reasons, been replaced by 
another subsystem. A real example might be mother, having being 
playing with her infant, hands him over to father who has just 
come in and is not privy to the game that mother was playing. 
BABEL would experience this change of sub-system as a sudden 
increase of failure within that episode. Accordingly, it would 
become pessimistic, move into a back search until it finds coded 
events corresponding to the new situation. These it takes up and 
develops in further episodic chunks, and so again begins to 
increase its success rate and thus increase its optimism. On a 
subsequent occasion the world reverts to the original episode 
that BABEL was mapping. If in the original episode BABEL was 
enjoying a high success rate then its degree of optimism would 
change accordingly. Such a readjustment takes time. It would be 
adaptive if BABEL were able to immediately summon the same degree 
of optimism which it had arrived at in its previous transactions 
within that particular system. This level of optimism would then 
be modifiable in the light of further transactions with that 
system. 
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This it could do by coding an episode, not only in terms of 
sensations and actions, but also by coding the success rate. (see 
fig 9.3) 
% Success 
L-LJ 
Episode 1 Episode 2 Episode 3 
Transition Transition 
Fig 9.3 Sequential coding of success rates over episodes. 
The question is now raised, "On what basis night success 
rate be computed? " This might be a ratio of the number of 
successes to some statistic. Possibilities for this statistic 
might be.. 
a)number of items in a considered chunk. 
b)number of items considered in a given moment in time 
The present framework does not provide a rationale for 
chosing between these alternatives. The choice of (a) is 
attractive because of its simplicity. However, chosing a 
different statistic would be interesting if that statistic were 
itself variable, inasmuch as a variable base might provide us 
with a medium for explaining different arousal levels. We shall 
leave this question unanswered and content ourselves with the 
proposition that each chunk is coded to include success rate, and 
this we can easily represent by search time. Long searches then 
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are indicative of difficult items, short searches of easy items. 
Within this we can build in constraints on what is to be 
considered in memory search. (see fig 9.4) 
Difficult 
Easy 
Memory search 
restricted to 
bandset relative 
to current 
° success rate 00 0o 
Time Present 
Fig 9.4 Restriction of BABEL's memory rearch 
Searching takes time and if the search time is too long then 
BABEL will fail to keep up with the world. In other words the 
world will be changing at a rate faster than BABEL can build 
representations of invariances in the sequences. Conversely, if 
BABEL is too efficient, search time will be so brief that BABEL 
would be in danger of coping with the world at a rate faster than 
change occurs in the world. Consequently it would spend time 
waiting for change to occur, and in effect get bored. To work 
efficiently, it seems that BABEL would need to pace iteseif to 
proceed at the same rate as change occurs in the world. 
By restricting BABEL'S memory searches to a band determined 
by its current success rate we have a crude mechanism that will 
effect a pacing feedback. So if BABEL finds itself dealing with a 
part of the world that presents difficulties it will restrict 
itself to dealing with items that were previously easy. In so 
doing it will experience success and so will tend to look for 
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more difficult items. If it continues to succeed then it will 
countenance yet more difficult items. The converse will happen 
should it experience failure. 
Bearing in mind that BABEL replicates chunks it has dealt 
with, then sets of chunks dealing with specific subsystems of the 
environment will be coded at various points and at various levels 
of difficulty. The sequence of these chunks will reflect BABEL's 
history of dealings with that particular subsystem. 
Within the bounds of this pacing system,. BABEL has-other 
possibilities for pacing. 
1) When an action is referred to in a chunk, BABEL may 
chose not to operate that action and thus free the 
environment from its interference, allowing the environment 
to 'behave" independently of BABEL. New events will thus be 
permitted and BABEL will set about mapping these new events. 
2) So far BABEL has operated the rules 
1)<IF SUCCESSFULL, SEARCH FORWARDS> 
2)<IF FAILING, SEARCH BACKWARDS>. 
In line with a search band of appropriate difficulty we will 
now revise these rules. 
a) <IF WITHIN SEARCH BAND, SEARCH FORWARDS> 
b) <IF OUTSIDE SEARCH BAND, SEARCH BACKWARDS> 
These revised rules will allow BABEL to play! 
Let's assume that at different times BABEL has been coding a 
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particular subsystem of the environment with increasing success. 
In this coding it has selected a subset of the component elements 
of the subsystem and, by means of integration and 
differentiation, has been striving to form the most effective 
representation of the subset. Within this coding BABEL has been 
increasingly effective such that its search time, within this 
context, has decreased such that it is outside the search band. 
So even though BABEL is succeeding, rule (b) operates and it 
moves into a backsearch until it re-encounters elements which it 
entertained in its earlier encounters with the subsystem. (i. e. 
The variables that were originally discarded. ) These are now 
available, either for integration and differentiation amongst 
themselves, and/or for integration into the main chunk. 
So for example we have an original sequence which may be of 
two varieties.. 
A>M>B>G>C>D.. A> N> B> H> C> D 
Selection of the invariant items in these two forms would lead to 
the sequence 
A>B>C>D 
following discrimination becoming possible. 
CA3, THEN IF C13, CB >G3 ; ELSE IF CN3,1 8>H3 
THEN CC>DI 
The resulting effect would be to look at the conditions 
under which one of a set of variables will occur. 
Thus BABEL plays and is allowed to decenter. In so doing it 
increases its search time, bringing it back to within its search 
band since rule (b) would again operate and backsearching would 
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take place leading to decentration. Our account of Candy in 
chapter 3 would be describable in these terms. 
However, for decentration to work in this situation it is 
neccessary that BABEL tends to remain in an optimistic mode in 
order that integration may happen. If BABEL back searches under 
conditions of difficulty and remains pessimistic then the 
possibility of integrating the newly attended to material, made 
available through backsearch, is precluded. 
As was mentioned in chapter 3, the practice of attempting to 
force decentration by creating surprises only seems to work with 
some children. If it is attempted with children whose style of 
functioning is particularity obsessional it may result in 
outbursts of some intensity. 
Intuitively, obsessionality does have similar features to 
the unpacking that BABEL undertakes in its pessimistic mode. 
Highly obsessional adults of normal intelligence engage in a 
continual "checking out" of reality. They seem unable to take the 
risk of making assumptions and not checking that things are as 
they were a few minutes ago. They spend most of their effort in 
verification and this precludes the possibility of any further 
personal development which presumably involves decentration. 
In Candy's case, it is highly relevant that the use of 
suprise as a technique was not administered clinically by a 
stranger, but in the context of a relationship with her teacher. 
The term "relationship" has a wide range of uses and 
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applications. In this context, it is perhaps appropriate to 
emphasise the predictability of interactions within a 
relationship. Candy and her teacher knew and responded to the 
Limited and regular demands made of each other. 
Candy experienced her teacher as a context in which she was 
succeeding, and in BABEL's terms she would have operated in an 
optimistic mode which allowed her to decenter and integrate the 
information acquired when cups began to behave "differently". 
The obsessionally styled child, whilst not asocial to the 
extent of an autistic child, seems to seek success in the 
behaviour of objects and in routines rather than in social 
relationships. Furthermore, his prowess in seeking success is 
limited and his manner of operating has an anxious quality about 
it. This we might interpret as analagous to LABEL's pessimism. 
Severely withdrawn children such as Judy seem to seek 
success in the much smaller systems afforded by stereotypies. 
Within such systems they acquire considerable competence which is 
difficult to emulate. Such children may bounce balls with 
considerable accuracy, spin pairs of cups in perfect synchrony, 
or engage in finger dances of great intricacy. This Latter 
activity is analogous to the handwatching behaviour of the normal 
infant but the repertoire of handmovements has been developed to 
a considerable Level of competence. This comment underlines the 
notion that many mentally handicapped children seem to maintain a 
particular developmental structure and elaborate its contents to 
a high degree, whereas the normal infant abandons that particular 
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structure in favour of new forms of increasing flexibility. 
The child engaged in stereotypy has paradoxically attained a 
precocious state of equilibrium which Piaget suggested was, as an 
unattainable goal, that which motivated child development. 
Attaining equilibrium entails building a model of the world 
such that the world becomes utterly predictable. The world is 
however such a complex system that it seems unknowable, but by 
means of processes such as Schultz' "sensoristasis" an open 
relationship is maintained with the world and a disequilibrium is 
maintained such that human models of their world are always 
striving to predict and control. 
Children such as Judy attain equilibrium by chasing a subset 
of the world which is knowable and controllable, and which have a 
strong boundary around them. They relate to parts of the world as 
a closed system and preclude the possibility of attempting to 
build models of other subsystems of their world. 
Further modeling of stereotypy 
Within a system like handwatching BABEL would model the 
system as maintaining itself by continuously unpacking and 
exposing new elements within the limited elements of the 
eye-hand system and reintegrating and differentiating these 
elements to produce a variety of hand dances. Within such a 
system it may be possible to abstract the processes of playing, 
but it is within the confines of the closed system. 
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If, for a number of reasons, any attempt was made by BABEL 
to countenance material outside the closed system then it would 
soon experience failure. If the optimism/pessimism parameter was 
particularity sensitive to failure then BABEL would tend to 
unpack rather than integrate, and search time would not be 
decreased. The adoption of pessimism would be carried into the 
closed stereotypic system and would lead to unpacking within the 
system. This would create new work and operations within the 
closed system would return to a level dictated by the success 
rate band 
Any excursions outside the closed system of a particular 
stereotypy would be constrained by the search band to consider 
only those other systems which lay within that band and which 
would have the same equilibriating properties as the original 
closed stereotypic system. 
YI (Stereotypy 3 
Stereotypy 2 
Fig 9.5 faintainance of stereotypy within bandwidth. 
Even where the child to have available behaviors not 
included in the tight constraints of a stereotypy, the effects of 
the various feedback systems would be, as it were, to dampen the 
available options. (See Fig 9.5) 
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At the risk of being pedantic let's describe this process 
explicitly through a series of diagrams. 
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Fig 9.6 
In fig 9.6 we have a range of chunks coded at differing 
levels of difficulty (a function of search time). An event occurs 
in the environment and a backsearch commences for a coding of 
what matches that event. Items corresponding to sections 
{ h, f, d, b } are considered in turn until the appropriate chunks, 
as found in section {a}, are called up. Work on the chunks 
found in this section, under the [forward] search rules results 
in them being recoded at a higher success rate. Let's now add to 
process the idea that tolerance of failure increases so that the 
search band now moves upward to allow consideration of items in 
section {b). Were the section {b} items linked easily to 
section {a} then the resulting work done on these would result 
in a new coding at the increased success level. However this 
presupposes that items coded in sections {a&b} belong to the 
same interlinked system. If they are not then section {b} items 
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are likely to be coded at an increased level of difficulty and 
the "tolerance of failure" search band brought down. (see fig 
9.7) The experience of failure in section {b} elements would 
arise if BABEL was, at an early stage of its history, dealing 
with section {b} and sequential and coincidental variance was 
high. 
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The result of this would be to separate material within 
BABEL's competence from material that was too difficult. Were the 
relationships between the success rate control parameters and 
environmental contingencies "healthy" then the effect on the 
search band would be to increase the percentage failure rate that 
would be tolerated, but in the situation decribed here the effect 
would be to make it static. However successive successful codings 
of section {a} items would result in their falling below the 
range of the tolerance of failure search band. If the search band 
starts at a very high level then there is a limit to its 
movement. (i. e. 100% cannot be bettered). If the search band is 
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orginally more tolerant then, at the lower end of the band items 
will be subject to increasing pessimism and the process of 
unpacking, splitting, differentiation, will be increasingly 
applied leading to an increase in failure rate and a consequent 
recoding of the same items as being more difficult. The tolerance 
of failure search band would be lowered until the relationship 
between search band and closed system attained a dynamic 
equilibrium, and hitherto difficult material would no longer be 
attended to. 
This aspect of non attention apparantly occurs in phenomena 
found amongst the mentally handicapped which could be diagnosed 
as functional hearing losses. This is demonstrated in the 
following case. 
Charles 
Charles is a 21 year old resident of a ward for autistic 
young men. He appears to be deaf. He does not repond to speech. 
Even an attempt made to suprise him with a loud bang from behind 
produces no response, not even an eye blink. 
It was reported that Charles enjoyed playing with marbles. I 
sat opposite him and engaged him in some marble play. A game 
developed which entailed us rolling the marble to each other 
across the table top. This reciprocal rolling was performed for a 
few minutes. I then took the marble and, Looking directly at 
Charles over the table, rolled the marble along the floor to him. 
Sometimes I rolled it to the left of him and sometimes to the 
right. On each occasion Charles correctly anticipated the side on 
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which the marble would appear. I was careful to use only a wrist 
motion to direct the marble and so avoid giving any cues. 
Whilst it is possible that I was giving him some subtle cues 
it seems more likely that the only cue available to allow him to 
anticipate the path of the marble was the marble's rolling sound. 
Often children with very limited vocal competence and 
suffering from apparent deafness can be enabled to give attention 
and effort to sound by the simple activity of being imitated, 
even when the sounds are restricted to heavy breathing, teeth 
grinding etc. 
Let's take another Look at why the practice of imitation 
works in such closed system children. Firstly, let's consider our 
model operating in an environment that is closely linked by 
imitating the stereotypy. 
ut put lImitating System] 
Memoryl I Event I (Imitated Event 
Input 
Fig 9.8 Initial status of imitation episode 
Initially our model would not perceive a difference between 
its own activities and those produced by the imitator. In the 
case of BABEL, where input and output are via a teleprinter, this 
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would make no difference. However, were we to give a directional 
nature to the input/output device (e. g. a pair of eyes ) then the 
imitator could intervene and substitute imitated events for the 
real thing. The bogus system is now attended to. This having been 
attained, highly contingent events can be incorporated. (Fig 9.9) 
This entails that the imitating system extends its repertoire of 
behaviours to generate contingent events. 
Output 
Memory 
Input 
mitating Innovating 
ystem System 
Event I Imitated' Contingent o 
Event Co-occuring 
Fig 9.9 Extention of the imitating system to generate novelty. 
Returning to the account that culminated in fig 9.7 we would 
now view section { a, } as being integrated with elements of the 
contingent system which are obtained from the model's past 
memory. These would need to be related to past experiences, coded 
at an appropriate and accessible level of success. In integrating 
these with the imitated elements our model would recode them at 
an increased level of success. Moreover, the tolerance of failure 
band would move to include more difficult elements in the range 
of material contemplated. As long as the novelty generating 
system provides new elements that are integrable with our model's 
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elements, and these remain within its range of tolerance of 
failure then the memory system will countenance the coding of 
increasingly difficult material. 
Churchill (1971), in a study of autistic children engaged in 
a range of tasks of varying degrees of difficulty, experimentally 
manipulated his subject's success/failure ratio. He was thus able 
to experimentally manipulate the degree to which his subjects 
produced manneristic behaviour. Churchill further arges that if 
normal children were placed in a situation of unremitting failure 
they would produce very similar symptoms. 
Kaufmann (1976), a father of an autistic child, convinc- 
ingly claims to have cured his son by the practice of imitating 
his stereotypies. He set up a regime where he, his wife, and two 
enlisted therapists were engaged in imitating activities with his 
son for several hours each day. This resulted in a gradual 
decrease in the son's withdrawal. On occasions when the parents 
went away the boy, under the care of the two therapists and a 
friend, would typically regress. Kaufmann's claim of a cure is 
instanced by the occasion when his son responded to their absence 
not by withdrawal but by becoming very aggressive towards the 
therapists. Subsequently, his progress seemed much more 
substantial and robust. 
In exploring and discusing what may be involved in pacing a 
developing system in it's attempts to map a changing environment, 
we have introduced the possibility of a number of processes. One 
outcome of the exploration is the suggestion that it is the 
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playlessness of the mentally handicapped child that makes him 
mentally handicapped, and that his failure to pace himself with 
the world contributes to this state. Later, in chapter 11, we 
will look briefly at some ways in which this failure may arise. 
In attempting to model these pacing processes we have ended 
up with a hypothesis that entails several feedback systems and to 
operate models of such systems it has been neccessary to suggest 
parameters of responsivity. 
When a model builder introduces parameters into his model, 
he is in effect admitting that he feels that he is at the 
boundaries of his model and tacks either the time, the 
motivation, or the inspiration, to attend to the implied problem. 
He can save face though by the promise of further work on the 
area. 
George Kelly (1955) required that a psychological theory 
should be reflexive and should provide an explanation for its own 
emergence. The lack of time, motivation, and inspiration, that at 
this moment constrain this theorist, corresponds to BABEL 
attempting material that is outside its comfortable limits. 
Furthermore, this particular BAGEL seems to be highly optimistic 
and has opted for more integrating than unpacking. 
The discussion beginning with Candy looking into cups has 
led us into the complex area of feedback systems controling 
cognitions. I have avoided a simple conception of arousal in 
order to explore alternative possibilities, and these 
possibilities were suggested by Shultz' (1969) model of 
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sensoristasis. 
Let's return to Schultz' model and see what parameters 
operate here. Possible quantitative varieties of the model can be 
described by two parameters.. 
(a) ! Mean optimal arousal 
(b) Range of optimal arousal band. 
The model as it stands is static but dynamic variations can 
be contemplated. Bearing in mind the earlier comment that the 
optimal arousal level may vary with mood etc., we could have a 
statistic to describe this changeability. We could also introduce 
another parameter indicating the definition of the boundary of 
the optimal arousal range, varying from well defined to fuzzy. 
Simply using (a) and (b) gives us some ideas about mental 
handicap. A hyperactive child would have a high "preferred" 
arousal level. This would have the effect of restricting his 
attention to material having high information load and this load 
may be beyond the assimilative capacities of his cognitive 
structures. Conversely, a child with low optimal arousal levels 
would be restricted to low information loads and this would be 
manifest as subnormality. 
A child with a very narrow range of optimality would rarely 
be paced with his world and would be typically anxious, or, at an 
extreme, autistic. A narrow band child with low mean optimal 
arousal would be a low functioning autist. The same narrow band 
but with a high mean optimal level would correspond to an 
agitated and hyperactive autistic child. 
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Stretching the Anatogy 
It is also possible to relate parts of the model to models 
of adult psychopathology, as was earlier indicated tentatively in 
the case of obsessionality. To do this we'll change the manner of 
representing our model. In chapter 3 the relationship between the 
linear structure of BABEL's memory and a network model was 
outlined. Returning to a network representation we can include 
the idea of difficulty of material by imposing the network on a 
terrain of hills and valleys, where altitude represents 
difficulty. The idea of an optimal level of difficulty is 
represented by a contour band. The model functions by walking 
along different pathways in the network but attempts to choose 
paths that will correspond as closely as possible to a particular 
contour. It's choice of contour level will change as it traverses 
the terrain. So if the model feels "fit" it will choose a higher 
contour and move uphill. 
If we loosely relate our notions of coded difficulty with 
affect then the higher altitudes will have negative affect, and 
will in effect be repressed. An interesting corollary to this is 
that material at lower altitudes will also be repressed, since 
they are too easy. These too will have negative affect. This type 
of repression will be equivalent to overlooking the obvious. 
Arieti's (1974) notions of schizophrenia draw attention to 
the high incidence of extreme affect in the schizophrenic 
person's thought processes. This suggests that the schizophrenic 
is operating at high altitudes as it were, and taking on material 
of considerable difficulty which is beyond that person's reality 
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related integrative capacities. 
Depression would be analagous to a person choosing a contour 
that lies well below the person's capabilities. The subjective 
confusions between mild depression and boredom gives some slight 
support to this notion. 
On the basis of the assumption that psychopathology is 
interpretable as disorders of interpersonal relationships, one 
aspect of therapy would be to give the client a field of 
appropriately interactive opportunities. The experience of 
success would allow for the possibility of non pathological 
operation of the tolerance of failure band. Within this the nitty 
gritty of changing cognitive structures would depend on the 
particular orientation and style of the therapist. Sloan et. al. 
(1975) in their comparative study of behaviour therapy and 
psychotherapy conclude that the dichotomy of good therapist/ 
mediocre therapist cuts across the two styles of therapy and that 
good therapists share, not a particular viewpoint, but a 
patients' perception of them as caring and concerned. 
The model also seems applicable to areas of learning 
disorders of children of otherwise normal intelligence. In the 
case of children suffering from a maths block the model would 
argue that past mathematical problems are coded at a difficult 
level and as a result of difficulties encountered, search is 
restricted to easy items. As time passes mathematical elements of 
memory become more and more innaccessible. The result of this is 
that even relatively easy problems entail 'longer search times and 
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the child's competence may regress. However, if the child's 
teacher is able to take on the pacing function in a sensitive 
manner, she will ensure increasing success, the child's search 
band will progressively move towards the difficult range and 
events previosly coded as difficult will be organised into more 
complex units and recorded at an increasingy easy level. If this 
process carries on far enough the child will become bored, take 
over the pacing function himself, and in effect become 
"intrinsically motivated". 
A similar explanation could be applied to children with 
varying degrees of reading difficulties. * The original experience 
of failure would arise when the child was learning his letters, 
or even learning to talk, especially if there are hearing 
problems. The model would not discriminate between the 
possibilities that the failure originally arose out of a specific 
perceptual or motor problem or from an affective environmental 
problems, but the application of a transactional model would 
highlight the likelihood that even were the aetiology physical, 
the experience of failure would lead to an affective component 
which would exacerbate the condition. 
If this is the case, even assuming that the root problem is 
intractable, the intervention of a sensitive teacher to take on 
the pacing function would help to undo the knots of the problem 
---------------------------------------------------------------- * The model in its account of the development of syntagmic 
forms would provide a candidate explanation for the specific 
sequential disorders, both visual and auditory, that often 
present as a feature of literary problems. 
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and contribute to recoding the elements of letters at a more 
accessible level. 
These indications of how the analogy might be applied to 
other areas are a side issue here. The last comment, however, 
brings us back to our concern with the mentally handicapped. 
Even though, as was pointed out in chapter 1, there is 
little understanding of the organic basis of mental handicap, the 
existence of demonstrable lesions in some patients, more subtle 
chemical processes in conditions such as phenoketylurea in some 
other patients, and the existence of genetic abnormalities in 
others, leads one to assume that organic dysfunction has almost 
always a part to play in the problems of the profoundly and 
severely mentally handicapped. 
In contrast to this proposition the arguments developed 
through BABEL have emphasised an explanation of mental handicap 
as pathologies of developmental process arising from experienced 
failure and an implication that these failures arise from 
pathologies in feedback of an arousal-like nature. It is tempting 
then to locate the organic dysfunction in the organic arousal 
control device of the mid and hind brain. Certainly this may be 
so in some cases but it is worth bearing in mind, as does Karrer 
(1972), that demonstrations of malfunction in these areas does 
not in itself mean that these areas are damaged. The abnormality 
may be a function of deviant inputs from other parts of the 
brain. The source of these inputs may or may not themselves be 
damaged for they may reflect deviance in their own inputs. The 
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means of communication between the systems may be the source of 
pathology... and so on. (see Berg 1974). It would seem that 
before we can confidently identify the organic basis of various 
mental handicaps we need a well developed functional under- 
standing of the brain. 
However, as this work hopefully suggests, we can develop 
some therapeutic devices even though we are profoundly ignorant 
of the organic functions underlying the problems of the child we 
are trying to help. Moreover, in our explorations so far the 
therapeutic principles suggested have had some relationship to 
the activities of mothers and to these we now turn as it may be 
that we have much to learn from them. 
3 
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PART 4 
MOTHERING 
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CHAPTER 10 MOTHERING 
The subjective nature of indeterminacy 
In considering the infant's problems in understanding his 
world, it would seem that objects are far simpler to understand 
than people. The behaviour of objects can be described by fairly 
simple discrete rules. People, on the other hand, seem to be 
probabilistic in that there seems to be no possibility of 
absolute prediction of a person's behaviour. Language represents 
an intermediate level of complexity. Adults can recognise the 
grammaticality of an utterance without explicitly being able to 
express the rule that they are using. For instance, consider the 
following sentences... 
a) I wish to buy the Turkish Large red carpet. 
b) I wish to buy the Large red Turkish carpet 
c) I wish to buy the red Turkish Large carpet 
Subjects will select sentence (b) as being correct without 
realising that they are operating the rule .... 
[ADJECTIVES ARE ORDERED ACCORDING TO 
THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION EACH CARRIES] 
It seems plausible to suggest that we can view the domains 
of objects, language and people, as rule systems of varying 
complexity and that our relationship to these systems may go 
through three stages. 
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1) Having a partial and passive understanding of the system 
Z) Having a more complete and active understanding of the 
system such that we can construct elements of that system. 
3) Being able to apply a second system (such as a Language) to 
the first to give an explicit explanation (metalanguage) of 
what is going on. This in effect allows one to stand 
outside the system. 
If such is the case, then when we find ourselves in a system 
which appears probabilistic, the indeterminacy is not inherent in 
the system itself but in our relationship to it. 
Autistic children seem to follow the object, language, 
people sequence inasmuch as a severely retarded, autistic child 
masters only aspects of objects competence, and the more able 
autistic child may also acquire fairly considerable linguistic 
competence. Both are socially incompetent. 
Bettelhei m's (1967) account of "Joey the mechanical boy", 
and Emmanuel and Weirs' (1976) account of their experience with 
an autistic boy's use of a computer operated 
"turtle", both 
suggest that one manifestation of autism is an intolerance of 
probabilistic situations and a searching for closed 
determinate 
systems. 
This intolerance of uncertainty can be interpreted as an 
intolerance of failure. Churchill (1971) suggests that what is 
manifested as autism is in fact a symptom of a high failure rate. 
He gave a group of autistic children a range of problems to 
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solve, and observed that as each child progressively failed in a 
subset of problems his autistic symptoms, withdrawal, stereotypic 
actions etc. increased. Conversely, progressive success in a 
subset of problems was accompanied by a decrease of symptoms. 
Normal infants, on the other hand, chose people as objects 
of their explorations and only later chose to explore objects. 
They appear to take on the most difficult task first. 
A plausible explanation for this contariness is given by 
Watson's work (1976) on the infant's fascination by contingency. 
He studied a phenomena originally discovered by Hunt and Uzgiris 
(1964) that a mobile, which has been constructed so that its 
motion is contingent upon the infant's actions, will elicit from 
the child the self same cooing and gurgling that mothers normally 
elicit. 
Whilst it may be obvious to me that if I strike a tower of 
toy bricks with sufficient force that it will always fall over, 
this fact is not always obvious to the infant. Out of all the 
range of activities available to him, only one specific action 
will topple the tower. He may shout, wave his arms, kick 
his feet 
etc., but to no avail. Even when mother demonstrates how to do 
it, he may not understand the demonstration. However, when mother 
is the object of his actions, the world is biased to respond to 
him and his chances of succeeding in any enterprise involving his 
own actions are high. So, by and large, by responding in simple 
and consistent ways to actions initiated by her infant (e. g. 
imitating her infant) mother ensures success regardless of the 
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form or content. This regime of success promotion results in a 
highly confident explorer of the world. (the psychoanalytic 
omni potent infant. ) 
The effect of this omnipotence is that later, when the 
infant attempts to apply an action to an object and fails, he 
will persist in his attempts, 'blaming" as it were, not himself 
but the world. Even now mother maintains her role as success 
promoter. For instance, she compensates for her infant's lack of 
coordination, providing assistance in holding objects. Bruner 
(1973) terms such activity "scaffolding". Possibly the function 
of scaffolding is to allow the infant to cope with the cognitive 
problems he has selected without interference from unsought 
frustrations. 
This typification of the course of infancy emphasises the 
emerging independence of the infant and his gradual establishment 
as an agent in his own right. 
The infant fascinated by the contingent nature of mothers' 
games seems to be in a qualititatively different relationship 
with her than he was when newly born. Before being able to 
develop an understanding of the rules of mother's games he must 
begin by recognizing, at a primitive level, that there is such a 
thing as contingency. Where does this recognition come from? It 
would seem, as we shall see shortly, that this emerges from the 
initial negotiations that take place between mother and infant 
about the quantitative aspects of their relationship, in the way 
that mother and infant together learn how to ensure that the 
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infant is given information at a rate that he can cope with. 
Bowlby (1969) states: 
"In an ordinary family in which mother is caring 
for her child, no harm comes to him when she gives him 
as much of her presence and attention as he seems to 
want. Thus, in regard to mothering ... as with food... 
a child seems made that, if from the first permitted to 
decide, he can satisfactorily regulate his own intake" 
The arguments in the last chapter led to the proposal that 
the mentally handicapped child either cannot, or innappropriately 
regulates his own inputs and outputs. Implicit in this proposal 
is the idea that to some extent, therapeutic understanding of 
mental handicap entails enabling such children to manage such 
regulations and that in some way, arousal processes play a part 
in this. 
Stern(1977), Brazelton et al. (1974), and Papousek & Papousek 
(1977) have worked on the area of mother's role in developing the 
neonates' arousal system. 
The Papouseks state... 
"Paying attention to the relations between 
the course of learning and the level of alertness, we 
found that they can effect each other in both 
directions, i. e. that the couse of learning may also 
influence the behavioural states in a predictable way 
(Papousek 1969) 
Further evidence led us to the following 
assumptions regarding the regulation of behaviour in 
infants (Papousek & Papousek 1975) 
1) Differences in waking behavioural states 
actually reflect different degrees of activation of 
behavioural mechanisms and strategies controlling the 
input and processing of information on the one hand, 
and the organisation of adaptive responses on the 
other. 
2) There is a fluent transition evident between 
180 
the activation of such behavioural mechanisms leading 
to increasing attention, orientation, approach, 
exploration, and experimentation in one direction, and 
the inhibition of these mechanisms leading to 
decreasing attention, to habituation, avoidance, and 
complete inner detachment in the other direction. 
3) Parallel to the mechanisms named above, 
corresponding changes may be seen in the autonomic 
nervous system and in the behavioural responses inter- 
pretable as signals emitted for the social environment. 
Autonomic activation or inactivation controls the 
readiness for gross physical activity, among other 
things. Vocal signals and facial expressions may be 
differentiated only in rough categories in the first 
months of life, e. g. as signs of beneficial experience 
or pleasure, or as signs of displeasure, rejection or 
distress. Nevertheless, in a predictable way, they are 
also related to the discovery of a novel stimulus, an 
unexpected outcome of the infants' behaviour, the 
inability to find the solution in a problem situation 
as well as the achievement of such a solution (i. e. to 
the phenomena marking the course of the mechanisms 
named above). " 
This statement of the Papouseks is clearly relevant to the 
issue of input/output control. Their choice of words in 
describing the effects of inhibition of these processes, 
decreasing attention, ... habituation, ... avoidance, ... and 
complete inner detachment, ... is an apt 
description of a 
profoundly mentally handicapped and withdrawn child. 
In chapter 9 (Fig 9.9) the developmental neccessity for an 
environmental system, anaLagous to the mother was presented. This 
subsystem neccessarily promoted the experience of success. it was 
also pointed out that that the activity of this subsystem needed 
to be compatable, both with the content of what BABEL was 
operating and also with the quantitative aspects of BABEL's 
experience of success. 
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This raises the question of how the mother ensures that her 
activities are appropriate. The simple answer to this is that 
babies are very good at informing their mothers. We shall shortly 
examine some aspects of this process but the Papouseks' third 
assumption introduces the notion of signaling behaviour and to 
include this we need to update fig 9.9. (The figure is reproduced 
here to aid reading. ) 
Output 
J Infant LInput- Event 
Mothering System 
Mothers' Behaviour 
Fig 10.1 Schemati sati on of infant/mother system 
If we examine this model and consider ways of updating it, 
one device would be the inclusion of a second output from the 
child directly to the signalling system. However, a superficial 
impression of a newborn baby would be that it doesn't 
behave... hence the traditional view of the baby as a blank tabula 
rasa passively waiting to be programmed. 
The view emerging from studies of recent years presents the 
infant as a very different sort of beast. His behavioral states 
show an apparently innately regulated periodicity which seem to 
be synchronised with early events from earliest hours of life. 
Conden and Sander (1974) have shown from microanalysis of 
neonate/parent interactions that there is a synchronisation of 
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the infant's movements with similtaneous adult speech. Trevarthen 
(1974) has shown that two month old infants engage in speech-like 
patterns of movements involving lips, tongue, and hand waving in 
exchange with adults. 
Many students have interpreted these findings as evidence of 
innate knowledge. Whilst there are many findings which give 
strong support to the idea of innate competences it does not 
neccessarily follow that all infant behaviours have this status. 
For instance the synchrony of infant movement with adult speech 
can be explained in three alternative ways. 
(1) The synchrony results from the child's perception of 
the rhythmical aspects of speech, and his subsequent inte- 
gration of his own behaviour within the structure of the 
perceived rhythm. 
(2) The rhythmical aspects of adult speech are functions of 
underlying "natural" physiological rhythms which are common 
to the species. So it is easier when talking to adopt a 
language whose rhythmical characeri sti cs are compatable with 
one's own periodicity. In their evolution languages have 
developed on the basis of the species shared periodicity. 
This is a plausible explanation for the intercorrelation of 
infant/mother rhythm frequency but does not in itself give 
an account for the two being in phase. 
(3) The shared periodicity results from the parents 
tendency to modify his/her behaviour to match the infant, 
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imitation being a very good example of this. 
However these explanations are not neccessari ly exclusive. 
Explanations are possible which entail all these aspects. So it 
is possible that process 2 operates as a background condition 
within which process 3 operates making process 1 possible. 
Whatever version we adapt, it is a fact that infants are 
active but the nature of neonate behavior is very primitive. At 
this point a schematization such as fig 10.2 seems appropriate. 
Here the child does not attend to his own behaviour but to the 
effects of his mother's behaviour. Mother, in a sense, attends 
not to her own behaviour but to the effects of her behaviour upon 
her infant. i. e. His behaviour is available as a signal which 
provides mother with a basis for evaluating her own behaviour. 
Infant - EventI IMothering System 
Fig 10.2 Early attentional system of the mother\infant 
From this there emerges an increasing propensity on the part 
of the infant to attend to his own behaviour and to create 
specific behavioral events. Mother meanwhile monitors the 
infant's signalling behaviour and pitches her own appropriately 
paced contributions to his attentional arena. (see Fig 10.3) 
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I Signal Event 
Infant Attended event Mother system 
Confirmative & 
Innovative 
Behaviour 
Fig 10.3 Two level feedback system of the infant/mother dyad. 
An example of the emergence of such behaviour is given in 
the following therapeutic anecdote. This anecdote will also serve 
to introduce further material for discussion. 
Rabin 
Robin is 13 years old and profoundly handicapped. Prior to 
mothering sessions with him he could not walk, even though there 
was no physical handicap. He was usually seen seated in a chair, 
head down, sucking his hand, salivating copiously, and whining or 
grizzling. There was no eye contact and the ability to control 
his gaze was very limited. 
I undertook to engage in mothering games with him 
regularity for a period of time. Following an initial period of 
exploration a set of activities emerged which seemed appropriate 
on the basis of Robin's responses. 
(1) Vigorously throwing and catching Robin elicited 
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anticipatory broad grins, increase in tonus, and widening of the 
eyes. In the pause after such a throwing episode , Robin would 
grin, slowly but emphatically shake his head from side to side 
and produce either a loud and repeated "Bah.. Bah.. " sound or blow 
a rhythmical rasperry. 
(2) These sounds allowed me to imitate them, and over a 
period of three months their frequency increased considerably and 
there was a marked increase in his vocal repertoir. 
On one early occasion Robin was obviously unhappy at the 
beginning of a session. His head was down and he was grizzling. I 
reproduced one of his 'happy' sounds whereupon, after a pause, he 
responded by raisng his head and produced the same sound with a 
concommitant shift in mood. It would see that the presentation of 
the "happy" sound resulted in a memory search until it was 
located and recognised (As would be demonstrated by the third 
item in the Uzgiris and Hunt scale of the development of vocal 
imitation. ) In this calling up process the attached happy affect 
was also called up and this effected the change in mood. 
(3) A later game which emerged involved laying Robin on his 
back on a large Sorbo (foam rubber) block. By kneeling at his 
feet and using my knees as a stop I was able to pull Robin to his 
feet. This was possible since he tended to hold his legs rather 
stiffly. This action was accompanied by my producing enthusiastic 
sounds such as " one.... two..... three.... PULL ! ". The 
next item in the game consisted in my swaying Robin to and fro to 
the count of three and then dropping him onto his bottom 
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accompanied by sounds such as "GO", "BOOM", etc. This usually 
produced squeals of glee, and the usual vocalisations. On three 
separate occasions I reproduced the game in silence. Robin's 
responses on these occasions was completely neutral. This seems 
to imply that his coding of the game involved a synthesis of 
kinaesthesia and sound, and the experience of kinaesthesia in 
isolation was not readily available for recognition. (A similar 
phenomenon was mentioned in chapter 8 where the imitation of Judy 
was discussed. ) 
One such session was interupted by a conversation between 
myself and Robins' teacher, at a moment when he was standing and 
waiting to be dropped. After waiting for several seconds, Robin 
bent his own knees, droppped to the mat and produced his usual 
response of delight. 
Other than in babbling, as far as I know this was the first 
voluntary act that Robin had produced. I bent his knees, pulled 
him partially up and, by tapping his knee, prompted him to push. 
This he did. During that remainder of that session Robin would 
reliably assist in the pulling up and also anticipate and enact 
the drop. 
This episode made it possible to begin working on developing 
his walking although some sessions were hampered by his 
propensity to gleefully drop on his bottom. 
Other activities I engaged in entailed singing and rocking 
Robin, ( to effect an integration between his kinaesthetic and 
his auditory systems), imitating his hand watching and 
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reproducing actions applied to himself. ( Eg. If he tweaked his 
own lip, I would do the same to him. This is in effect imitation 
but the feedback is touch, rather that vision. The rationale for 
this activity is the same as that for engaging in imitation with 
Judy [page 136]. ) 
In a rather gross manner these sessions with Robin seem to 
reflect some aspects of the normal infant/mother game. The acti- 
vities involved the therapist in the role of confirmer, in the 
sense of imitating the child's activity or by repeating familiar 
events, and also in the role of innovator. The innovations 
introduced are judged to be appropriate if they produced a happy 
response. 
Although at the time-of these sessions I was aware of the 
notion of optimal arousal level, on no occasion did Robin 
approach a state which might be termed anxiety or distress 
despite some very vigourous attempts on my part to overstimulate. 
However it was possible to induce a state of helpless giggling, 
and this was interpreted as "too much". 
Intuition 
In the example of adult judgement about the relative 
appropriateness of the three sentences presented at the 
beginning of this chapter the subjects' relationship to the three 
sentences implied that they "knew how" without "knowing why". 
Likewise children abstract the functional rule structures of 
speech from adult utterances. These rules however remain embedded 
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Fig 10.4 A flowchart of possible "Mother" rules. 
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in the matrix of their own utterances. To be able to talk and 
to represent abstractly these rule stuctures entails a rather 
contrived metalanguage. Likewise it is plausible to suggest that 
social interactions are rule governed but that even specialist 
students of social interplay have only a very limited 
metalanguage for abstracting these rules from the matrix of human 
social events. 
Mothering is an intuitive activity, but this statement does 
not imply that it is innate or mystical. The flowchart in fig 
10.4 represents a set of rules that claim to have some 
correspondence to the activities of mothers. 
The diagram is intended to be didactic as well as 
explanatory and serves to draw the attention of those intending 
to engage in therapeutic activities with the profoundly 
handicapped to some of the characteristics of mothering. 
CHILD INITIATED ACTIONS 
CHILD' VARIATIONS OF 
MOTHER INITIATED 
ACTIONS 
MOTHER INITIATED 
ACTIONS 
Fig 10.05 
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Essentially, the diagram represents three embedded levels of 
interaction (fig 10.05) 
Changing from one level to the next is determined by the 
condition <DOES THE CHILD LIKE IT? >. At this level of interaction 
the responsibility to express the condition is with the child but 
reciprocally it is the mother's responsibility to respond to the 
child's communication. 
Theoretically, the operation of these rules would result in 
a dynamic shifting to and fro between two levels but with a 
tendency for the focus of the shifting to move outwards as shown 
in fig. 10.06. 
child initiating 
child cooperatin 
child passive 
Fig. 9. 
Fig 10.06 
The result of this process is the state where the child 
takes over responsibility for responding to the <LIKE IT? > 
condition, and this degree of control would be necessary before 
the child could begin to tackle understanding the less responsive 
innanimate parts of his environment. 
Bruner(1973) characterises the child in play as being 
"buffered from the consequences of his action", and goes on to 
describe mothers' role as a scaffolder. This characterisation of 
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mother is commensurate with the formulation presented here but it 
also draws attention to mothers' role when the infant is engaged 
in object play. In social play, attention was initially on the 
mothers effects on the baby but later mother herself becomes the 
focus for baby's attention. In object play he no longer attends 
to mother, who becomes a background figure who is taken for 
granted. However, Bruner emphasises that mother still maintains 
an important function in the form of subtle interventions into 
her baby's object play. These interventions ensure the baby's 
success in attaining tasks he has set for himself. 
An example of such an intervention would be the toddler 
doing a simple jig saw puzzle, and mother, recognising that her 
child knows where a particular piece goes but lacks the 
neccessary coordination to implement his plan, intervenes by 
shifting the board to compensate for the child's lack of 
coordination skills. 
As Pdelsons' (1973) study (discussed in chapter 5) shows this 
process continues in early language acquisition where mother 
ensures her child's success in communication by referring to what 
she thinks her child is trying to say rather than to what he 
says. 
Jean Berko Gleason (1973) demonstrates that this role is not 
restricted to the mother. Her observations of how the family 
talked to the toddler showed that, with the exception of the 
three year old, all the members of the family talked using a 
syntax which was slightly ahead of the toddlers' productive 
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competence, but that the messages they gave him were within his 
grasp. The 3 year old seemed to have enough to do in dealing 
with his own Language acquisition let alone take on the problems 
of another. 
The families' ability to generate a novel syntax seems 
amazing. One explanation might be that they sample their toddlers 
speech, then undertake a syntactic analysis, compute an index of 
complexity, increase this a few points, then synthesise a new 
syntax with the updated index of complexity using a set of uni- 
versal rules. Such psycholingui sti c virtuosity would make the 
Chomsky of the 1950's green with envy since it would entail that 
the family had a complete grammar readily available. Such an 
explanation does seem implausible if we restrict our view of a 
grammar to a set of syntactic rules since the family's processing 
of a number of grammars would entail a considerable memory load. 
If our conception of a grammar is broader and includes 
semantic aspects (Filmore, 1968) then another explanation becomes 
possible. It seems more likely that the structure that the family 
employs in order to generate utterances addressed to the toddler 
is their understanding of the child's growing understanding of 
his world. By referring to this semantic structure and with their 
own social/ linguistic competence it would be possible for them 
to generate the appropriate utterances. 
Some insight into this idea of knowing the child's semantic 
structure can be derived from my own experience as a father. Up 
until our son reached the age of three it was usually possible 
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for my wife and myself to be able to trace the origins of the 
questions he asked, and it seemed that we had a reasonable 
mapping of what he knew and experienced in his world. However, 
with the commencement of his attendance at playschool he became 
privy to sources of information that were not available to us. 
Consequently our knowledge of his semantic maps became patchy and 
we could no longer account for the source of every question. 
Berko Gleason's study draws our attention to an aspect of 
the parenting role which deserves some emphasis. The process of 
mothering entails not only the promotion of success but also, 
paradoxically, the creation of problems. * The sayings, "Nothing 
succeeds like success. " and "You only learn from your mistakes". 
are both in complete contradiction to one another, but at the 
same time both are true. As was suggested in chapter 9, the 
experience of success leads the child to attend to new material 
and to integrate this material. The "healthy" experience of 
failure promotes differentiation and splitting. 
It seems that some non institutionalised mentally 
handicapped children fail to learn to talk because their mothers 
are too good at understanding their intentions, and such children 
are never confronted with the weakness of their adopted system of 
comunication. This too happens in institutions, especially with 
"endearing" children. 
Bruner's (1973) notion of scaffolding reintroduces the 
notion of systemic asynchrony. The act of scaffolding seems 
implicitly to recognise the multi linear nature of development 
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since it recognises that the child, when dealing with tasks 
involving two systems, is developing his competence in one whilst 
mother attends to and supports the other. It also seems that in 
so doing, mother enables development of the other. 
Furthermore, in the jigsaw example, the perceptual-cognitive 
aspects of the task will develope perceptual competences that may 
serve to inform the perceptual-motor system. This type of process 
is analogous to the use of "bootstrapping" to improve inference 
(i. e. " pulling oneself up by one's own bootlaces. " see Goldberg, 
1970 & Humphreys, 1981 ) 
Another example of bootstrapping seems to happen in the 
development of phonology. When the infant learns to babble, he 
treats the content of babbling as an isolated system which has no 
reference to meaning. But babbling does not in itself produce the 
full repertoire of sounds or sound combinations required for his 
mother tongue. The same child, when later he has acquired some 
language, will employ semantic knowledge to help him discriminate 
between sounds. For instance a child unable to discriminate 
between "i" and "ee" wiLl Learn, on the basis of confusion or 
laughter by his parents when referring to daddy's "fit", to make 
the neccessary discrimination. 
The success of such feedback would suggest that the child 
has some primitive cognizance of his parents' communicative needs 
and such events would contribute to the development of his model 
of his parents. 
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The echolalic child masters such discriminations without 
reference to other systems such as semantic structure. This seems 
a more difficult path to take than that taken by the normal 
inf ant. 
The course that this discourse has followed could be taken 
to imply that all the mentally handicapped child needs is to be 
mothered and all will be well. This is a function of the model 
of mothering proposed in fig. 10.4 not discriminating between 
normal processes and those of the mentally handicapped. In order 
to develop this discrimination, the mothering model needs some 
qualification. The model, as a description of mothering, makes 
the following two assumptions. 
(1) The child has responsibility for deciding the boundaries 
of mothers activities. e. g. Too boring, too exiting. 
(2)The child is able to communicate his enjoyment of her 
activities in an appropriate manner. 
These assumptions do not discriminate between the processes 
of the normal infant and those of the mentally handicapped child. 
Furthermore the flowchart makes no reference to the content of 
the mothering game and it may be possible to have pathologies of 
content. 
In chapter 9 the notion of an optimal level of arousal or 
difficulty was introduced and it was suggested that there were 
several possible explanations of how processes in this area might 
operate. Some of these ideas involved notions of slow processing, 
oversensitive modulation of the arousal band, mismatch between 
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arousal band and appropriate richnes of information etc. These 
possible explanations involved some tenuous assumptions and 
speculations, which is fair practice, but the strongest general 
explanations that emerged were: 
a)The possibility of pathology in the control processes 
themselves. 
b) The possibility that abnormal behaviours in such 
processes may be functions of disorders in other areas, organic 
or environmental. The effect of these disorders would be to 
cause an unremitting experience of failure which would be 
manifest as a disorder in the control process 
These two possibilities are not seen to be mutually 
exclusive and in each individual case either or both may apply. 
The question is raised, in the context of the present chapter, 
"Assuming innapropriate arousal levels, are there environ- 
ment entailing processes which would, in any way, modify the 
regulatory processes? " 
In the account of success promotion with Judy, some claim is 
made that such modifications occurred, but there are other 
possibilities. 
One possibility is already widely practiced, and that of 
course is chemotherapy. The problem with this practice is that 
without full reference to the nature of the childs' processes it 
is rather a hit and miss affair. Certainly it may produces the 
desired effects but it is possible that a regime which entails 
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the monitoring and coordination of chemotherapy with mothering 
like practices would be dramatically effective, but alas our 
understanding of the general processes involved are minimal and 
for such a project to be possible we would need to understand the 
process idiosyncracies of each individual person. 
Brazelton, Koslowski, and Main (1974) draw attention to a 
facet of mothering which suggests that some work is done by 
mothers in helping their infants to modulate arousal levels. 
Their work is based on microanalysis of interactions and attends 
to whether the baby is initiating mother directed behaviour or 
not (this discrimination was based on the child's looking 
intent), and on mother's response to baby's behaviour. The 
process is represented graphically in fig 10.06 
mother 
------- infant 
Number of 
behaviours 
added to the 
interaction 
Time 
Fig 10.06 ( After Brazelton et. al. 1974 ) 
The suggestion then is that mothers respond, not directly to the 
intensity of their infant's behaviour, but to the direction in 
which the infant wishes to go. So if the infant is increasing the 
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intensity of his interaction with mother her response is to 
enable this. When the infant "judges" that the interaction is 
"too much" and pulls away, mothers' response enables the child to 
pull away. 
ßrazelton et. al. further demonstrated that where mother 
responds to the infants pulling away by persisting in attempting 
interaction then the period during which baby looks away is 
increased (fig 10.7) 
Looking 
intent 
Looking 
away 
mother 
------- infant 
Fig 10.7 ( after Brazelton et. at. 1974 ) 
Another possibility that may occur in this process is that 
mother can decide if baby is getting "overexited" and accordingly 
introduce calming behaviour. In our flowchart representation of 
mothering (fig 10.4) this would be equivalent to mother 
overiding baby's signals for more and returning to the quiet old 
games of rocking, cuddling, etc. 
f 
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Time 
Some normal children respond to fatigue with an almost manic 
hyperactivity which elicits a containment from their parents. In 
the folklore of parenting we have the expression "laughter 
turning to tears", or the Welsh version "play turning bitter" 
The signals which mother monitor during this period entail 
laughing, cooing, etc. but especially the direction of the 
infant's gaze. 
The processes suggested by Brazelton et al. can be directly 
employed with good therapeutic effect with the mentally 
handicapped withdrawn child. The activity can be described as 
using the child's eye gaze as "permission" to interact, and gaze 
aversion as "withdrawal of permission". The effect seems to be to 
give the child deliberate control over the adult, and the 
certainty that he can "switch" the adult "off" allows him to take 
interactive risks. 
The therapist need not initially use eye contact since such 
children often seem to practice deliberate gaze aversion, and the 
criterion for permission is the child's looking, not at the 
adult's eyes, but at his activity. This has much in common with 
what Bruner (1975) termed " the negotiation of joint attention". 
The activity is likely to be initiated by the adult and may 
involve imitating the child's activity, tickling him (although 
this often seems to be too direct) playing alongside him with an 
interesting toy etc. 
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Howard 
I employed a rather tenuous form of"joint attention" with 
one autistic adolescent boy. In the first session with Howard I 
initially gave him his head and walked alongside him wherever he 
went. After an initial period of apparent puzzlement, he seemed 
to be testing a hypothesis about what I wanted from him. He 
walked from the hospital school to the ward gate and then waited 
for me to open it for him. This I did not respond to. After a 
pause he walked away and walked a route around part of the 
hospital with myself walking alongside. As this was in progress I 
noticed the variety of sounds produced by his feet and produced 
slightly exagerated imitations of these sounds. During the walk 
there seemed to be some further testing when Howard set to go 
outside the hospital gate, but when he saw that I was not going 
to follow him he turned back and continued his walk within the 
grounds. Throughout this period I gained a strong impression that 
he was attending to the sound of my feet. The walk culminated in 
us both walking in convoluted cirles on the hospital lawns with 
Howard grinning broadly and glancing occasionally in my direction. 
Further sessions in the classroom, using his gaze for 
interactional permission led to a noticeable increase in his 
awareness of his surroundings. Following these sessions he went 
on holiday with a group from his school. This, coupled with a 
decrease in his medication, produced a moderate but very 
noticeable increase in his outgoingness and level of activity. 
I have also operated in a similar manner with an 
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institutionalised chronically schizophrenic lady and effected 
very noticeable changes in activity and sociability. An account 
of the case is presented in appendix 2. 
It would seem that asocial, or autistic children actively 
withdraw the signals that are the currency of mothering games, 
but some blind children and some profoundly handicapped children 
do not have the obvious means available to signal to the mothering 
figure. 
Low Arousal 
( Asleep ) 
lioderate Arousal 
( Alert ) 
High hrcusal 
( Distress ) 
Fig 10.8 The arousal related postures of infant hands 
( After Papousek & Papousek 1974 ) 
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S. Fraiberg(1974) in her work with mothers of blind babies 
draws attention to this problem. The absence of gaze monitoring 
in such pairs in effect puts the mother "in the dark" in her play 
with her blind infant. Fraiberg noticed that some mothers managed 
to maintain a far better rapport with their infant's needs. She 
found that these mothers operated by attending to the child's 
hands. (See fig 10.8). The therapeutic implications of this 
observation were very direct and effective and Fraiberg and her 
team set about drawing the attention of the other mothers to 
their infants' hands and educated them to be sensitive to the 
nuances and meanings of their babies' hand dance. 
t-1a ry 
A particularity effective example of the application of 
these ideas is given in the case of Mary. She was a normal baby 
who conracted meningitis at the age of 9 months. Some 14 years 
later she presented as a completely passive but poigniantly 
beautiful girl. Her limbs were completely floppy and there was no 
muscle tonus. Consequently, she could not even raise her head. 
She was diagnosed as being blind and deaf. She was completely 
mute and her eyes continally and rapidly rolled. 
My initial mothering sessions with teary were very tentative 
and gentle, but when I became counterintuitively more vigorous in 
my handling of her, she produced a dramatic increase in muscle 
tonus. 
It was noticeable that activities I engaged in such as 
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tickling, stroking the lips, singing and rocking, produced a 
decrease i n Mary's eye rotation and I used this as a feedback 
signal to tell me if Mary was attending to my actions. Novel 
activities produced this effect but it was noticeable that if an 
activity w as prolonged the eye rolling increased again. 
It seemed possible that Mary was not blind but employed eye 
rolling to maintain a minimal level of sensation in the form of 
movement in her peripheral vision. When I initiated an activity 
it provided Mary with an alternative source of stimulation so she 
no longer needed to generate visual motion. However, when she 
habituated to a novel stimulus she found it neccessary to return 
to the eye rolling. 
Mary's muscle tonus increased during these sessions and the 
hand behaviour described in Fraiberg's account emerged. With this 
available as a signal it was possible to have a fairly direct 
indicator of her arousal level. Intuitively it seemed that at a 
specific level of arousal (arm approximately 30% of distance 
between complete flacidity and spasm) Mary was more inclined to 
initiate movements. The Mothering activities were modulated to 
maintain this level as far as possible, after initially more 
intense episodes when she was swung to and fro. 
Through a series of events (which entailed the ward being in 
quarantine for a month half way through the sessions and 
eventually Mary being transferred to another hospital) only eight 
mothering sessions of some 1/2 hour duration were possible. 
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During these eight sessions the following changes in Mary's 
abilities were noted. 
1) Increase in muscle tonus and an associated increase in 
head control. If she was sat up vertically she could hold 
her head. If placed on her face she would actively move to 
one side, whereas previously her head just flopped. 
2) Occasionally she would grasp my arm. 
3) On a couple of occasions a smile emerged. 
4) She began to coo quietly and tentatively. 
5) Ward staff comented that she began to fuss if she was 
uncomfortable 
6) Perhaps most remarkable was the demonstration that she 
was neither deaf nor blind. When I cooed from one side flary 
moved her eyes in the direction of the sound. This was 
repeated with every coo. 
Joyce and James Robertson (personal communication) have 
obtained similar results by "mothering" a profoundly handicapped 
boy. Over a period of some six weeks the child that they worked 
with manifested developmental changes in the order of 4-5 months. 
In the examples of mothering presented in this chapter the 
mothering activity was preceded by a period of exploration which 
gradually developed into a particular "style" of mothering. The 
process of getting to know where the child is "at" entails an 
implicit developmental model, and whereas mothers tend to operate 
in the here and now, and in effect have no curriculum, it may be 
useful in contemplating the developmental needs of a profoundly 
handicapped child to have reference to some structure and fig 
10.8 is a provisional and sketchy candidate for such a structure. 
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Fig 10.8 Some aspects of early infant development 
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The further development and application of such a structure 
would, as with the representation of sensori-motor development, 
entail the recognition that development is not unilinear and that 
the principles of horizontal decolage applies here as well. 
For instance, of the 5 senses, only sight, sound, and 
kinaesthesia is considered here. The experience of feeding 
involves both taste and smell and is excluded from this account, 
yet they would be a dynamic part of the priming period of 
development. 
The notion of decalage applies inasmuch as although primary, 
the mother is not the only person to have contact with the 
infant. As the infant begins to discriminate between people, so 
strangers, to make contact with the child, appear to follow an 
abreviated version of mothering in trying to establish rapport 
with the child. The stranger who is too enthusive will quickly 
cause the baby distress since he has not attended to baby's 
initial signals informing him that his actions are taking the 
baby beyond the informational boundaries within which the baby 
feels comfortable. 
In the area of object play, regression back to earlier 
mothering games occur in a sense when the child is disturbed and 
returns to mother for comfort. 
Sandler & Sandler (1978) in a discussusion of the 
development of object relations typify infants as wishing and 
seeking "nourishment" in the form of reassurance and affirmation. 
The gratification of such desires provides a "background of 
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safety" from which the infant operates in his developmental 
endeavours. The seeking of reaffirmation from mother is manifest 
in situations where mother and toddler may be engaged in 
independent activity in the same room but continually engage in a 
subtle "checking up" of each other. When mother Leaves the room 
the infants' need for gratification is highlighted by his anxious 
or distressed behaviour. 
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CHAPTER 11 
The logic of the material presented so far has drawn 
attention to the social interactional aspects of control 
processes fundamental to an open ended and developing cognitive 
system. Without necessarily proving anything, this formulation 
has allowed us at least to contemplate the notion of therapy with 
the profoundly mentally handicapped. In most areas of handicap a 
distinction is made between the impairment (e. g. chronic bronch- 
itis) and the handicap (e. g inability to walk any distance). In 
mental handicap this distinction is not usually made and a child 
will be described as, say, being visually impaired and being 
mentally handicapped. The two aspects are seen as being 
independent. Rarely is the "mental" spoken of as a process 
leading from impairment to handicap. This, it seems to me, arises 
from our considerable ignorance about the impairments involved in 
mental handicap. 
In this chapter some possible mechanisms involved in infant 
development will be discussed as possible loci of impairment. My 
aim is not to give an exaustive account but to make tentative 
suggestions about some of the mechanisms involved in 
developmental impairment. 
Eye contact 
Investigations of the nature of infant/mother interactions 
characterise the dialectic nature of their interplay and present 
the infant as a system that in isolation is functionally 
incomlete. Only in the context of his mothers' actions does he 
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become a viable developing system. 
In the clinical examples presented so far the importance of 
eye contact has been referred to on several occasions. In the 
case of autistic children it was proposed that they actively 
practised gaze aversion (See also Creak (1961)), whilst in cont- 
rast, children like Lary, did not know how to look. 
Whilst working with Robin.. I noticed the occasional eye to 
eye contact occured during rocking activities, when he was 
cradled in my arms and rocked from side to side whiLst I was 
Looking into his eye. The following seemed a plausible explan- 
ation for this process: 
Robin, in rocking his head from side to side generated 
visual motion in the same manner that Mary did. In so doing he 
generated peripheral, rather than f oveal vision. In the activity 
of rocking I took on the responsibility for creating this visual 
motion so Robin no longer had to shake his head. In Mary's case 
eye rolling was obviated. 
Having thus enabled him to hold his eyes steady, what he 
sees, in the act of being rocked, is a field of motion at the 
centre of which is focused the adult's eyes. Relative to the 
surrounding field the image is relatively stationary and 
coincidentally lies in the area of his fovea. (Fig 11.1) It 
seemed then that this was the first time that Robin had looked at 
anything. 
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Periferal 
Vision 
Fovea 
Stationary 
Image of ... 
Adult Eyes. 
Field of 
Motion 
-: Vý ., m-l- 
Fig 11.1 The fixation of the "mothers" eyes on the infant's 
fovea in the act of rocking 
An attempt was made to see if the effect was repeatable and 
another child was sought with the specification that... 
a) he was thought to be blind despite no apparent damage to the 
eye, and.... 
b) that he indulged in either head shaking, or eye rolling. 
Ian was a four year old who fulfilled my criteria and I 
attempted to elicit eye contact by rocking, but after 15 minutes 
I abandoned the attempt. Further reflection suggested that the 
issue of optimal arousal/information level was involved. In other 
words the child chose a particular rate of head rocking to 
generate an optimal rate of visual motion, thus the rocking rate 
adopted by the adult was crucial. A second session was attempted 
with this in mind and I rocked him at various rates whilst I 
looked into his eyes. In less than one minute, prolonged eye to 
eye gaze was obtained. 
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Later sessions involved gaining eye contact then moving my 
eyes slightly off Ian's gaze. This succeeded in eliciting 
appropriate eye movement on his part and led to the ability to 
track a moving object. Further work by his teacher led to this 
formerly immobile child moving about by wriggling, and eventually 
developing the basic motions of crawling. 
Although such a technique seems to work with the profoundly 
handicapped child it does not neccessarily mean that the same 
explanation applies to the development of eye contact in the 
normal infant. Neonates usually take a few days before opening 
their eyes. However, babies born under a LeBoyer regime, where 
birth takes place in a dimly lit room, are reported to be born 
with their eyes open. 
Wertheimer (1961) demonstrates some interesting competence 
in a neonate less than 1 minute after birth. He operated a 
clicker on each side of the infant's head, and on each occasion 
the infant's eyes moved in the direction of the sound. This 
suggests that not only could he locate the source of the sound in 
space, but that he looked towards the source as if expecting to 
see something. 
Research generally recognises that infants have the ability 
to fixate upon an object a few weeks before they engage in eye 
contact with their mother. 
It would seem possible that the elicitation of gazing 
behaviour in children who are unable to fixate is a reversal of 
the acquisition order of normal infants. However the development 
21 2 
of infant vision is a complex area. Greenberg (1977) suggests 
that 4 different processes are entailed, he further suggests that 
researchers are not always clear about which process they are 
investigating and this results in much conceptual confusion. 
Greenberg however, does not consider the role of peripheral 
vision in his conceptualisation. 
The elicitation of gazing by rocking does have the quality 
of biological neccessity. We have a situation where, 
(1) We have the morphological structuring of the retina into 
an area developed for the reception and transmission of visually 
fixated information, surrounded by an area dedicated to a large 
extent to the reception and transmission of movement. 
(2) The natural mothering activity of rocking whilst looking 
into the infant's eyes having, from the infants point of view, 
the same structural form. 
(3) In this activity, the eye of the mother is placed at the 
relatively inflexible focusing distance of the infant's eye. 
This is either very fortuitous serendipidy, or an example 
of the very sophisticated functional "designing" that one expects 
fron the evolutionary process. 
Another approach to the therapeutic problem of developing 
visual fixation in the profoundly handicapped and which again 
raises issues relevant to normal infancy is given in the 
following case. 
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Brendan. 
Brendan is a hydrocephalic 13 year old who engages in 
rhythmical to and fro rocking whilst he moves his eyes in a slow 
and roughly elliptical rolling motion. He often moved his fingers 
in front of his eyes, smiles, and engages in a delicate finger 
dance without apparently looking at what he was doing. 
I attempted to asses Brendan on the Uzgiris and Hunt scales 
but failed to elicit any fixation, Let alone any ability to 
track. Despite my firm beleif in the Piagetian notion of 
invariant developmental order,. I placed a sweet on the table in 
front of him, and then placed a screen in front of that. Brendan 
reached out, knocked the screen out of the way, and obtained the 
sweet without looking at what he was doing! 
I attempted a more sophisticated effort at ascertaining 
whether he was able to track or not. The following procedure was 
used. 
Brendan was sat at a table and behind him was placed a large 
mirror. In front of him was set a videocamera. A flashing light 
held in the camera operators' hand was moved along a square path 
around the camera. PLay back of the video tape showed Brendan's 
face and the reflection of the flashing light traveling a square 
path around Brendan's head. Inspection of the tape showed no sign 
of any correttation between Brendan's eye movements and the 
movement of the light. 
Later reference to T. G. R. Bower's work (1977) suggested a 
plausible explanation which gave some therapeutic insight. 
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Dower placed young infants in a cubicle and placed an 
attractive object for them to grasp. When the infant started to 
reach for the object he was plunged into darkness. The infant 
continued to reach for the object. ( Bower employed infra red 
cameras to film his subjects. ) 
A few weeks later the same infants were unable to perform 
the same task. It seemed that in acquiring eye-hand coordination 
it became neccessary for them to visually monitor the progress of 
their hand to the object. This was of course impossible in 
darkness. It also suggests that these infants, prior to acquiring 
eye hand coordination, registered the location of the object, 
computed a trajectory along which to send their hands and then 
had merely to operate the appropriate hand/arm movement. 
This then provides us with an explanation of how Brendan 
succeeds in retrieving the sweet and suggests how he might be 
enabled to develop further visual competence. ' 
From his point of view he had a perfectly adequate means of 
acquiring objects , but he had no experience of reaching for 
moving objects for which he needed eye hand coordination. 
The following procedure was followed. A sweet was placed in 
front of him, and once he had started reaching for the sweet it 
was moved a few inches to one side. His hand would then reach for 
an empty space where he expected to find a sweet. A similar 
process to the "lettuce leaves in a cup" suprise operates and he 
notices the sweet alongside his hand. 
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By thus increasing the displacement of the sweet from its 
original place, over the period of two weeks we enabled Brendan 
to acquire the ability to track. Subsequent testing on the 
Uzgiris and Hunt (visual pursuit and permanence of objects 
subscale) demonstrated that Brendan could track an object which 
disappeared behind a screen and persisted in looking at the point 
of disappearance. 
Bower's (1974) work suggests that in some areas of the 
infant's competence a specific competence may disappear and then 
later reappear. It seems that although the behaviour is the same 
the underlying processes which maintain the competence are based 
on forms of greater flexibility than those supporting the original 
form of the behaviour. 
Bower, Broughton and tloore(1970) demonstrated that infants 6 
to 10 days old, reached out in the direction of a visual object. 
Bruner and Koslowski (1972) studied the same behaviour in an 
infant at 10 to 22 weeks of age and many of the infants in their 
sample had not reached satisfactory reaching. 
The Uzgiris and Hunt assessment of Brendan suggested that he 
scored at item 4 when he recovered the sweet from behind the 
screen, whereas within Piagetian theory he was not even scoring 
item 1. The discrepancy between Bower et. al. 's and Bruner & 
Koslowski's findings becomes less of a puzzle if we entertain 
the notion that different processes result in the same behaviors. 
The question that arises is whether the earlier 
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manifestations of particular competences are functional, or 
whether they are vestigial functions left behind in the course of 
phylogeny. 
A newborn calf will walk within an hour of birth. The rapid 
transition from the first staggering attempts to stand to a 
competent gait later in the same day, suggests that the calf has 
an innate schema of "how to walk" and the Learning process 
entails fleshing out this schema. The human infant on the other 
handlearns to walk, very slowly, and his walking is usually 
preceded by learning to crawl. Infants, however, do have a 
walking reflex and P. Zelazo (1976) has shown how it is possible 
to practise the reflex. The baby that he worked with shows some 
amazingly precocious walking. However the quality of this trained 
reflex walk is mechanical and lacks the fluid adaptablity of 
normal walking. 
In this particular instance the walking reflex is vestigial 
but other reflexes may be functional. e. g. the rooting reflex, 
which allows the baby to find the nipple. 
The Inculcation of posibility 
In chapter 5 it was pointed out that the child's 
understanding of language was ahead of his abilty to speak, and 
as ficNamarra(1972) pointed out, "the child needs to know what he 
wants to say before he actually can try to say it. " 
The distinction between " knowing that" and "knowing how" 
arises in many areas and it may well be that some of the 
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primitive innate competences may serve to draw the child's 
attention to "things he can do". Once his attention is drawn thus 
then he may begin to develop a sensori-motor version of the same 
competence and so use this as the basis for further elaboration 
and development. Were such functions to be identified as 
operating pathologically then it would not be difficult to set up 
procedures that served as an alternative basis upon which the 
mentally handicapped child can build upon. 
The picture that seems to be emerging from our understanding 
of infancy is that of the infant possessing these chunks of 
innate competence which could be classified thus: 
(a) Redundant vestigial competences. 
(b) Independently operating competences. 
(c) Incomplete competences that only function when the other 
half of the system, viz. mother, is actively present. 
These semi systems set up the infant as ready to engage with 
the social fabric of his environment. 
D. S. Lehrman(1953) has commented that from the point of view 
of evolutionary theory, the cultural system can replace the more 
stable genetic mechanism as a means of encoding and transmitting 
adaptive information. The relative instability of culture has the 
advantage of a much faster response to environmental changes. 
The example of the structural compatabiLity of the retina 
with mother's activity, assuming it applies to normal infants, 
would be an excellent example of the shift of adaptive 
responsibility from genetic to social systems. It also suggests 
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that a useful approach to the study of infant cognition may be 
to make the assumption that mothers "do everything for a purpose" 
and then to undertake a functional analysis of mother's activity 
from the infant's point of view. We might term this approach 
"maternal ecology". 
Other examples of maternal ecology might be singing and 
rocking as kinaesthetic/auditory integration, whilst at the same 
time providing diachronic rhythmical structures upon which the 
infant can overlay knowledge of these modalities. 
The interplay between mother's activities and the infant's 
stimulus/arousal control processes is an example of such a 
biosocial competence system. The nature of this system's 
functioning draws our attention to a point, and that is that this 
particular system does not function in isolation but 
functionally 
relates to other systems such as those dealing with smiling, 
gazing, muscle tonus etc. It may be that this particular system 
is privileged but it would be wise to be open to the possibility 
that other systems may interrelate. 
In the case of mothers of mentally handicapped children this 
conceptualisation has important ramifications, for if the 
baby is 
"damaged", then the information that he imparts to her is likely 
to be distorted. Consequently her actions may be innappropriate 
to a varying extent. 
This, misinformation may be confounded by social processes. 
The mother of a child whose language is delayed may through her 
contacts with other mothers be under pressure to sustain her 
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child's normality. The resulting pressure on the child, if 
innapropriate, may seriously exacerbate his condition. 
Another process may occur if the infant is born not ready to 
be fully viable as a partner in the pair. The 
embryogenic/maturational processes which culminate in this 
viability may still be in progress but by the time viability is 
attained, mother will have experienced her infant as a less than 
responsive member of the dyad and may not be able to complete the 
dyadic interplay. Such babies miss their cue. 
This hypothesised process is comparable to the systemic 
asynchrony mentioned in the context of the Uzgiris and Hunt 
scales, only now our concept of system explicitly includes both 
mother and child. 
The therapeutic implications are similar to those mentioned 
earlier, and in principle would entail recognising the nature of 
the delayed system and its relationship to other parts. This 
in turn would entail maintaining the viability of these parts 
whilst working on promoting the viability of the pathological 
system. 
Further, where a function is damaged it may be possible to 
reprogram. An example of this is the PECO method, employed to 
treat adult patients of normal intelligence who have suffered 
cerebellar damage. The effect of such damage is a lack of control 
of the limbs, and patients find a simple task like picking up a 
cup impossible. The PECO method entails a patient "talking" his 
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or her way through a motor task. E. g. "move my hand forward a bit 
more, now down a bit.. etc. " It would seem that language provides 
the patient with a medium with which the actions are rebuilt and, 
over a period of time, reasonably normal function can be 
reattained. 
I have employed a similar technique to a limited extent with 
an athetoid child. In the absence of language, the contingency of 
my responses to the child's actions was employed, within the 
context of a game, as a means of drawing the child's conscious 
attention to her unused arm. 
This discussion has been based on some speculative 
hypotheses about the nature of pathology in mental handicap. 
Empi ri cal studies of mothers and mentally handi capped infants 
support the plausibility of some of these speculations. Studies 
of such pairs {eg. O. Jones, 19771 suggest that mothers of 
mentally handicapped infants tend to talk over their babies and 
the interplay between the two is out of synchrony.. It should be 
noted that here the term synchrony refers to the entrainment, 
(taking of turns), between mother and infant. In this text we'll 
adopt the term dyadic synchrony for this "turn taking" to 
distinguish it from the idea of systemic synchrony introduced in 
chapter 6. 
Oliver and Davies (1979) undertook a similar study to that 
of Jones but they found that the mothers and mentally handicapped 
babies in their sample had better dyadic synchrony than did 
normal infant and mother dyads. The direct contradiction between 
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the two studies is intriguing and may be a function of different 
samples, or different investigative procedures. If we accept both 
studies at face value then Jones' findings are not suprising if 
we view the infant as misinforming his mother. However the Oliver 
and Davies findings poses some interesting problems of 
interpretation. 
One possible interpretation is that Oliver and Davies' 
mothers are doing their work in an optimal manner and their 
babies will attain their full, but limited potential. Another, 
less generous interpretation, would suggest that these mothers 
are "too good" {c. f. Winnicott's, 1976, concept of the "good 
enough mother"} and their actions leave no work for the infant to 
do. This interpretation would fit into an" optimal discrepancy" 
hypothesis ( Barker, Lewin, et al., 1956 ) and would also fit the 
present work. 
If we adopt this position then the reason for this state of 
affairs is of interest. Very baldly the question asked is "who's 
to blame? " If we tend to ascribe blame to the mother then we 
need to ask if the would behave thus with a normal infant. No 
such comparative study has been done to my knowledge, but it 
seems most unlikely that the blame lies with mother, rather it 
would be the case that damaged infants elicit such behaviour from 
their mothers. Accepting for the moment that mothers of the 
mentally handicapped are either "to good" or "not good enough" 
then the same argument would apply to the mothers in Jones' 
study. 
222 
Bearing in mind Sameroff and Chander's formulation of the 
nature of the dyad as being transactional, ( Chapter 1) then the 
process would proceed along the lines of the "malmodified " 
mother responding to her infant in a presumably non optimal 
manner, further malmodifying him... he responds and further 
malmodifies her acti ons.. et c. 
In our account of Judy, an explanation was presented which 
outlined a process of increasing the child's tolerance of 
failure and leading to an increasingly open relationship with her 
world. A reversal of this process would be analagous to the 
pathological infant-mother process suggested here. 
Very cautiously and tentatively it seems that it may be 
possible to undertake a reversal of this process. Before giving 
more substance to such a proposal much work needs to be done. The 
implications are that we can then engage in the early diagnosis 
of a damaged infant, and engage in an informed and sensitive 
intervention with the mother/damaged infant dyad. 
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CHAPTER 12 
As was stated in the introduction to this thesis the 
problems of the severely and profoundly handicapped are generally 
regarded with unmitigated pessimism by most who ever consider 
their plight and my intention was to generate some realistic 
optimism. In pursuing this aim I may be guilty of overstating my 
case and of including uncautious optimism. 
In the previous chapter a regime of early diagnosis of 
specific functional impairments followed by dyadic therapy to 
minimise the developmental effects of that impairment was 
suggested. The notion of early diagnosis entails a great deal 
more knowledge than we have at present of how to conceptualize 
what the neonate brings with him with which he sets about 
understanding his world. 
Although therapy and diagnosis are inseparable it is perhaps 
appropriate to concentrate on the therapeutic aspects since good 
work in this area will have direct diagnostic implications and 
from the point of view of mental handicap this work will need to 
take into account the functional relationship between the 
persons' biology, his psychology, and his culture. 
Such diagnostic work does create some ethical issues which 
entail considerable caution and judgement in clinical practice. A 
misdiagnosis of problems in an infant will create uneccessary 
anguish and anxiety and may even contribute significantly to 
altering the subtle balance of a formerly healthy infant/mother 
dyad. It may be the case that a premature diagnosis will disrupt 
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and interfere with a therapeutic dyad whereby there may be some 
problems with the baby but the quality of mothering is such as to 
lessen the baby's pathology. A premature intervention may 
handicap the mothers' potential for therapy. ( A similar issue is 
raised by Stern (1977). 
In areas of mental handicapp as those addressed by this 
thesis it would seem that diagnosis without therapy should be 
avoided and the therapeutic aspects of research should have 
priority over the diagnostic aspects. 
Assuming knowledge of therapeutic process and a well worked 
out diagnostic regime, the parent's relationship to such 
knowledge needs to be understood. It seems that the experience of 
most parents of mentally handicapped children is of professionals 
not informing them of their child's condition, and these parents 
bitterly resent not having been told that their child is mentally 
handicapped. Yet in the one or two cases I have heard anecdotally 
(J. Foyle, personal communication) of parents responding with 
understandable anger and withdrawal on hearing of their child's 
condition. In these cases further support and therapy for the 
child was no longer accepted from the informant by the parents. 
It is clear from some of the cases that I have presented 
that the simple act of mothering does produce some relatively 
dramatic changes in some institutionalised mentally handicapped 
children, but let me add a cautionary postscript to the account 
of Judy. (page 138). 
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Some of the sessions with Judy were recorded on video tape. 
Her parents were invited to view the tape. On seeing their 
daughter they were delighted, and commented how nice it was to 
see her so happy, just like she used to be at home! It seemed 
that the withdrawn Judy was a function of the institution and 
prior to admission she was a happy, boistrous, but destructive 
and unmanageable child. 
Whilst this takes away some of the punch from the 
presentation let me add that the imitation procedure has enabled 
many a-social children to begin to take on and enjoy social play 
with an accompanying increase in outgoingness. 
This raises a rather circular point. In the large hospital 
for the mentally handicapped, workers with a therapeutic outlook 
often wonder to what extent they are dealing with the effects of 
the institution rather than with the effects of the condition of 
mental handicap. It may be salient to point out that some 
superficially more benign hostel may be more institutionalising 
than the large victorian "bin", and some families may be 
similarity powerful agents of the institutionalising process. 
If we regard it as a process then we may discern degrees of 
institutionalisation and any practice which deviates from ideal 
mothering may be regarded as such. 
This idea of deviation from "good enough" mothering 
corresponds to King, Raynes, and Tizard's (1971) categorisation 
of institutions into child orientated or institution orientated. 
They suggested that the mechanisms which enable a place to be 
226 
child orientated entailed a fairly democratic staff structure 
within which responsibility rather than concrete jobs were 
delegated. This had the effect of better staff morale, and 
created and enabled opportunities to relate appropriately with 
the residents. One effect of this was a considerable superiority 
of the language levels of the children in the child orientated 
setting. 
Deviations from the activity of "ideal mothering" are 
bipolar. Some wards may administer a rigid and insensitive regime 
which demands administratively convenient behaviour from its 
inmates. At the other extreme, wards may function in a very 
caring manner but by making no demands and expecting no change, 
may be equally institutionalising. 
The developmental effects of "good enough" mothering are 
constrained by the nature of the child's handicap. In the 
previous chapter the possibility of therapeutic mothering was 
entertained which related not just to the childs expressed needs 
but fundamentally to his means of expressing needs. The degree to 
which this may be possible will depend on the functional nature 
of the handicap. It may well be the case that some handicapping 
functions may be beyond the influence of therapeutic mothering. 
For instance there is the possibility that some intellectual 
aspects of mental handicap may arise simply from the speed of 
neural transmission. This may be modifiable via arousal functions 
by therapeutic mothering, but there may be bounds on such 
modifiability, and to go further it may be neccessary to go into 
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the biochemistry of neural transmission. 
If we accept the plausibility of therapeutic mothering, we 
still do not know the limits on its effects. In some children it 
may be far reaching, and in others minimal. 
Another cautionary possibility exists. Even as it is 
understood now, the nature of the infant mother transaction is 
complex and subtle and a complete mapping of the processes is 
likely to unfold a scene of considerable complexity. It may be so 
complex that the effort required to engage in therapeutic 
mothering may be daunting. To overcome this possibility it might 
be neccessary to chunk the components of the process into more 
manageable units. 
A similar dilema arises in the operant approach to language 
acquisition which ignores current understanding of mothers' role 
in the acquisitional process of the normal infant. Whereas, in 
terms of acquiring specific words the method produces good 
results, these results rarely generalise in a fundamental way, 
and the operant therapist has to contemplate the impossible task 
of teaching the whole language bit by bit, and as Chomsky and 
Miller calculated, this process would take millienna. 
The alternatives would seem to be either to decide on an 
economi cal and realistic subset of the language, or to 
ambitiously shift ones focus and look at the possibility of 
working on the acquisition process itself. 
So if therapeutic mothering is confronted with the same 
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dilemma it may need to focus on a subset of the total system, but 
optimistically it seems Likely that these subsets are not closed 
systems but are influenced by changes in other subsets of the 
infant system. Given understanding of their interelationship we 
might contemplate the possibility that work on a specific dys- 
function will ramify throughout the whole system 
Affect and intelligence 
Two aphorisms operate in our culture 
(a) Nothing succeedes like success. 
(b) You only learn from your mistakes. 
These apparently contradictory statements seem both 
essentially true and if we regard the first as relating to the 
affective aspects of learning, and the second as relating to 
cognitive aspects, then the contradiction changes to a contrast. 
In the account presented here the two aspects go hand in 
hand and are inseperable. The formulation bears a close 
similarity to Bowlby's (1969) ideas of attachment. 
The learning infant is seen as operating from within a field 
of secure predictable knowns from which he takes on appropriately 
limited but less predictable elements from beyond his secure 
field. (Sandler & Sandler, 1978) The security of this field 
though, is intrinsially linked to the infant's experience of 
success. If success fades then the child can no longer take his 
field of security for granted and has to check up on elements of 
the system. If this activity meets with limited success, then the 
infant, (or even the adult) will devote much effort into 
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maintaining the system. In cases where failure is met the 
boundaries of security will recede. 
In considering the problems of mentally handicapped people, 
emotional problems are very often ignored and they are typified 
purely in terms of intellectual problems. The mentally 
handicapped child is usually perceived exclusively in terms of 
his handicap and only rarely is he perceived as a child in his 
own right. This perception allows such children to be brought up 
under conditions that would create a national scandal were they 
perceived as children. 
Typically the issues are not so clear cut. A large bare ward 
with limited furnishings is sometimes a better environment for a 
disruptive and anxiously aggressive adolescent then a nicely 
furnished domestc setting. In the latter case any sign of an 
impending outburst will create anxiety about property in those 
responsible for care on the ward, and this anxiety will 
contribute to, and grossly exacerbate the childs outburst. In the 
barren ward, anxieties about property are minimal and the child's 
disruptive behaviour may disappear, not because of coercion, but 
because of the absence of staff anxieties. Staff on such wards 
may be able to provide sensitive opportunities for the child to 
begin to relate, but all too often the regime of such wards makes 
such developments extremely unlikely, and a child in such a 
regime is more likely to be seen as attention seeking rather than 
as needing affection and extending his surroundings. 
The perception of someone as mentally handicapped, rather 
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than as a child (or adult) seems to reflect some confusion in the 
area of child development generally and this confusion stems from 
the relationship between the variable and invariable components 
of development. 
In chapter 5 it was pointed out that a mentally handicapped 
child described within the framework of the Uzgiris and Hunt 
scales was indistinguishable from the normal infant. Where 
differences did emerge it was in the manner of transition from 
one cognitive structure to the next. Piagets' structural theory 
is not intended for looking at individual features, such as 
personality, cognitive style, etc. The theory aims, and to a fair 
extent, succeeds in abstracting the invariants of development. 
This invariance is a function of the interplay between the 
physical/functional invariants of the human species and invariant 
structures in the environment. Rosch(1974) for instance, argues 
that human categories are as they are because they reflect the 
nature of the world rather than the species. To talk about 
individual differences we must, against a background of 
invariants, contemplate the variants of the system. The 
environmental variants would be culturally conditioned. Within 
the subsystem of any culture there are both invariant aspects, 
(e. g. the language system) and variant aspects, (e. g. mother's 
personality). Species variance may be manifest as different 
constitutions, temperaments, etc. 
There are cases though when the invariants may vary with 
concomitent implications for development. The development of 
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object permanence in a blind infant would be an example of such 
variant instability. 
The implications of changing the nature of environmental 
invariance can be seen if, for example, we contemplate the 
developmental implications of an infant reared under conditions 
of zero gravity. The changes in spatial and causal relationships 
might produce a world view that gravity bound intellects might 
find difficult to comprehend. 
In the case of blind infants we have a variation in what is 
normally taken for granted. To share the world view of a blind 
person is extremely difficult and can only be done in an abstract 
intellectual way. We may don a blindfold and become more aware 
of sounds, smells, etc. but our relationship to these modalities 
differs from those of a person blind from birth since he has had 
a lifetime constructing the world in these modalities. 
Consequently he has strategies and structures appropriately 
negotiated with his world. Even if we were to commit ourselves to 
a prolonged period of being blindfolded there is no guarantee 
that we would eventually aquire the world view of the blind 
person, for we have available a structural understanding based on 
a largely visuaL modality, and this would be available to help us 
organise "blind" perceptions. The person born blind does seem to 
be different from one who has lost his sight. 
Yet, even though it may be difficult to empathise with the 
blind person we can identify the cause of the difference in world 
view, and the very act of identification gives us a direction in 
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which we may begin to empathise. 
In the case of mentally handicapped people we again have an 
instability in species invariance, but in this case our ignorance 
about the nature of the difference between them and us precludes 
the possibility of empathy. The result seems to be that we adopt 
a view of the "mentally handicapped" as a different species and 
the norms and expectations that we normally apply to our kind 
rarely apply to this other "species". 
If we do attempt to identify the differences, the most 
apparent is that in intellectual ability and this gives us a 
metonymic coding such that we do not need to unpack the other 
attributes of that person. 
It is very salutary to attempt to role play a mentally 
handicapped person being taught a simple task such as putting a 
coat on. My first attempts in such a session resulted in a 
contrary and uncooperative act, but the role was that of a 
relatively bright person. With practise though it became possible 
to recognise those areas of competence that I normally took for 
granted. The role playing is rather intellectual and contrived, 
but it is salutary to recognise for instance, that someone 
pointing and uttering something incomprehensible, causes me to 
look at his finger, and not at the coat button which I was 
required to fasten. 
Trying to make sense of such data is bewildering and may 
induce various emotions including anxiety or even anger. The 
experience is not purely intellectual. 
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As a theory, BABEL begins with the invariants of human 
development and draws heavily on piagetian formulations, but with 
an emphasis, not so much on the structural theory but on the 
processes that are postulated to underly the transformation from 
one structure to the other. The emphasis on transformations does 
not in itself move the discussion from the domain of the 
invariants of development to that of the variants, but by 
attempting to specify unambiguously the mechanics of the theory, 
areas of discretion are revealed which promise to modulate 
various versions of the invariant theory into variant theory. It 
is perhaps not suprising that these gross modulations have some 
validity in application to mental handicap, and finer modulations 
may begin to refer to more normal individual variants. 
So for instance, in formulating BABEL, the realisation came 
that a coded episode including an action did not neccessarily 
entail that that action was operated when that chunk was 
addressed. In terms of a theory of developmental invariance, such 
discretion was necessary to allow the system to reflect upon a 
situation rather than impetuously operating a response 
conditioned to the stimulus. Having recognised the area of 
discretion and built a choice into the system, questions then 
arose as to the parameters of the choice, such that we might have 
various versions of the system with different propensities to act 
or not. 
At an extreme, versions of these parameters could be linked 
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to conditions such as hyperactivity or expreme passivity, but 
within these extremes there are viable variations. 
This would be in accord with Escalona's (1968) work on the 
developmental implications of temperamental differences in 
infants. This moves the theory into the area of variance and may 
give it potential as a theory of personality, cognitive style, 
etc. So the action/innaction parameter might relate to the 
dimensions intraversion/extraversion and theories of the locus of 
control. 
The story however is not so simple and both in its own 
history and in its presentation BABEL has become increasingly 
transactional. In discussing levels of variants then it is 
neccessary to recognise that explanations of developmental 
variance must entail the dialectic between species and environ- 
mental variance against the background of the dialectic of the 
invariants of both systems. 
Understanding mental handicap then entails understanding 
its dialectical nature which is a facet of the fascinating 
interplay between the organic and the cultural. 
When I began this work I fondly imagined that I would end up 
with some answers about mental handicap. At this point in time I 
realise that I have reached far short of that aim and have ended 
up with a way of thinking about mental handicap, a wide range of 
questions, and little that claims to be an answer. 
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In response to this realisation I would claim that I have 
shown it is plausible to be optimistic about the problems of the 
mentally handicapped and I would like to think that the questions 
I have raised have been along potentially useful lines both in 
terms of theory and therapy. 
However I am confident enough to think that the questions 
raised are important and worthy of consideration if only because 
of their implied optimism. However, it is rash to swallow a 
theory wholesale just because of its optimism: we need to 
countenance it's veracity. Yet I feel that proof of a theory as 
general as that explored here is impossible, for that would 
entail omniscience. Such a theory can only be judged in terms of 
the extent to which it is plausible and useful, and that 
judgement needs to take into account the historical and cultural 
context in which the theory is offered. 
It would seem that BABEL is ony as useful as it is plausible 
for if it is implausible, then I have raised false hopes. How the 
plausibility of this work is evaluated will no doubt reflect the 
particular criterion of each reader. Whilst respecting the 
reader's right to impose his own criterion, I would like to raise 
some aspects which lead to my own evaluation of the theories 
plausibility. Also I would Like to make clear the boundaries of 
my claims so that evaluation is fair to the theory. 
In earlier chapters I have taken some pains to typify the 
theory as a model. Many people mean many things by the term model 
and confusion often arises when various interpretations of the 
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word are used 
BABEL attempts to provide a general theory of processes 
underlying the development of normal and mentally handicapped 
children. I use the word general in a particular way and do not 
imply that it explains everything. By general I mean that I assue 
that a common process exists in developmental change regardless 
of what point in a child's development a change is observed. It 
is also general inasmuch as it assumes that at a particular level 
of abstraction the same process occurs in both normal and in 
mentally handicapped children. This Level of generality is 
intentional and the notion of specific procedures was avoided. In 
looking at the transition from nonrefletive to reflective action 
in the child operating at Piaget's stage 5, it was tempting to 
build in a procedure along the lines of.. 
IF APPROACHING STAGE 5, GO REFLECTIVE, ELSE REh1AIN IMPULSIVE 
In the account of the sensori-motor field it was suggested 
that specific functions such as crawling, smiling, etc. might 
arise as a result of maturational processes. But even if such a 
possibility exists, to build them into the model as specific 
procedures would preempt the possibiLity that they arise out of 
the operation of the general process. 
In typifying BABEL's structure as chunks of embedded lists 
it was tempting to invoke the magic number 7 and structure the 
lists accordingly. The decision to ignore the number 7 was 
deliberate and the possibility was entertained that the workings 
of the general process might generate it. So far '7" has not come 
to light, but a possible source might be in the interplay between 
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BABEL's processing speed and the environmental rate of change. 
Until quantifications are entered into the model, no numbers will 
emerge from it. 
Such decisions are not arbitary, but are partially motivated 
by a need to be optimistic. Given a choice of two possible 
explanations where the available evidence does not discriminate 
between the two it is possibly appropriate for the therapist to 
opt for the most optimistic version. 
The bias goes further, for in cases where an explanation 
involving concepts such as capacity are suggested, a pessimistic 
intractability is implied about the condition of the person of 
limited capacity. This imposes constraints on the therapist for 
of course you can't put in "what God left out". However if the 
opportunity arises for a different understanding of capacity as 
process which allows for modification, then the therapist needs 
to pursuit such possibilities. Furthermore he must be on the look 
out to creat such possibilities especially when the pessimistic 
alternative is based on untested assumption, even though it may 
be conventional wisdom. 
BABEL then is a healthily biased general theory of develop- 
ment which sets out to create therapeutic possibilities. It does 
not however claim to be a complete general theory, either in the 
sense of explaining everything or being completely worked out 
within its own boundaries. Even though the theory is presented as 
an explanation its usefulness may perhaps be better judged as a 
medium for thinking with and for raising questions. 
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Although BABEL is not a complete theory, that does not imply 
that it will not explain more than it does in this presentation. 
BABEL is argument by analogy and analogies can be stretched too 
far. "Stretching an analogy" can be a very usefull and valid 
method of inquiry. In the process of stretching various anomalies 
arise which just do not fit. In the case of BABEL itis easy to 
produce instances of human performance with which the theory does 
not cope. In contemplating exceptions we are not left just with a 
list of unaccountable phenomena as sometimes the contrast between 
these phenomena and the overstretched theory indicates a possible 
direction in which an alternative direction might take. This 
might develop into a very well worked out theory which covers 
many of the aspects of the original theory, and many more, but it 
is likely that some aspects covered by the first theory are not 
considered by the second. A synthesis of both theories would lead 
to a third position and this would have strenths as well as 
omissions... and so on. 
Thus typified, the work of an investigator needs to be 
understood and evaluated, not in terms of a static structure 
presented as a theory but as a process of which the investigator 
is part. This view of investigative activity essentially follows 
that of Kuhn (1962), typifying science as operating at a given 
period in its history, within a paradigm (qua analogy) and 
operating what he terms "normal science". This entails building 
up evidence in support of the current paradigm. A point is 
reached where the current paradigm becomes inadequate, a 
revolution ensues in which, usually younger scientists are 
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involved, and a new paradigm emerges with an associated change of 
perceptions. The fact finding process of normal science then gets 
under way again .. etc. Whatever Kuhn's intentions were in 
presenting his theory, it is usually taken to be a description of 
how science progresses rather than a prescription for how it 
should proceed. The possibility of interpreting Kuhn 
prescriptively has considerable attractions and would lead to 
much less effort being expended in defending ones position. As I 
write this I am struck by the analogy between the entrenched 
style of paradigmatic science and the style of the autistic 
child! 
Having presented the idea of a Kuhnian prescription I am 
reluctant to admit to an inconsistency in my own position, 
inasmuch as I recognise that I am working within a psychological 
paradigm that might be grandly labelled "transactional 
constructivism" and from this position I am critical of 
intolerant other positions. Within this framework, however, I 
have been engaged not so much in a fact finding enterprise but in 
a process of changing ideas, perceptions and questions. So 
judgement and plausibility need to take into account, not just 
the formulations presented but the means by which these 
formulations were arrived at and their likely therapeutic 
impli cati ons. 
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UZGIRIS & HUNT SCALE 
Scale I 
The development of visual pursuit and the permanence of objects. 
Item 1. Following a slowly moving object through 1800 are. v 
Adiinistratton 
An object likely to be attractive to the child is employed. Using; an 
object that the child is playing with is usually successful. The object 
is passed slowly from, say, left to right, in a horizontal path about 18" 
from the child's eyes. His eye movements are observed. This may be 
repeated several times. 
ol 
CL 
r 
Criterion 
The passes this item if his eyes smoothly follow 
the object along its path of movement. 
Explanation 
The child who passes this item has learnt that he can employ the 
muscles of his eyes to maintain the object in his field of view. 
His application of an action has an effect on the image he receives. 
Item 2. Notices the disappearance of a slowly moving object 
Adninistration 
As in item 1 but this time the object moves slowly along its path 
and disappears from the child's view behind a screen; or over the edge 
of the table. This may be repeated several times. 
ýý 
ý. 
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Criterion 
The child 'notices' the disappearance of the object. This would 
be based on observing the child persisting in looking at the paint of 
6 
disappearance or returning his glance to the starting, point after several 
presentations. Failure to reach criterion would be demonstrated by his 
losing interest in the object after it disappears. In this latter instance, 
with retarded children, it is advisable to establish, by re-presenting the 
object, that the child is still interested in the object. 
Explanation 
Here the child's knowledge is essentially the same as in item 1 but 
he has now acquired confidence in his ability to maintain the object in view 
by using his eye muscles, such that when the object disappears, he persists 
in trying to make it reappear by operating the muscles, i. e. by"looking. " 
You will note that in this explanation we assume that the child knows that the 
object is "there. " What he doesn't know is how to make the object reappear. 
Item 3. Finding an object which is partially covered 
Administration 
An object which the child is interested in is partially covered by a 
cloth, or similar. _ 
It is important that the object should be such that 
its appearance partially covered is not identical to its appearance un- 
covered, e. g. a partially covered rectangle remains a rectangle. 
11 
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ý :1 
Cri terion 
The item is passed if the child obtains the object from unier the 
cover. He fails if he loses interest or even reacts to the loss but 
does not retrieve the object. 
Explanation 
Prior to this situation, the assumption seems to be m 1e that the 
child has learnt to attend to objects as a whole constellation of 
attributes to which he may apply his actions. This item demonstrates 
6 
the ability to apply the same set of actions to an image manifesting scme, 
but not all, the attributes of the original object. 
Item 4. Finding an object which is completely covered 
Administration 
An object in which the child is interested is placed under a towel 
(or behind a screen) in frcnt of the child. 
- ýý 
'/ 
ýý 
Criterion 
>D 
a. / 
The item is passed if the child retrieves the object. 
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Exnlsnation 
Here it seems that the child is attending to the object's location 
as an attribute of the object but it also seems possible that the attended 
attribute is the actions that the adult has applied to the object. 
Some support for the latter explanation is derived from the observation 
that it is often possible to "teach" this stage to a child by physically 
holding his hand and getting him to "hide" the object, thus demonstrating 
to him how the object got to its location. 
It seems here that how the object is hidden is crucial. If the object 
is placed on the table in front of the child and then covered, then the 
object's location is the salient feature. If the object is slid under, or 
behind the screen, then the object's "behaviour" (the actions it is subjected 
to) becomes the salient feature. The important point, though, is that moving 
up the object permanence scale, what we are finding is that the child is 
becoming less dependent on complete perceptual information and is increasingly 
able to work with fewer clues which themselves get increasingly divorced 
from the purely perceptual domain. 
Item 5. Finding an object completely covered in two places 
Administration 
Two screens are employed here and placed side by side, a short 
distance appart, in front of the child. The object is first hidden unser 
(or behind) one screen and the child allowed to retrieve it. The object 
is now hidden a second time behind the same screen and again the child is 
allowed to retrieve it. For the third hiding, the object is placed behind 
the second screen and the child allowed to retrieve it. 
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Criterion 
The item is passed if the child is able to retrieve the object of ter 
the third hiding. 
Explanation 
Here, what we are doing is setting up an expectation that the object 
is to be found, behind the first screen, so it is possible for the child to 
succeed in retrieving the object after the second hiding by assuming that 
the object is defined by its location. If the child depends on this hypothesis 
to such an extent that he does not attend to the object's behaviour, then he 
fails on the third hiding. 
So, whereas item 4 is mainly concerned with finding if the chili can cope 
with one attribute, item 5 deals more specifically with asking "can the child 
use the actions applied to the object as information about the object? ". 
Item 6. Finding an object completely covered in two places alternately 
Administration 
Here, as in item 5, two screens are employed but the object is hidden 
alternately behind each screen. 
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Criterion 
Searches correctly under each of the screens. 
) 
Explanation 
Success at this task depends on the child having the ability to 
represent the object in terms of the actions applied. Frankly, I am 
unclear about why item 6 should be more difficult than item 5. It is 
possible that the child at item 5 can use the applied actions as infor- 
mation but tries to fall back on the other ones such as location, but 
where there is a contradiction between expectation and information, he can 
use the information. In this item then, what we might be seeing is the 
child coming to rely on applied actions as a source of expectations. 
Item . Findint' an object completely covered 
in three plnces 
Administration 
Three screens are here employed and placed side by side. 
For each hiding, the object is placed randomly behind one of the 
three screens. _-0% 
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Criterion 
Searches directly under the correct screen each time. 
Explanation 6 
This item appears to test, under conditions of greater complexity, 
the chili's ability to define the object's location in terms of where 
the adult has placed it. 
N 
Item 8. Finding an object after successive visible displacements 
Administration 
Three screens are placed as in item 7, side by side. This time, 
the object, in the view of the child, is passed behind the first screen, 
on behind the second screen, then on to the third screen. The object 
is left behind the third screen and the adult then demonstrates that his 
hand is empty. It is advisable to pause behind each screen. 
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Criterion 
Uzgiris & Hunt provide no criterion for this item since their investi- 
gation produced too few instances to be included in their analysis. 
They suggest that there may be two steps between item 8 and 9. However, we 
will provisionally accept that the child passes this item if either they 
search the screens in the order of hiding or go directly to the last screen. 
Explanation 
It seems here that we have a situation where each time the object dis- 
appears the child can formulate a hypothesis about its location but on each 
reappearance, disconforming information is given so the child has to formu- 
late a new hypothesis. This item then seems to test a flexibility of hypo- 
thesis formation-reformation. However, with increasinm competence in this 
situation, the child can presumably deal with a new rule, viz. the object is 
behind the screen from behind which it does not reappear. 
6 
Item 9. Finnin? an object under three s'i rimpo^ed screens 
Adminiatration 
The object is placed on the table in front of the infant and covered 
with a cloth. This is again covered with another larger cloth which is 
again covered with a third cloth. 
Note If the object used is small, such as a sweet, it is as well to use 
nesting covers. (Sweets tend to get lost in a pile of towels. ) 
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Criterion 
Removes all screens and takes object. 
Explanation 
Here we seem to be testing the child's confidence in his ability to 
find the object, by testing his persistence in continuing to search. 
Alternatively, what may be going on is that in order to obtain the 
object hidden here, the child must be able to cope with a representation 
of the adult's actions applied, not to the object itself but to the covers 
and these actions not having an effect on the object's location. i. e. He 
must be able to distinguish actions which change the object's location 
from those actions which do not change the object's location. 
Item 10. Finßinp an object following one invisible displacement 
Administration 
Here the object is concealed under a cover, such as a cup, or in 
the adult's hand. The concealed object is then placed behind a screen 
(or under a cover). The original concealing cover is brought back into t 
the sight of the child. This is termed an invisible displacement. 
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Criterion 
The child passes this item if he looks under the cover, then looks 
behind the screen. If he looks directly behind the screen, it is 
likely that some cue has been given or that he may be operating a 
hypothesis that in these 'games' the object is alk &is behind a screen. 
Explanation 
Success in this item requires some consiierable representational 
sophistication. The child can represent what has happened to the object 
purely in terms of the actions applied to it and in t"e absence o'' any 
perceptual inform-ation about the object itself. He can core with trans- 
formations 'in his head. ' This level of representational ccmpptence jr 
necessary, though not sufficient for symbol u-e. 
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Item 11. Finding object following one invisible dicrlace^ent 
with two screens 
Administration 
Here, two screens of a different colour are employed and tie object 
is concealed, as in item 10, under a cover. The concealed object is first 
hidden behind one of the screens and the cover brought back in front of 
the child, (i. e. a hidden displacement is operated behind the first screen) 
who is then allowed to look for the object. This hiding is repeated a 
second time behind the same screen. A third hiding is then done behind 
the second screen. 
1st hiding 
2ni hiding 
3rd hiding 
Criterion 
The child passes this item if he goes directly to the correct screen. 
Exrlaration 6 
Here, the strength of the child's hypothesis that the object is where 
the adult's actions have transferred it to, is tested. In a sense, by the 
second hiding, the child is tempted to use an easier hypothesis - the 
object is to be found behind that particular screen. If the child has 
become competent in being able to mentally represent an absent object 
through a transformation, then he will not be tempted by the hypothesis 
of place. 
Item 12. Findin, an object following one invisible dicolacement with 
two screens alternated 
Administration 
As in item 11, but the hidden displacement is operated alternately 
behind the two screens. 
L 
__ 
IL .-1 
- 
// 
Criterion 
The child passes if he searches directly behind the correct screen. 
Explgn. tion 
As in items 5 and 6,1 am uncertain why item 12 should be more 
difficult than item 11. A possible explanation is that in item 11 the 
task on the first two hidings seems easy and only on the third hiding 
is the difficult, discriminating item administered. Here, the complexity 
of the task is apparent on the second hiding and only a child really com- 
petent in the handling of mental representations of transformations will 
attempt item 12. 
Item 12 may also discriminate between children who have competence 
at item 11 but who vary in their degree of risk-taking. 
Item 1 3. Fin4in an object following one invisible displace! Ant with 
three screens 
Administration 
Three screens are placed in front of the child and the invisible 
displacement operated behind any one screen. The child is then allowed 
to find the object. This is repeated randomly behind each screen 
about 5 times. 
ý. 
Criterion 
The child searches behind the correct screen each time. 
Explanation 
This seems a further test of the child's competence with invisible 
displacements in a situation of greater complexity. 6 
Item 1 4. Fin1inp an object following a series of invisible displacements 
Administration 
A row of three screens is arranged in front of the child and the 
object concealed under a cover or in the hand. The concealed object is 
now in turn passed behind each of the three screens. It is important to 
ascertain that the child sees the cover passing between each screen. 
The object is ! eft behind the last screen and the child is allowed to 
search. If the object is concealed in the hand, it is permissible to 
demonstrate that the hand is empty. 1 
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Criterion 
The child passes this item if he searches behind the last screen. 
Explanation 
Here the child's representational sophistication is considerable. 
He can represent the passage of the concealed object behinri the three 
screens and then operate the scale; that the objects is behind the screen 
from which it did not reappear, to his representation of the object's 
passage. 
Item 1 5. Fi. ndinR an object following a series of invisible di^r1nce'rxits 
by searching in reverse of the order of hidiri. 
Administration 
As in item 14, but this time the object is concealed behind the 
first screen and the hand or cover then continues, empty, in a path 
behind the second two screens. 
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Criterion 
'Searches systematically from the last screen, back to the first. 
Explanation 
This item requires the same ability to apply the non-reappearance 
rule to his representation of the object's successive transformations, 
as item 14. But, further requires that having failed behind the first 
screen, he systematically reapplies the rule to the prior screen until 
the object is found. 
By now, he is completely free of perceptual information about the 
object and can manage a "mental" construction of what has happened to the 
object; he can further devise actions to test the hypothesis in a 
systematic way. 
SCALE II 
The Development of Means for Obtaining Desired Environmental Events. 
1. Appearance of Sand Watching Behaviour 
Administration - Observation. The behaviour is more likely to 
be observed in the absence of visually attentive 
objects. 
Criterion - hand watching is observed. 
Explanation - The hand watching child has discovered that there 
is a relationship between what he does to the 
world and the effect it produces. He sends in- 
structions to the muscles of his hand and 
observes his little pink digits waggling in front 
of him. There is an analogy here with tracking 
where again a specific action produces a certain 
perceptual effect. 
The difference between hand watching and tracking 
is that tracking has to conform to a criterion of 
success -a goal - which is to maintain the object 
in view. In hand watching we have play; 
inasmuch as there is no criterion of success, the 
activity is done purely for the effect it produces. 
Hand watching seems to presuppose the ability to 
hold a gaze although profoundly retarded children 
without tracking abilities seem to engage in hand 
watching. 
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(2) Achievement of Visually Directed Grasping 
Administration - An object of interest to the child is held 
directly in front of him, vithin his reach. 
Criterion The child passes this item if he reaches out and 
grasps the object, this may not happen unless both 
hand and object are in view. 
Explanation Here the child has discovered the possibility of 
applying the competence gained from hand watching 
to objects with which he was previously restricted 
to a passive perceptual relationship. 
His hands have ceased to be an end in themselves and 
have now come to be a means to an end. 
As in the development of the object concept, what we 
are beginning to see here is the child's relation- 
ship with the world changing from a passive reliance 
on perceptual information to an increasingly active 
relationship where the child increasingly makes 
sense of the world by structuring it in terms of 
the effects of his own action. 
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(3) Repetition of Actions Producing an Interesting Spectacle 
Administration - Any object which produces a spectacle in which the 
child is interested when a simple action, such as 
hitting, is applied to it. Ideally, the spectacle 
should be both visual and auditory. Bells, rattles, 
roll upright musical toys etc. are suitable. 
Some experimentation may be necessary before 
finding a spectacle in which the subject is 
- Criterion 
Explanation - 
interested. With infants, the object ie placed 
at a distance, then the child can touch it but not 
grasp it. With a more mobile, severely retarded 
child, this is rather difficult and it is probably 
better to allow the child to play with the object, 
occasionally interrupting the play to demonstrate 
the spectacle. 
Applies the action systematically and repeatedly 
to produce the effect. 
Here the child is now truly using his actions as 
a means to an end. His attention now focusses 
less on the action itself and more on the effects 
of the action. 
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(4) Letting Go of an Object in order to Reach for Another 
Administration - The child is given two objects to hold, one in 
each hand. A third attractive object is then 
quickly presented and the child observed. 
Criterion - The item is*passed is the child puts down one 
of the objects in his hand prior to reaching 
out for a third. 
Explanation - It seems that here we have the first intimation of 
foresight. Before operating the sequence: 
reach and grasp: it is possible that the child 
attends to the component units of the sequence 
and realises that in order to grasp, the hand 
must be empty, so he operates an action 
(putting 
down an object) in order for the necessary pre- 
conditions to be met. 
This explanation implies that the child has the 
ability to represent his course of actions 
before he operates, i. e. he has a plan which he 
reviews in toto before operating. 
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(5) Use of Locomotion as a Means 
Administration The child is seated on the floor and his interest 
is engaged in a pair of objects that "go together, " 
e. g. a cup and saucer, and the child is allowed to play with them. 
One of the objects is then placed a short distance from the child 
such that in order to obtain it, he must crawl to retrieve the 
object. With retarded children, this item may be difficult to 
administer if the child's quality of play is poor. Placing an 
attractive item out of the child's reach does not really test 
this item. Some insight might be obtained by selecting two 
types of edibles that the child likes but has a greater preference 
for one. The preferred object is placed out of the child's reach 
in his sight and he is given the second, less preferred item. 
Criterion The child is observed to obtain the out-of-reach item. 
Where preferred edibles are used, the child would 
possibly have to reject the offered edible and obtain the preferred 
but out-of-reach edible. This latter criterion is speculative. 
It is presupposed that the child is mobile. 
Explanation Here, the situation is set up where the child is 
executing a plan, with variations. By moving one 
of the objects out of reach, the execution of the plan is blocked 
and the child has to bring in a complete competence system - 
locomotion, ann apply it to the situation in order for the original 
plan to be executed. 
Structurally, this item is very similar to item 4, 
the difference being in the relationship of the adjustment made 
to the plan itself. In item 4, the inserted element - "put down 
the object" is a variation of the components of the plan. 
In this item, the inserted element's relationship to the plan is 
superficially arbitrary and its usefulz1ess is only apparent when 
the operation - move to the object - is completed. This implies 
that not only is the original plan's representation used but the 
insert - "move" is itself represented as a plan and the outcome 
checked before it is operated. 
(6) Use of Relationship of Support 
Administration - The child is seated at a table upon which 
is spread a towel within reach of the child. 
On the towel, well out of the child's reach, 
is placed a desired object. The child is 
observed. In the case of more mobile sub- 
normal children, they may stand up in order 
to reach the object, in which case, it is 
necessary to restrain them. Since this 
action could be interpreted as a communication, 
that the object is forbidden, it will be 
necessary to demonstrate to the child how to 
pull the towel to get the object, in order to 
'give permission. ' 
Criterion The item is passed if the child obtains the 
object by pulling the towel, with or 
without demonstration. 
Explanation Here, the child in his assessment of the 
problem and his formulation of his plan 
will incorporate the towel as a means to an 
end. So, in items 4 and 5, the inclusion of 
new elements is applied to ready existing plans. 
Here, the secondary element is incorporated 
into the child's plan in its first formation. 
So, the child is beginning to design plans of 
longer sequences. 
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(7) Understanding of the Relationship of the Support 
Administration - The situation is identical to item 6 except the 
object is held a few inches above the towel. 
It is necessary that item 6 is first administered. 
ý- 
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Criterion The child makes no attempt to employ the towel 
as a means of obtaining the object. 
Explanation Here, the possibility of using the towel as a 
means of obtaining the object is presented but, 
in order to ignore the 'temptation, ' the child 
must fully understand that the object must rest 
on the towel for the operation to work. 
Here, we are differentiating between the vague 
realisation, (possible in item 6, ) that by 
6 
pulling towels, objects located at the far end 
will come closer; and a much more exacting set 
of criteria which demand that the object must rest 
on the towel for the operation to succeed. 
(8) Use of String Horizontally 
Administration -A desired object to which a length of string is 
attached, is placed either on the table or on the 
floor - out of the child's reach but, with the 
string within the child's reach. The child is 
required to pull the string in order to obtain 
the object. It is permissible to demonstrate 
that the string may be pulled in order to obtain 
the object. Some obssessional children have a 
great liking for string and the object needs to 
very attractive. 
Criterion The child, with or without demonstration, obtains 
the object by pulling the string. 
Explanation I am unclear why this item should be more difficult 
than item 7. Structurally, both items are very 
similar and intuitively it would seem that the child 
will have had more experience of pulling string, 
in the form of wheeled pulling toys than of pulling 
objects placed on towels. Two speculaticna seem 
possible. 
Either (i) 
My intuitive assumption about the child having 
experienced string pulling is incorrect, and that 
the pulling of string toys occurs during and after 
this item. Retarded children are usually more mobile 
than normal infants operating at the same cognitive 
level, and this eventuality will affect the relative 
difficulty of this item in tie two groups. 
Or (ii) assuming the child has had experience of string-pulled 
toys, it may be the case that the child has a con- 
struction of 'string-pullable in the presence of 
wheels. ' The absence of wheels might violate the 
criteria of this construction. This may be 
doubtful if we suppose that the child learns 
negative criteria only when the criteria are 
diagnostic - e. g. things on string without wheels 
cannot be pulled. 
(g) Use of Strir Vertically 
Administration The child is seated in a chair and the desired 
object attached to a piece of string is suspended 
vertically so that the object is out of reach but 
within sight of the child, and is obtainable by 
means of the string. 
With more mobile children, it may be necessary to 
resort to expedients such as standing the child 
on a table to administer the item. If necessary, 
it is permissible to demonstrate the solution. 
Criterion The child without or with demonstration obtains 
the object by acting on the string. 
Explanation This item, though structurally similar to the 
other two, demands a full understanding of the 
relationship between the string and the object 
since it is not likely that he has had experience 
of vertical string pulling. The task may also 
demand greater motor competence if a hand over hand 
technique is necessary. 
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(10) Use of Stick as a Means 
Administration -A desired object is placed on a table well out 
of the child's reach. On the table, within the 
child's reach is placed a stick long enough to 
obtain the object. If the child does not attempt 
to obtain the object, it is permissible to demon- 
strate how to use the stick. With more mobile 
children who are liable to lunge across the table, 
it seems permissible to place the obect on a high 
shelf and require them to knock it down with the 
stick. 
Criterion Without, or with demonstration, the child obtains 
the object. 
Erplanation In the items involving the towel or string, the 
situation is presented in which the potential 
means and relationship is presented to the child. 
Here, he must be able to construct a representation 
of the potential before he can use it. Even if the 
solution is demonstrated, the child needs to be able 
to represent the demonstration. If he cannot 
represent the demonstration, then he will not be 
able to understand the 'answer. ' 
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(t t) Foresight in the Problem of the Necklace and Container 
Administration - For this item, a long thin and unstable container 
and a necklace is required. A clear plastic 
tube sealed at one end is very appropriate. 
Without putting the necklace in the container in 
night of the child, the child is required to put 
the necklace in the container. The main point of 
this item is that in order to put the necklace in 
the container, it is necessary to steady the con- 
tainer with one hand whilst putting the necklace in 
with the other. This item asks, "Does the child 
foresee that he will have problems with the con- 
tainer's instability before he attempts to put the 
necklace in? " The child may of course invent other 
appropriate means of coping with the container's 
instability - such as bunching the necklace into a 
ball or dangling it. 
criterion At the first attempt, the child adopts a way of 
pulling the necklace in which shows that he, has 
foreseen problems arising out of the container's 
instability. Uzgiris & Hunt comment that the 
child who has a few unsuccessful attempts, at the 
problem before solving it may be demonstrating an 
intermediate stage between 10 and 11. 
j9z, 1anRtlon This item demonstrates the operation of 
foresight 
which involves considerable representational 
sophistication. The child 
lust represent the 
problem and make *dry runs, ' or simulations, of the 
solutions that occur to him in order to select the 
beat solution before actually operating it. 
Since we are only interested in the demonstration of 
foresight, a wide variety of situations are possible 
as eubetitutes for this item. Item 10, if done without 
demonstration and it can be assumed that the problem 
is unfamiliar, would be an appropriate demonstration. 
(12) Foresight in the Problem of the Solid Ring 
Administration - Several identical wooden or plastic items (discs, 
cubes, spheres etc. ) are used each with a hole 
such that they can be threaded onto an unmounted 
rod. The hole on one of these items is visibly 
blocked. The child is required to thread the 
items onto the rod. It is permissible to demon- 
strate the task with one or two of the items but 
it is not permitted to draw attention to the 
plugged item. Should the child select each 
item for the rod leaving the plugged item last 
and not attempting to put it on, then the problem 
should be re-presented and the items re-arranged, 
to increase the probability of the plugged item 
being selected. 
Criterion The child makes no attempt to, thread the solid 
ring onto the rod. 
Explanation As item 11, this item demonstrates the operation 
of foresight. The content of this item seems 
to have greater subtlety in that the focus of the 
foresight is focused on a detail of the materials 
employed rather than on an overall property. 
Though, again, the relative difficulty of item 12 
over 11, may reflect the child's greater experience 
of unstable containers than plugged holes. 
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SCALES IIIa and IIIb - Imitation 
Introduction 
The child's assessed perfozmance on this scale is particularly 
sensitive to the ambience created by the adult. Uzgiris & Hunt 
suggest that once the infant begins to direct his behaviour towards 
the adult (by smiling, giving him toys, etc. ) then it is appropriate to 
administer the scale. With the severely retarded and institutionalised 
child, such signs of readiness may not be so clear. 
The child can be encouraged to be interested in the adult by 
bouncing on the knee, tickling etc. It is important to develop 
a playful situation. As Bruner (1977) states in a discussion of the 
origins of communication in the mother infant dyad. 
"When things become too 'serious' and intention-bound, communication 
regresses to the level of demand and counter-demand. The simulative, 
conventionalised and rule-sensitive spirit of play seems to be a 
sine qua non for language learning. " 
In this scale, we are looking at some of the elements of pre- 
language learning. 
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SCALE Ma - Vocal Imitation 
Item 1. Use of Vocalisation other than crying 
Administration - Observation of child's vocalisations. 
Criterion The child is observed to produce vocalisations 
other than those indicating distress, e. g. (cooing). 
Explanation The situation is structurally analagous to hand 
watching, whereby the child operates an action 
and observes the results. The child repeats this 
sequence in order to reproduce the effect. 
Item 2. Resvons 
----------- 
e to Familiar Vocalisation 
Administration - Talk to the child in a normal adult manner 
observing the child's response; then utter 
one of his own sounds a few times. Pause and 
observe the child. Repeat the child's sounds. 
It is appropriate to shift to a different sound 
in the child's vocabulary. 
Criterion The child is observed to respond in some 
positive manner to sounds similar to'his own. 
Explanation This item demonstrates that the child can 
differentiate between his own sounds and the 
more complex sounds of adult speech. This im- 
plies that he has some representation of the 
effects of his own action and moreover can 
recognize the similarity between adult 
imitations and his own sounds. 
Item 3. Restonse to Familiar Babbling Sounds 
Administration - When the child is not vocalising spontaneously, 
gain his attention and feed back to him babbling 
sounds (as opposed to cooing sounds of item 2) 
which he has been previously observed to utter. 
Repeat the babble a few times then pause and 
observe his responses. Repeat the babble. ' 
If the child has a variety of babbles which he 
frequently uses, change to a different babble 
after three or four presentations of the first one. 
Repeat this procedure for 2 or 3 different sound 
patterns. 
Criterion The child demonstrates an active interest in the 
adult's performance. This may range from: 
i) The child smiling, producing mouth movements 
and continuing to look at the adult during 
pauses, 
ii) Produces similar sounds to the adult and 
changes his sounds to match those of the 
examiner. 
Explanation The criterion for this item covers quite a range of 
competence. Structurally, the item is similar to 
item 2 in that the child recognizes and may repeat 
adult vocalisations similar to his own. The fact 
that he has moved from simple cooing to the patterns 
of sounds which constitute babbling indicates that 
representationally, he can cope with sequential 
patterns of sounds. 
Item . Imitation of Familiar 
Words 
Administration - Words, or wordlike sounds produced by the infant as 
fed back to him by the adult and his response during 
pauses are observed. 
Uzgiris & Hunt suggest that where the child uses 
meaningful words, objects orpictures corresponding 
to the words used by the child are used. Where 
objects are used, it is important to repeat the 
child's words back to him when he is not too engrossed 
in the object play. 
The 'words' in this item may be idiosyncratic and 
their 'meaning' known'only to a person who has close 
regular contact with the child. 
Criterion The child is observed to vocalize in response to the 
adult's productions. 
Explanation Although objects may be used in-this item, the child's 
meaningful use of sounds is not-. the focus of this item. 
This item seems to investigate the child's ability to 
represent and produce 'chunks' of regularly occurring 
patterns with a definite beginning and end. So, in 
items 2,3 and 4, we have the following sequence: 
Item 2: Competence in producing single sound elements. 
Item 3: Competence in'stringing these elements into 
open-ended patterns. 
Item 4: The ability to represent and produce regularly 
occurring sequences into new, higher-level unite. 
This new level of representation implies that adult 
sounds are no longer heard 'by the child as an 
ongoing jumble of sounds but that he can perceive 
adult sounds as sequences of-words. It would seen 
plausible that to do this,.. he has attended to the 
intonation contours of adult utterances. Although it 
is not at issue in this item, it seems that the child 
may at least 'suspect' a relationship between words 
and 'things. ' Moreover, the patterns of sounds 
produced are beginning to conform to the patterns of 
the child's native language. 
Item 5. Imitation of Unfamiliar Sound Patterns 
Administration - Sound patterns unfamiliar to the child are used here. 
When he is not spontaneously vocalising, ' gain his 
attention and produce one of the unfamiliar sounds. 
Do this several times, pause and observe his response. 
Repeat this procedure a few times. If the outcome is 
not clear, repeat the procedure using another new 
sound. 
In this item, the novelty of the sound is important 
and some observation for some time before the' 
administration of the item may be necessary. k " 
Criterion Vocalises in response to the adult's utterances. 
The vocalisation does not have, to correspond to 
those made by the adult. 
Explanation Since Uzgiris & Hunt do not demand that the child's 
vocalisation necessarily approximates to the adult's 
production, this item seems to-test that the child at 
least 'entertains' the possibility that he can 
attempt an unfamiliar sound, i. e. he has the notion 
that sounds not within his representational repertoire 
are reproduceable. It is plausible to argue from 
this that the child has some sort of awareness of 
himself as an agent, at least in the domain of social 
sounds. 
Where, within this item, the child does succeed in 
reproducing new sounds, then it seems necessary that 
he has some good overview of'how -to organize 
his 
vocal chords, mouth, tongue etc. to produce a new 
sound, before he actually operates his attempt to 
form the sound. Were he to do this by trial and 
error, then it would take him'a very much longer time 
to produce replicas of new sounds than it in fact 
does take. 
f Item 6. Imitation of New Words. 
Administration - Simple words, not within the child'a repertoire, 
are repeated to the child whilst the child is 
playing but not too intently, with, the appropriate 
object, adjectives may be used. Alternatively, 
the situation may be focused on the Adult-Child 
interaction where verbs. such as bounce, jump, kiss 
etc. may be used. Following a few presentations 
of the word, pause and observe the child's behaviour. 
Repeat a few times with the same word then change to 
another word. 
Follow the abode procedure until about 6 or 7 different 
words have been used. 
Criterion The child is observed to either directly imitate all 
the new words or else to produce approximations which 
the words. improve with practice for all , 
Explanation This item demonstrates that the child has good overall 
organization of his vocal apparatus which allows him 
to a certain extent, to predict what sound patterns 
will emerge from the operation of specific sequences 
of vocal actions. 
It also seems possible that"the child has some working 
knowledge of the rules of"patterns of sound combinations 
which characterize the language of his environment. 
SCALP IIIb Gestural Imitation 
Item 1. Systematic Imitation of Familiar Simple Schemes 
Administration - The infant is observed at play in order to determine 
which simple actions (schemes) he employs. 
When the infant is not playing, reproduce one of these 
actions then pause and observe the child's behaviour. 
Repeat the procedure a few times until the child's 
response becomes clear, then repeat again using another 
simple action that the child employs. With retarded 
children who use stereotypies, it is appropriate to 
use their stereotypy as a scheme. 
Criterion The child passes this item if he responds with a 
consistent action to the adult's performance. 
The child's actions may or may not be an imitation 
of the actions produced by the adult. 
Explanation In this item, the child demonstrates that he can see 
that his own actions and those of the adult have some 
relationship. When the child imitates his own actions 
preferred by the adult, he demonstrates that he can see 
the identity between his own actions and the adult's, 
and is further interested in testing out this relationship. 
When the child responds to the adult's performance with 
a different but consistent action, it is less clear what 
goes on. It is plausible ti}at the child recognizes 
the adult's actions as familiar and responds to it 
with the first action pattern that comes 'to mind. ' 
This implies that, although the child recognizes the 
action as familiar, he cannot reconstruct it in a new 
context. (He would normally apply it to an appro- 
priate object. ) 
If this is the case, it is then unclear why the child 
should not, on each attempt, change his actions to those 
more clearly resembling the adult's performance. He ray 
be focusing on the sequence "You do that; I do this; 
you do that; etc. " rather than on the similarity. 
Item 2. Imitatiön of Complex Actions Composed of FamiliRr Schemes 
Administration - The principle underlying this item is that an 
consistent action that the child uses spontaneously 
is selected and the adult uses it in a more complex 
context. So, for example: the child may bang a 
brick on the table. The adult places several bricks 
on the table, selects two of them and bangs then 
together several times. The adult then observes 
the child's response. The adult may help the child 
in placing the bricks in his hand. Other examples 
might be: the child can shake a rattle; the adult 
places a brick inside a cup and shakes the cup - then 
presents the child with a cup. The child bangs one 
hand on the table; the adult claps his hands together. 
Criterion The child is observed at least to attempt to imitate 
the adult's actions. 
v r4 exe_a.. 
Explanation The child here demonstrates that he can at least 
perceive the possibility of^a relationship between 
his action and the more complicated context that the 
adult has placed his actions within. 
As in item 1, the child's success in imitating is not 
at issue, it is his recognition that'it may be possible 
for him to do what the adult does that is being tested. 
a 
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Item 3. Imitation of Unfamiliar Gesture Visible to the Child 
Administration -A gesture that is likely to be unfamiliar to the infant 
is selected and performed in front of him when he is attentive. 
His responses are observed. This procedure is repeated for 2 or 3 
different unfamiliar gestures. 
Criterion - The child passes this item if he succeeds, either 
immediately or through successive approximations. 
Explanation - In order to be able to imitate an unfamiliar gesture, 
the child must go though the following steps: 
(1) Look at the adult's actions and break them up into their 
component muscular parts plus develop some representation 
of how the bits fit together. 
(2) Identify the component muscular actions in his own body. 
(3) Assemble these into a coherent plan of action, then, 
either(4a) Where the child is observed to imitate by successive 
approximations, he operates his plan and then compares, 
noting differences, his actions and the adult's. 
Then he must incorporate the information' back into 
step (3) and repeat (4a) until he is 'happy' with 
the match. 
or (4b) Where the child is observed to produce a successful 
imitation, he must be able to represent how his plan 
would look in operation and compare it to the adult's 
without actually operating his plan. 
Several points emerge from this explanation. 
(1) Whereas in item 2, the child is involvgd in integrating familiar 
complex actions into even larger units, here he needs to be able 
to unpack his own actions into smaller components and reassemble 
them to form new complex actions. 
(2) The initiation of unfamiliar actions is a complex skill trat 
requires that the child can, as it were, stand outside himself 
and look at his own actions as objects of his perception. 
The explanation I've attempted here also implies that the child can, 
to a certain extent, represent the adult's actions as a system appart 
from himself. Between item 2 and item 3 in this scale, much seems to 
have happened which the scale does not reflect. 
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Item 4. Imitation of Unfamiliar Gestures Invisible to the Infant 
Administration - The adult engages the child's interest and performs 
an unfamiliar action which the infant cannot see 
himself doing unless he had a mirror, e. g. pulling 
his ear lobes, putting his finger on his tongue, 
opening and closing his mouth etc. 
The infant's response is observed after several 
demonstrations. The procedure is repeated for 
3 or 4 gestures. 
Criterion The child passes this item if he makes some 
consistent attempt to imitate the adult's actions. 
Whether he succeeds or not is not at issue. 
Explanation Ignoring for the moment the fact that the criterion 
only demands that the child makes a consistent attempt 
to imitate rather than succeed, the main point is 
that a concealed imitation requires the child to be 
able to represent in some form how his actions would 
appear, from outside his body. In practice, this 
would involve that the child can perceive the 
equivalence between, say, the adult's tongue and 
his own. 
Where the child makes an attempt (though unsuccessful) 
to imitate the invisible gesture, what is demonstrated 
is that although he cannot actually solve the problem, 
he assumes that the problem is 'solvable. ' 
APPENDIX. 2. 
DAISY 
INTRODUCTION 
Daisy is a withdrawn and mute lady in. her late 50's, who has 
been a hospital patient for the past 40 years, foLLowing -an 
initial diagnosis of schizophrenia. It is not--known whether, the 
original schizophrenic process is still operating.. In 1952 a 
Leucotomy was performed but it is unclear what bearing this has 
on her present condition. 
Prior to the onset of her illness, Daisy appears, to have Led, 
_ an active and rich life, enjoying sport, dancing . and -, music. She 
was well educated and was employed as a clerical worker in the, 
civil service. 
Daisy is capable of some speech, andWill-on, raresoccasicns, 
utter a word or phrase. This appears to be. more , 
likely " to happen 
when she is angry. 
Over the past 12 months Daisy appears=to have progressed asý 
a result of sensitive and attentive management by nursing staff, 
e. g. she now feeds herself though still needs to be prompted to 
go and get her her food. 
INTERVENTION 
AIM 
The aim of my involvement with Dorothy was to explore and 
develope means of enabling her to enjoy social interaction such 
that she might begin to talk again. 
ASSUMPTION 
The assumption was made that Daisy found social interaction 
aversive because she had no control over any ensuing interaction. 
For example, if Daisy smiled and looked at someone, they would 
reciprocate and initiate further behaviours which she may or may 
not have been able to cope with. This uncertainty led to 
increased anxiety so her solution was to avoid giving any signals 
which initiated or maintained social interactions. 
PROGRAMME 
This assumption suggested that one way of helping Daisy was 
to give her an experience of very low level interactions which 
she could terminate if she so wished. Accordingly, I saw her 3-4 
sessions a week, usually of half hour duration and set about 
initiating a variety of games, which I felt that she could cope 
with, and responding to any signals of aversion that she gave. 
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A game which very explicitly followed this principle and 
which was used a great deal in the earlier sessions involved 
rhythmically tapping Daisy's chair and observing her eyes. If she 
looked away from me I would discontinue the tapping, if she 
lcoked in my general direction I would recomence the tapping. As 
the proportion of time spent looking in my general direction 
increased (this included occasional direct eye contact).. I moved 
closer to Daisy by tapping her hand. Again I employed her gaze 
direction as an indication of when I should discontinue and 
recommence my behaviour. Through such games Daisy gained 
increasing tolerance of physical contact and in a period of 8 
weeks responded to games such as being shouldered almost off the 
chair with hoots of laughter and would occasionally and very 
tentatively push back. 
Much of my interaction with Daisy involved my sitting with 
her and talking. Topics of conversation wereaLways problematic 
since her responses were minimal. In earlier sessions I drew 
sketches of her and made comments about her long eye lashes etc. 
Comments which she responded to tended to be about the here and 
now, e. g. the behaviour of other patients, programs on the T. V. I 
had introduced topics from her past such as references to her 
former ability to play the piano, but Daisy usually responded to 
these efforts by turning away. 
It was very noticeable that if I was talking to another 
person and one of them commente about what Daisy was doing, she 
would immediately desist and withdraw. 
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